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EDITORIAL

THIS July 1956 issue of PHILOSOPHY is the last number I shall have the honour of editing. It was in January 1926 that the first number appeared, so that I have been Editor of The Royal Institute of Philosophy's journal for over thirty years. I recall that in launching the journal those many years ago, I explained that it was necessary because a large number of the Members of the Institute which had been formed a few months earlier lived either in the provinces or abroad, and it was, therefore, essential to have a publication which would keep them in close touch with its activities. I sincerely hope it has succeeded in some measure in fulfilling this object. It has been a guiding principle in the general policy of the journal to aim at making philosophy as intelligible as possible to the well-informed reader. With this object in view, the Editor has done his best to provide certain articles in every issue capable of being understood and appreciated by every educated person. But it has also been a feature of the journal to include articles of special interest to the expert.

I find that in the first number of PHILOSOPHY the late Professor S. Alexander wrote on "Art and Science," the late Professor G. Dawes Hicks on "The Metaphysical Systems of F. H. Bradley and James Ward," the late Professor J. Arthur Thomson on "Different Kinds of Evolution," Professor Morris Ginsberg on "Emotion and Instinct," the late Professor John S. Mackenzie on "The Present Outlook in Social Philosophy," and the late Professor F. B. Jevons on "The Purpose of Philosophy." The same number also contained Abstracts of a course of lectures by Bertrand Russell on "Perception." Subsequent numbers were similarly honoured by many distinguished contributors who were living and active over a quarter of a century ago.

I desire to record my grateful thanks for the generous services

given by the many authors of articles, reviewers of books and writers of surveys over the long period I have been Editor of PHILOSOPHY. I am sure the Members of the Institute and other readers of the journal will wish to join with me in expressing gratitude and appreciation for all they have done to enable PHILOSOPHY to achieve in some measure the original aim set for it.

The Council has appointed Harry Burrows Acton, Professor of Philosophy at Bedford College, University of London, to be my successor as Editor of the Institute's journal. Professor Acton, as a member of the Mind Association and of The Aristotelian Society, will be well known to many teachers of philosophy in the various Universities of the Commonwealth and America, as well as to Members of the Institute who have attended his lectures from time to time, and read his occasional contributions in PHILOSOPHY; and perhaps also his book published last year entitled *The Illusion of the Epoch*. I am sure Professor Acton will receive the same generous treatment from all those concerned in the dissemination of a knowledge of philosophy, that it has been my privilege to enjoy for so many years.

When the Institute was founded in 1925, it was considered by at least some distinguished thinkers that philosophy was both *critical* and *constructive*. I do not know to what extent the present generation of British philosophers would allow that philosophy should be constructive as well as critical. Perhaps I may, therefore, be permitted in conclusion to quote a short passage from Whitehead's *Process and Reality* on this topic.

> "Philosophy will not regain its proper status until the gradual elaboration of categorical schemes, definitely stated at each stage of progress, is recognized as its proper objective. There may be rival schemes, inconsistent among themselves, each with its own merits and its own failures. It will then be the purpose of research to conciliate the differences. Metaphysical categories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious, they are tentative formulations of the ultimate generalities."[1]

[1] *Process and Reality*, pp. 10–11.

SYDNEY E. HOOPER.

PHILOSOPHY AND THE LIFE OF THE NATION[1]

The Rt. Hon. VISCOUNT SAMUEL, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.C.L., LL.D., D.Litt.

I.

THE over-all picture of the first half of this twentieth century shows that science has grown, religion has waned, and crude philosophies have brought great disasters upon mankind. The age is perplexed and anxious—unsure as to the very foundations of its civilization.

In this predicament where are we to look for help? To natural science, which has won so many triumphs? But science knows its own limitations: it teaches us to understand what things are, and how to handle them: it cannot tell us for what purposes, or how in general to conduct our lives. Religion ought to guide us. But the great institutional religions are ancient; they have developed formal theologies and complicated dogmas; they are all, in greater or less degree, in disagreement with one another and at variance with modern science: so that, to many, the religions seem to have little relation to the realities of present-day life. They no longer govern the daily thoughts and actions of the generality of mankind.

Philosophy remains: and there if anywhere, now if ever, we might look for our guide. But will anyone say that, taking the world over, philosophy is in fact playing that part, is influencing, whether directly or indirectly, the thinking of ordinary men and women and the course of events?

Meantime we have seen what we have seen. The same generation that has witnessed, in scientific discovery, the mind of man rising to its highest achievements, has been plunged, by two great wars, into the lowest depths of barbarism. It is true that, in the working of our social systems, the western world has made in this century a striking advance; but that advance has not extended over the larger part of the globe; and everywhere, shaken by constant class conflicts, social structures are dangerously unstable.

In order to explain the background to this lecture—and as it may be my valediction—I would venture to begin with a personal note. My long life has covered a considerable part of this period of rapid change, most of it near the main current of events. I was born in the middle of the reign of Queen Victoria, and the first half of my adult life was spent in politics and administration. In

[1] Lecture delivered to the Members of The Royal Institute of Philosophy and guests at The Institute of Education, University of London, on 7th February, 1956.

philosophy I was interested only in so far as it included ethics, and in ethics mainly as the foundation for politics. In Parliament, in 1902, and soon after in the Government, I was in the midst of the violent political controversies of the years that preceded the first world war; and in the crisis of 1914 when peace and war were in the balance, and afterwards during most of the war itself. It was a testing-time for beliefs and principles, but it gave no room for the quiet pursuit of philosophical studies.

The war over, I was invited, unexpectedly, to be the High Commissioner for Palestine under the newly established British Mandate. I accepted that post gladly, as a great privilege, because I believed, as I still believe, that the present age offers the possibility of a re-birth of that religious impulse which twice in the Holy Land —first, three thousand years ago, and again two thousand years ago—had given to mankind the most powerful spiritual leadership it has ever known.

For five years I was in Palestine—1920 to 1925—helping to lay the foundations of a modern state in what had been a derelict province of the decadent Turkish Empire. Government House was situated, temporarily, in a building on the Mount of Olives itself. From my garden I could see the Dome of the Rock on Mount Zion; covering—however uncertain may be some of the Palestinian sites —the bare rock which undoubtedly was the altar of the Temple, planned by David and built by Solomon—the first Temple of the monotheistic religion in the world. Close by rose the dome of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Around the whole assemblage of domes and towers still stands the circuit of the walls that had borne the brunt of so many sieges; had seen the rise and fall of so many masters; and now—perhaps the strangest event in all that history—had come, at least for the moment, under the rule of the people of a small island in the far-off Atlantic.

But this was not the Jerusalem that had been foretold—the City set upon a hill, to be a beacon of light to all the peoples. Far from that, I found it a focus of incessant dispute and frequent conflict—between nation and nation, race and race, faith and faith, sect and sect. Worst of all, these antagonisms were held—and by everyone—to be natural and inevitable. Always it had been so and it would be so always. A hundred years hence, or a thousand years, there would still be Christians, Jews and Moslems, Catholics, Orthodox and Protestants, all in conflict with the others and each claiming divine authority.

First the moral shock of the Great War—that such an event in the history of mankind should have been possible in our time; and now this experience, this scene of religious strife and turmoil in the one place held holy by all the western nations, while the world

was crying out for moral leadership—these changed the course of my life. I felt compelled to stand back, to examine afresh the ideas that were causing this state of things, and to review my own.

2.

During the next ten years I tried to make good some of my deficiencies in philosophy, to keep up to date with the developments in science, and also to make some inquiry into present religious trends, both eastern and western. I was not specially concerned with the successive systems propounded by the great philosophers, ancient or modern, since each in turn had been refuted by the criticisms of the next. And it was not my business to specialize in logic, linguistics, semantics, or that kind of metaphysics that Michelet defined as "the art of bewildering oneself methodically." I kept to my single track, guided by one very simple principle. It is this. Men's actions are governed by their ideas: right ideas lead to good actions, and good actions bring welfare: wrong ideas lead to bad actions, and bad actions bring suffering and disaster. If we wish to discover the causes of our calamities, we must first clear our minds as to what is to be included as welfare; and then determine what ideas are right and what are wrong, guided in this by experience of past results and by the possibilities of present conditions.

In spite of frequent distractions from the political side, I have now been pursuing my single track for thirty years, "following the argument whithersoever it may lead." This resulted in a book, first published in 1937, called *Belief and Action: an Everyday Philosophy;* followed in 1951, by a short book, *Essay in Physics*, in the province where empirical philosophy overlaps with theoretical physics. Another will soon be ready for the press: its subject is expressed in its title—*In Search of Reality.*

It was really Einstein who, though he was unaware of it, had been the origin of this last. I had been honoured by his friendship for many years. He had been interested in my *Essay in Physics*, and wrote me a long letter, stating his views on the relation between relativity physics and realist philosophy; this he allowed me to print as an addition to my essay: and he was good enough also to suggest my coming to see him in Princeton, if opportunity offered, so that what appeared to be a fundamental divergence of view might be discussed better than by correspondence. This proved to be possible in the following year. It was a long conversation, devoted to that single point. But the divergence persisted.

The general view I had reached as to what should be the main purpose of philosophy in the present situation, has been so well

expressed by Professor K. R. Popper—the author of that excellent book *The Open Society and its Enemies*—that I venture to quote, with his permission, some passages from a recent paper by him. "Ever since the rise of Hegelianism," he says, "there has existed a dangerous gulf between science and philosophy . . . Genuine philosophical problems are always rooted in urgent problems outside philosophy, and they die if these roots decay . . . What matters is neither methods nor techniques—nothing but a sensitiveness to problems, and a consuming passion for them; or as the Greeks said, the gift of wonder." His contention is "that philosophy is deeply rooted in non-philosophical problems; . . . and that these roots are easily forgotten by philosophers who 'study' philosophy, instead of being forced into philosophy by the pressure of non-philosophical problems."

What is this but Socrates in the market-place over again, but with him now Francis Bacon, fresh from the House of Commons and the Law Courts?

Whitehead said much the same when, speaking of education in philosophy, he wrote: "The pupils have got to be made to feel that they are studying something, and are not merely executing intellectual minuets."

3.

Let me digress now for a moment to offer a parable.

I imagined the other day an undergraduate, taking the Oxford Greats School, having a dream on the night before his Finals began. He dreamt that, entering the hall at the appointed hour, he found it, to his surprise, filled by all the Philosophy Professors of the University and Tutors of the Colleges: he himself was expected to mount the dais and conduct the examination. Grasping at once the situation, this he did, and thus addressed them: "You will observe that there is no printed examination paper on your desks; and only a single sheet of foolscap, instead of a copy-book, to write on. That is because there is only one short question at this examination, which I will now dictate and ask you to write down. It is as follows—'What is it that philosophy really wants to say?' " Thereupon he left the platform. Time passed in a flash. He was sitting next at the table. On it lay a heap of foolscap sheets: all of them closely written, on both sides, with much interlining, many erasures, and insertions of second and third thoughts, with post-scripts all round the edges. He announced: "These papers are all illegible and incomprehensible, and are all rejected. You will return in the afternoon, when you will be expected to answer the same question, but on one side of the paper only. And I would warn you that anyone who fails a second time will at once be dismissed from

the post he now holds." On that he woke up, with a happy sense of inward satisfaction.

Now I know that in treating so irreverently the professional philosophers I am obviously setting a trap for myself; for one of them might fairly ask—"Well, what would you yourself have written on one side of that sheet of foolscap?" I have only an amateur status, and no post to be dismissed from—except that of President of this Institute: and, after twenty-five years, it is high time that that was done in any case. So I will try to anticipate that challenge—not indeed on a sheet of paper, but by occupying half an hour of your time. And if what follows seems over-condensed, and, being deprived of most of the arguments, facts, illustrations and authorities that might be given in support, may appear to be dogmatic, self-assertive, and unconvincing, let me plead in defence that it is not easy to give the gist of thirty years in thirty minutes.

4.

The position that Einstein took up, in its essentials, was this. We have no knowledge of the universe except through our own mental concepts. What we take to be physical reality is merely a construction of our own. Mathematics consists also of concepts of the human mind. The only way from the one to the other—from mental concepts to reality—is (and I quote his words) "a way of conscious or unconscious intellectual construction, which proceeds completely free and arbitrarily." Einstein does not propose to raise mathematics to the same status of reality as the physical universe of our experience: but the effect of what he says would be to reduce our universe to a status of unreality like that of mathematics. In the conversation at Princeton Einstein said—and repeated with emphasis—"We may *hope* that an objective universe exists; we may even *believe* that it exists; but we do not *know* it." I differed, and he asked me to give my reasons. Briefly they are these.

For hundreds of millions of years, before man existed, an objective universe, of some sort, existed. Successive generations of astronomers, geologists and anthropologists have found proof of this: no scientist would dispute it. Existence comes first: human perception, if it comes at all, comes after: what is prior cannot be a construct of what is later. Nor is it the case that we have to depend only on our own sense-data for knowledge that an objective universe exists. Animal experience proves it also; plant experience as well. The birds I see in my garden, busy with their own affairs in their own section of our common world, and the trees and the grass give evidence that is as valid as my own. The individual existence of any of these confirms the real existence of a universe that is

objective to all. Lifeless nature also confirms it. We cannot doubt that the firmament of stars, this sun, this globe, the phenomena of light and heat, are facts in themselves, are in no way constructs of our own minds. The conclusion must be that an objective universe exists; independent of man; real in its own right. We were born into that universe; we live in it, die in it, our fathers before us, our children after us. We are not to be persuaded that we do not know whether it exists or not.

I said just now "a universe of some sort." When we ask "of what sort?"—that is a different matter, which ought to be dealt with separately. Then indeed we pass from the objective to the subjective. Then we come to consider, not things as they are in themselves, but our own perceptions and interpretations of them. Critics of realism point to the many past errors in man's interpretation of what he sees and feels—the earth flat, and fixed, with the firmament circling round it; eclipses of the sun portents from the gods; matter consisting of hard, small, indivisible atoms; a hundred other examples could be given. How, then, can we feel any confidence in whatever ideas about reality may happen to be current among conscious beings on this particular planet at this particular time?

The realist will agree as to the facts: he will admit that they forbid full confidence in any single scientific theory now accepted. But it does not follow that, because many beliefs have proved to be false, none are valid, and that the word "real" has no meaning. The vast structure of scientific fact, taken as a whole, stands firm under the test of experience, and proves the contrary.

When we set out in a search for reality and the critic asks—How do you know that there is any such thing?—we can offer that answer. We must differentiate between the cosmos itself and man's perceptions and interpretations of it. The one is objective; the other is subjective. The one is given; to bring the other into accordance with it is the unending task of philosophy and science.

That, then, we take as our starting-point. We do not get far, however, before we are met by another objection. With many nineteenth-century philosophers realism was discredited because it was identified with materialism. But that does not follow. One can be against materialism and still be a realist. In fact a realistic view of the universe about us will oblige us to believe that life and mind are an integral part of it: and further, that they are something other than matter: that conscious human actions, and the events of history, are not to be explained in the terms of physics and chemistry.

I think it will be generally agreed that our greatest contemporary neurologist was Sir Charles Sherrington. He spent a long lifetime

in the experimental study of the brain and nervous system, and in expressing his conclusions in works of admirable comprehensiveness and lucidity. This question of a basic distinction between life and mind on the one hand and matter on the other comes to a point in the problem, now actively discussed, of the mind-body relation. On this Sherrington wrote: the search, in any scheme of physical energy, "for a scale of equivalence between energy and mental experience arrives at none . . . The two, for all I can do, remain refractorily apart. They seem to me disparate; not mutually convertible, untranslatable the one into the other . . . Strictly we have to regard the relation of mind to brain as still not merely unsolved, but still devoid of a basis for its very beginning." I had the advantage of Sherrington's acquaintance in his later years and used sometimes to visit him at Eastbourne, where he was living. The talk usually came round to this subject, and I would support the dualistic position. I well remember, during a walk once along the sea-front, when Sherrington stopped, laid his hand on my arm, and said, summing up the whole matter, "It is perhaps no more improbable that our being should consist of two fundamental elements than that it should rest on one only."

In the works of six of the more recent writers on this subject which I have consulted, I find that all of them agree that science has so far not been able to bring mental phenomena into the materialist framework.

As to life and its reality, let me give an illustration. Suppose you are walking in a park in the autumn and pick up a fallen chestnut; perhaps near by you see what may be another chestnut; it is much the same in shape, size and colour; you pick it up and find that it is a pebble. Now look at the two as they lie side by side in the palm of your hand. The pebble is what it is; and left for a hundred years it will so remain. But the chestnut is not only what it now is. Let the conditions be favourable, and it will gather materials and activity from the soil, from the rain and water-vapour in the air, from the light and heat of the sun. In time it will become a great spreading tree; and that tree may produce, year after year, hundreds of other chestnuts, every one of them with the same potentialities. This potentiality is as much a part of the chestnut as the molecules, atoms and particles of which it is composed. Look well at the two as they lie in your hand—the pebble and the chestnut: you will see all the difference that there is between a not-living universe and a live one.

As to the reality of mind—here is a little incident that happened not long ago. A group of British Members of Parliament went to Russia, and at a social gathering Mr. Gromyko, in the course of conversation, said to one of them, Mr. Christopher Mayhew, "But

what is your own philosophy? Is that glass I am holding real or not?" Here was a typical example of the confusion that persists between materialism and realism. Mr. Mayhew, who tells the story, does not give his reply. But he might well have said, "Certainly I am a realist, Certainly your glass is real. But let me ask in return —'Do you consider the present conversation between us as also a reality?' " If Mr. Gromyko were to say "No," then obviously it would have been absurd to continue discussing the matter, and they would have done better to turn the conversation—if there was a conversation—to something else—if there was anything else. But if he were to say—"Yes; I agree that a conversation such as this is a real event in a real universe"—then he would have disposed of his own materialism; for it cannot be doubted that any discussion, with arguments on one side and on the other, is not material; cannot be analysed or measured by the methods of physics and chemistry, or be described in their terms. So with the novelist shaping his story, the sculptor carving his statue, the musician composing his piece, or any of the higher activities of the human mind.

Life and mind, then, are real elements in a factual universe. We know that they are real because we see what they do. They are not the less real because we cannot say what they are. And if minds are real, then mental phenomena, processes, events, must likewise be real. In other words ideas in individual human minds are part of the world of reality. Surely that cannot be doubted. Are they not embodied in our ways of life, in the creeds of Churches, the programmes of parties, the policies of nations? Do they not determine personal conduct and the course of history?

But because we rank ourselves definitely with the opponents of materialism, it does not follow that we have gone over to the opposite camp, to the Platonic idealists. The ideas that we have been speaking of are localized in living persons, and may be given objective effect. They are not philosophic abstractions—Truth, Beauty, Goodness or the like: not imaginary "forms," following fictitious "patterns," laid up in a hypothetical "heaven." Nor are they of the order of dreams, illusions, myths, creations of the imagination, with no objective consequences.

Bearing in mind that distinction, we may perhaps leave behind this perennial controversy and pass on to matters of more direct concern to our present inquiry.

6.

As ancient as the controversy between Realism and Idealism is the conflict of Freewill and Determinism, and usually as inconclusive. But it is vital to resolve it if we are to have any ground for asserting

individual moral responsibility, if we are to have a rational basis for any system of ethics.

The discussion is often inconclusive because the problem itself has been presented on false assumptions. The very term "Freewill" is misleading. To say that our decisions and actions are "free" suggests that they are uncaused and unconditioned. This leads to much learned debate on the nature of Causation. It is asked: "A cause A is followed by an effect B: how does that come about: and how, in such a process, can novelty ever appear?" The reply may be simple. This A–B relation never in fact occurs. Never in the history of the universe has any event been the consequence of some single event; always of a combination of a number of events. When something happens and we try to find why, we usually mislead ourselves by looking only for the one abnormal and final event which completes the combination and brings about the result; taking for granted the many normal events that have combined to create the situation itself.

To give an example—let us say a man smells in the night an escape of gas: he takes a box of matches and goes to look for it; there is an explosion and he is killed. The coroner's inquest finds that his own action was *the cause* of the death; and that is sufficient for all practical purposes. But anyone could write down a long list of previous events which are not taken into account because they belong to the usual state of things, although if any one of them had been absent this accident could not have occurred. For instance—the existence of coal and of the mining industry; the use of an explosive gas to light our houses; the fact that this house was lighted by gas and not electricity; the leak itself, due to some defect or negligence; the man having a box of matches at hand and not an electric torch, and his not knowing better than to use them—had any one of these factors been missing the event would not have happened: the moment they all came together, the explosion took place. The causality lay in the combination. And so it is with every event, of every kind.

There is therefore no mysterious "Law of Causation" that makes things happen, and that needs to be described, defined and explained by philosophers. It is a question merely of succession: when the prior events are such that the combination of them will produce a certain result, then, that combination being effected, that result will ensue, and if not, not.

There is, however, one law—or principle, or fact, name it what you will—which is of the essence of the matter; it is usually termed the Law of the Uniformity of Nature. This asserts that, if a certain combination of causes has produced a particular effect on one occasion, then the same combination on any other occasion, if it

is precisely the same, will always produce the same result. Like causes produce like effects.[1] There is no ground for supposing that causation in this sense applies everywhere else, but not to human decisions and actions. Acts of will, then, are not uncaused. It also cannot be contended that the will is "free" in the sense of unconditioned. It is evident that heredity and environment, "nature and nurture," always come in. The body and mind of the person who wills depend upon his ancestry, upon the country he lives in, the education he has had, the social atmosphere he breathes. Take all that away, and he would not be what he is, and what he is determines what he does. We have learned also that heredity includes primitive animal instincts, deep-seated in the subconscious mind, but continually irrupting into the conscious. How futile then—we are told—it is to think that any of our actions is really spontaneous, that this supposed freedom is anything more than a pathetic illusion.

This description of the conditions cannot be disputed—so far as it goes. But it is incomplete, and that incompleteness makes it invalid. Another factor is present, and not to be ignored, which changes the whole situation.

Consider the human infant. Beginning from a single fertilized cell, at birth it becomes a separate entity, but it is still passive and helpless. A year later, five years later, ten years, it has passed through stages of physical growth; its parents watch the child developing, as they say, "a mind of its own." In maturity the adult possesses an independent power to choose and will to act. This has not come at a particular moment as some miraculous gift: it comes gradually and late, but as easily and normally as seeing or hearing, walking or talking; it is as real as hands or feet.

The principle that every event results from a combination of

[1] A school of present-day physicists, however, has challenged this. On account of certain difficulties that have arisen in laboratory experiments relating to the structure and mechanics of the atom, they have preferred to abandon causation altogether and to accept Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty, with "Chance," or "Probability," as the basic factor in nature. It is, of course, impossible to go into this question here. I can only recall that the two greatest theoretical physicists of our time—Einstein and Max Planck—while not denying the uncertainty that attaches to those experiments, definitely rejected Heisenberg's deduction, while Rutherford never accepted it. It is interesting to note that another physicist of international fame, M. Louis de Broglie, has stated recently that, while for twenty-five years he had been faithful, in his books and lectures, to the indeterministic view of Heisenberg and Bohr, he now believes that the whole question must be re-examined. (*The Revolution in Physics*, pp.–221, 237. Pub. by Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954). Most philosophers have never been persuaded by the mathematical physicists to abandon causality and the uniformity of nature in favour of uncertainty and probabilities.

prior events, holds good here also. The working of the physical universe, the activities of the surrounding society, the characteristics that have been inherited by the individual, including those in his own subconscious mind—all come in. But there has been added something new, different, unique—his own autonomous will. This takes a place as yet another cause, inside the vast complex of causation. What has happened is not an aggregation—so much heredity, so much environment, education, subconsciousness, spontaneity—added together like a sum in arithmetic. It is a combination, like a chemical compound, not a mixture. And the product is as different from its constituents as the water you drink from a glass is different from the hydrogen and oxygen that compose it. We are bound to recognize that here is another ingredient—universal, familiar, and real in its own right. Abandon, if you like the ambiguous term Freewill; speak instead of "the power of choice"—which is what is really meant—and you will see that this supposed insoluble problem need no longer trouble us. Into the centre of the scene steps the human person, with a conscious mind that perceives, remembers, imagines, and then reflects, chooses and acts. Living with others in a community, this power to choose and to act carries with it, in his own eyes and in theirs, a moral responsibility. An ethical philosophy centred on the person finds here a firm basis.

Our path, seeking reality, has now led us into the broad fields of ethics and of social welfare and personal conduct. It brings us to the Moral Law.

7.

Morality did not originate at particular dates when the great religions were established and their codes formulated. Beginning far back in the family life of simian men, it developed in the Stone Ages into the habits and customs of the clan, the tribe, and later the nation. As the centuries went by, prophets, priests and sages shaped it into the moral law we have today.

Whatever makes for the welfare of the individual and of the community—and in the long run the two are identical—is morally right. The elements in welfare are many—physical, mental, spiritual, emotional. They include the practice of right living itself; so they include what we term the virtues—honesty, truthfulness, kindness, self-sacrifice, and the rest. These are essential to right living; they come to be valued and pursued as ends in themselves. All this makes up the content of ethics: it has evolved under the stress of age-long experience. It is evolving still.

So much for the content, but what of the "sanction of ethics?" Why should we do what is right, when it is easier, or pleasanter, or more advantageous to do what is wrong?

Again, it is not a question of *a sanction* but of many sanctions. They may be seen to be of two kinds. Some are internal, within the mind of the individual; some are external. The first arise from his own power of choice; his own principles and conscience; his own self-discipline; his own character. The others are brought to bear by the environment; by the influence of schools and Churches, of institutions of all kinds; by the laws of the State; by the pressure of public opinion.

We come here to the heart of the matter. We have set out to find the causes in order to prevent their recurrence. We find them—obvious enough—in the wrong-doing of persons and of communities, sometimes through error, sometimes through bad intent. The Moral Law is as real as the Common Law: and both are constantly being broken. The working of our institutions, from the State downwards, is faulty. Everyone, looking around, sees clearly these mistakes and follies, these vices and crimes. Everyone has suffered from the wars. And everyone knows that if all this were otherwise, if the moral law were better observed, the evils that have afflicted us would diminish, and perhaps slowly disappear. Why is this not happening; or if happening at all, only too slowly? Evidently because the sanctions of the moral law are not strong enough to be effective. Those sanctions—the self-discipline of the individual and the influence of the society—are largely a question of social climate, of the social atmosphere. This is basic to the rest of what I have to say.

The climate of a society depends upon the ideas that are prevalent at the time. Ideas are disseminated from one to another, mainly by speech and writing. Civilization has developed the arts of language and literature. Oratory and drama, poetry and prose, have grown up through the centuries. The modern world adds the techniques of the newspaper, broadcasting and the cinema. Ideas are communicated also by the visual arts—painting, sculpture, architecture, and by music. All these influence the intellect, and the emotions.

These powerful agencies, affecting here and now, day by day, the opinions and behaviour of tens of millions—how far is the atmosphere that they are creating wholesome, how far is it tainted? The novel and the press, the cinema and the theatre, how far are they raising the civilization of our age, how far are they debasing it? If the mental air is polluted, how can the mind remain clean?

Noxious tendencies have always existed, and they have been countered by other agencies, powerful through their wide appeal. Chief among them have always been the institutional religions. What is new in our present situation is the acknowledged weakening of the Churches. To most thoughtful observers this is a cause of

great anxiety. If this main support of the moral law continues to decline, and perhaps in the end to disappear, the effect upon the present and the coming generations may be grave indeed.

We turn then to consider, as the conclusion to our inquiry, what are recognized to be the two main causes of this decline:—the doubts, intensified by the two great wars, as to the belief, upheld by the theologies, in a Divine Providence, transcending the cosmos yet immanent in the world, just and merciful, omnipotent and benevolent, "a friend behind phenomena." And this has followed upon the contradiction between the new discoveries of science and many of the old dogmas of theology.

The first of these brings to a point what has always been one of the great philosophic problems. Besides the Problem of Reality—which is the question of the validity of human knowledge; and besides the Problem of Freewill, or power of choice, there is, always with us, what is termed the Problem of Evil.

8.

But once again we must demur to being offered as a starting-point an abstract generalization. The realist will not discuss a "Problem of Evil" because he must hold that there is no such thing. *Evils*—in the plural and with no capital *E*—are certain. But that there should exist, let loose upon the world, some vague maleficent Force, formless and mindless, to be symbolized in a goddess Kali of the Hindus, an Ahriman of the Zoroastrians, the Adversary of the Book of Job, the Devil of medieval Christianity, the Satan of Milton, or the Mephistopheles of Goethe—all this is emptiness—the fantasy of a nightmare. Neither the theologian nor the philosopher need spend time and energy in debating it. We can come at once to close quarters with the particular evils that afflict us, and the practical problems that they present.

It is necessary first to distinguish between two categories, raising different considerations. One consists of natural evils, outside the control of man: the other consists of the evils that we bring upon ourselves.

All we are and do, enjoy or suffer, depends at bottom on astronomical and geological conditions. The earth is a planet as well as a home. The stage of evolution that it has reached as a planet sometimes makes it unsafe as a home. Although normally the processes of nature are gradual and evolutionary, events occasionally occur that are sudden and catastrophic. An underlying rock-stratum slips a little, and up above we have a disastrous earthquake. A volcano erupts, Pompeii is destroyed. We have hurricanes and cyclones, droughts bringing famine, raging floods, strokes of lightning.

Apart from the natural evils there are those—and they are by far the larger part—that are the consequence of our own ignorance or misbehaviour, our own mistakes, vices, crimes. Here we link up with the conclusion that we reached on freewill, and personal responsibility. In so far as there is power of choice there is room for mistake. When we make mistakes we suffer for it; and when we suffer we speak of the existence of evil. The remedy lies in our own hands—to learn from experience not to make the mistakes again. So we are back in the field of practical affairs. The scene shifts from theology to ethics, politics, economics, technology; to the moral law, to personal responsibility.

When we speak, however, of "we" and "our," it is well to remember that it is not necessarily the sufferer himself who is at fault, either wholly or even partially. We have the advantages of living in a society, and we have also the disadvantages. Someone must have been at fault; but it may be someone else who has injured us, or some institution that has failed to act or has acted wrongly—a trade union, an employers' association, a Church, a Parliament, a State that attacks another or fails to resist a wanton attack upon itself.

But these institutions—what are they? Nothing else than the persons over again, multiplied, organized and co-operating. There could be no State if there were no citizens; no Church if no congregations and ministers; no newspaper press, cinema, radio, if no readers or audiences, causing the demand and determining the supply. Institutions are not entities, things in themselves, with a life of their own—the State of Hegel, the organism of Herbert Spencer, the culture of Spengler, the civilization of Toynbee. All these are only patterns, and there cannot be a pattern without some "stuff" that is being patterned. There can be no wave in the sea without the water, no sound-wave in the air without the atmosphere, no design in the wall-paper without the paper, no pattern in the dress without the cotton or the cloth. So with all social institutions. There is a stuff. It consists of human beings, and of nothing else. If the institution fails and evils ensue, the responsibility is theirs, for there is nowhere else that it can lie.

Let us not set a low value on the achievements of man in his age-long struggle against the evils that have encompassed him. The whole of science, the whole of civilization, speak to the contrary. And if it is true that they themselves have brought evils, and grave ones, that were unknown to primitive man, the balance of good, taking into account intelligence, knowledge, health, is heavily to his credit.

Even the category of natural evils is not clear-cut and unalterable. Civilized man may be able to advance even there. Vast

engineering works have changed the character of whole provinces, preventing drought and flood. If there are hurricanes at sea, we build ships large and powerful enough to outride the storm. We can even grasp the lightning and make it harmless. And against those other natural evils, the bacteria and viruses that bring diseases—microscopic, yet more formidable than the earthquake or the volcano—there man has won the greatest of all his triumphs. Plague and pestilence, and many diseases that had always been the scourge of mankind, have been almost eliminated; there are high hopes that many among the rest may yet be conquered.

Other calamities remain, arising from the physical character of the planet, which are far beyond the possibility of control. As to these we can only say—in the concluding words of one of the great Greek tragedies—"Lament no more: these things are so." But over all the rest of the vast range of mundane life, the field is open, the prospect hopeful, the future bright.

9.

I do not know that an empirical philosophy can bring us, with our present state of knowledge, much further, in our search for reality, than the line we have now reached. But it does not follow that this is the end of the road. We see it, vaguely, through a haze, stretching forward into an immense unknown.

We have been dealing, by the light of reason, with the perceived universe. But that cannot be all that there is; and reason is not the only faculty of the mind that can be enlisted. The universe that we see does not explain itself, cannot have created itself. We are bound to infer that there must be something else—not a figment invented to fill an intellectual vacuum; but real, of the same order of reality as the known cosmos. And the mind has also instinct, intuition, curiosity, imagination, emotion. Less reliable than reason, they may serve nevertheless to supplement it. There they are; active in mankind, helping to form ideas and to decide actions. They join together in Religion.

Religion seeks to catch the voice of Wordsworth's "All this mighty sum of things forever speaking." But in what language does it speak? That is the difficulty. When, in the practical world, something new appears—electricity, flying, nuclear energy—a new vocabulary quickly comes into being to describe facts and processes; it is based on terms we already had to denote matters more or less analogous. But that cannot be when we move into a sphere that is outside our experience altogether. Theologians find words like creation, infinity, eternity, omnipotence, omnipresence. But these words convey no significant meaning. When, rejecting mate-

rialism, we accepted the reality of life and of mind, we were obliged to say that we see what they do, but we do not know what they are. Accepting the reality of the Divine, we can say no other.

Nevertheless the emotions and intuitions of religion must find a means of expression and therefore must have an object. Philosophic ideas and terms are of little avail. "Religion," says Meredith, "has a nourishing breast: philosophy is breastless."

In the age when civilization arose in the valleys of the Nile, the Tigris and the Euphrates, where great armies could march and great kings gather power, it was natural for men to imagine deities like kings, only more so—their sway wider, their power more absolute, but still accessible through gifts and petitions. "The gods became," it has been said, "sublimated kings." This conception still has a place in various religions. A kind of courtiers' flattery survives: "When good befalls a man he calls it Providence, when evil Fate." All such ideas are crude and inadequate; but it is difficult to see, if Deity is to be spoken of at all, how the ascription of human qualities can be avoided, for we have no other vocabulary.

We have spoken of the value of religion as the stand-by of ethics, and the present danger that the social atmosphere may be worsened by its decline. It seems essential to maintain the religious outlook, religious moods, among the generality of mankind. Two thousand five hundred millions of men, women and children!—they are not philosophers; they are surrounded by every kind of temptation; they know their own limitations and deficiencies; they need something beyond and greater than themselves to sustain them, to satisfy their emotions.

Those who have attended some solemn ceremony in a noble church like Westminster Abbey, with its traditions of a thousand years of history, cannot fail to have been deeply moved by the poetic liturgy, the sublime music, the aspiration to righteousness. Ancient dogma is not the point of chief importance. A feeling of spiritual union with all the past and all the future, a sense of cosmic consciousness—it is that which is important.

So we come at the end to the necessity for a harmony between philosophy, science and religion. No one of them can rest in contradiction with the others. Theologies gradually change, from within: creeds evolve; the orthodoxy of one period in never quite the same as that of another; at the present time changes are proceeding, in some degree, almost everywhere. The teaching of science also changes, even in fundamentals: the twentieth-century trend against nineteenth-century materialism is significant. The synthesis of philosophy, science and religion may be achieved.

So modern man stands upon his planet—peering, through the haze, into the future.

WHAT DOES THE TERM "ETHICAL VALUE" REALLY DENOTE?

The Very Rev. the Rt. Hon. Professor R. CORKEY, M.A., D.Phil.

THE terms we use in putting forward arguments may be ambiguous. When this is the case, our reasoning, however strictly we adhere to formal syllogistic rules, is apt to be fallacious. Here is a familiar text-book example of such a faulty process of thought.

> This cat has one tail more than no cat.
> No cat has two tails.
> Therefore this cat has three tails.

Owing to the frequency with which the terms we use in everyday speech can be employed in a variety of senses, logicians have always been compelled to give some account of the meaning of terms. They have always been aware of many of the problems of "Semantics," as the study of symbols is called today.

In recent years attention has been called to the fact that occasionally a particular word, by reason of its associations, may tend to create, in the minds of those who use it, wrong impressions about the nature of the object it denotes. An example will indicate how this can happen. Ordinarily, when the predicate of a sentence is an adjective, it denotes a quality of the object named by the subject-term of the sentence. Consequently when someone says to us, "Jones is popular," we tend to take it for granted that the word "popular" denotes a quality in the character of Jones. This, however, is incorrect. The fact really denoted by the word is the fact that those who know Jones think well of him. In assuming thoughtlessly that his popularity is a personal quality—a constituent in his make-up—we have been misled by a linguistic idiom. Jones's popularity has its locus, not in him, but in the minds of those who know him.

Now a number of philosophers have of late assumed, too hastily I think, that a careful determination of the precise character of the objects denoted by the words we use, would enable us to resolve all the philosophical problems that have perplexed thoughtful people throughout the ages of the past. In particular, it is claimed that the difficulties men have had in interpreting ethical and moral judgments would disappear, if we attended more carefully to the so-called "function"[1] of the words we use in such judgments. We may find, it

[1] The word "function" is appropriate when used to describe the distinctive purposes for which we employ different kinds of sentences. The "function" of an indicative sentence, e.g. is to make a statement about something. Imperative sentences, however, have a different function. They are not used to make statements about anything, but in order to get things done. When,

is said, that our intention, in expressing ethical and moral opinions, is not to denote objective qualities of, or facts about the things of which we speak, but to indicate subjective attitudes that we and other people have towards them. Just as unreflecting people have been misled, by the adjectival form of the word "popular," so, it is alleged, many philosophers in the past have, in a similar way, been tempted to suppose that when we say, "This situation is good," we mean to affirm the reality of some quality of "ethical goodness" in the state of affairs before our minds. But, it is now thought by many, that the function of the word "good," i.e. our real intention in using it, is not to *denote* an objective quality in the situation, but merely to express, or denote, our subjective approval of it, or perhaps the approval of people generally.

Now if this novel "semantic" interpretation of our everyday ethical and moral judgments is correct, we shall obviously be compelled to accommodate ourselves as best we can to a purely subjectivist theory of morality. The good in which we believe, and which we strive to realize for ourselves and others, consists, according to this theory, merely of the things of which we, as individuals or as groups, approve, and are ready to commend. It will be impossible for us any longer to entertain the age-long opinion that some kinds of experiences, such as happiness, are really good, and that, other things being equal, the greater good, so far as we have real knowledge of it, ought always to be chosen in preference to the less. On this subjectivist assumption there will be no means available to us for discovering whether our ethical opinions about particular *situations* have been really wise or foolish; or whether any of our moral convictions about *what ought to be done*, are truly rational or irrational.

In considering this question of the function of our ethical judgments (i.e. as to the objectivity of what is denoted by such words as "ethical value" and "moral worth") I shall, for the sake of clarity, restrict my attention for the moment to what I call "*ethical* value,"[1] i.e. the value we seem able to recognize in some objective human *situations* rather than in others. The question of the objective status of the *moral* worth in some forms of *conduct* is another and more complex problem.

Let us take, as a typical example of such an ethical value, the happiness manifest in a group of healthy, innocent, school-children, playing together in their leisure time in a game which they all

however, we speak of the "function" of a substantive or adjectival term in an indicative sentence, the word is not so apt as the logician's word "denotation."

[1] It should be noted that, contrary to common usage, I restrict the use of this term to non-voluntary intrinsic values. *Moral* value, on the other hand pertains only to good will and its acts.

obviously enjoy. Now if for the moment we limit our attention to that determinate situation, *as thus presented*, and judge of the goodness or badness of that perceived state of affairs, we would, I think, agree that, in respect at least of the children's happiness, the state of affairs is as it "ought to be." We seem to be able to see, as if by sense perception, that their enjoyment is in itself good; that it possesses ethical value; and that this ethical value is objectively "there," to be seen by any normally minded person who may witness the event.

I am here assuming that we can, at will, restrict our attention to particular determinate human situations, such as that which I have described, and I am taking it for granted, as I have indicated, that it is often possible to recognize the ethical character of such an isolated fragment of our social environment, in so far at least as the physical and psychological facts there present are known to us. Otherwise, in my opinion, we could never form any reasonable ethical or moral judgment about anything. It ought to be noted, however, that it is not possible to form a reasonable opinion about *our duty* towards such a situation merely on the basis of the facts immediately presented to us. To discover our duty in regard to any state of affairs, we have to take into account not merely the details of the situation here and now, but also the characteristics of the results that may accrue from it, in so far as these can be reasonably forecast. A games-master, e.g., who was responsible for looking after the health of these children, and who was aware of the danger to some of them, of over-exertion, might well be able to recognize duties towards the group which would not be felt by a mere on-looker who saw only the immediately apparent facts. The recognizable *ethical value* of a specific, determinate situation, as such, is one thing; our *moral obligations* in regard to it are quite another. We can often have a degree of certainty about the first, which we cannot have about the second. We discover the first, if at all, by immediate perception. We come to a knowledge of the second, in large part, by forecasting what may emerge from the present.

The question I now wish to consider is, What precisely is denoted by the term "ethical value." What does it really affirm about the experience of pleasure? What is its function in the sentence, "Pleasure is an ethical value"? Five different answers have been given to this question. (1) It was assumed, e.g., by the earlier hedonistic utilitarians, that "pleasure" and "ethical value" are identical notions. They mean the same thing. (2) Others, following G. E. Moore, have held that this value "resides in" pleasure, but is not identical with it. It is a "non-natural" quality of it, as distinct from its merely factual qualities. (3) The term, according to certain ethical relativists, denotes not anything objective about pleasure itself, but merely the fact that the speaker, and others, "approve of" it as a factor in

experience. The "function" of the term is to express or denote our *subjective* approval of pleasure, rather than an *objective* quality of it. (4) A fourth interpretation given to the expression, e.g. by Sir David Ross, is based on the theory that, while pleasure in itself has, strictly speaking, no intrinsic value, nevertheless "the innocent pleasures of one man are for any other a worthy object of satisfaction";[1] and they possess a derived value on that account. In reality, therefore, on this theory, it is the sense of satisfaction one has in contemplating the pleasures of another that is denoted by the term.

(5) A fifth view is that the term, when so used, denotes neither an objective quality as such, nor a merely subjective attitude or decision, but *a recognizable fact about* pleasure (and, as I think, about certain other specific qualities of experience that do not concern us now) the fact, namely, that where conscious experience exists, there pleasure, as a quality of that experience "ought to be," other things being equal. In and by itself, pleasure is "good-making" in that sense. When it unmistakenly emerges in a conscious experience hitherto devoid of it, the experience is directly recognized to have become in a fuller degree more as it ought to be, other things being equal. As a consequence, the quality of pleasure, if, when it emerges in a particular determinate state of affairs, supplants feelings of pain, then the situation is directly recognized to have been transformed in some degree from being ethically bad to being ethically good, other things being equal.

It will not be necessary, in considering these various interpretations of "ethical value," to discuss many of the problems that inevitably arise in making a general outline of moral philosophy.

1. If we assume, as I do, that happiness in the lives of others has intrinsic value, and may in some circumstances give rise to moral obligations, we need not examine here the claims of various other qualities of experience to be also included in the class of value-qualities. (2) Nor need we consider whether we have ever a right, or a duty, to seek our own pleasure; provided it be admitted that, occasionally at any rate, we have a duty to seek the pleasure of others. (3) Nor will it be necessary to enter into the merits of a quasi-deontological theory, such as that of Ross, provided we agree, as Ross does,[2] that sometimes it is the perception of intrinsically good ends that awakens in us a sense of moral obligation. (4) Nor, finally, will we be required to examine the difficult problems that arise when, in seeking to discover our duty, we have to "weigh"

[1] Ross: *Foundations of Ethics*, p. 279.

[2] E.g., op. cit., p. 67, "Yet even if Utilitarianism is not true, it is still the case that it is *one* of our main responsibilities to produce as much good as we can, so that the question whether pleasure is the only good remains a very important question."

values against other values and against disvalues, when all of these are present in the state of affairs we think it our duty to bring about. Any detailed consideration of these questions would be irrelevant to the more fundamental "semantic" problem I have in mind. The question I wish to examine is, what precisely is denoted by the term "intrinsically good" when we predicate it of any particular situation?

1. Moral philosophers now universally reject the first interpretation suggested above—that pleasure and intrinsic value mean the same thing, that the terms are synonymous. There are two serious objections to this theory.

(*a*) When we say, pleasure is good, or has ethical value, we plainly mean to say more than that pleasure is pleasant. Our intention is to affirm something about pleasure over and above its pleasantness as a mere psychological entity. This theory is based on what has been called "the naturalistic fallacy," on account of its identifying ethical value with a merely natural phenomenon.

(*b*) But there is a second, and from my point of view, a more obvious objection to this first interpretation. Pleasure in my opinion, is not the only basic intrinsic ethical value. There are other kinds of experience, e.g. goodwill, that equally possess this intrinsic value. The value itself must therefore be something that belongs equally to each of them—something distinct from their different psychological characteristics—and on account of which we group them together as a class by themselves. It was these facts that prompted G. E. Moore and others to suggest the second interpretation of ethical value.

2. Since basic ethical value somehow belongs to certain kinds of experience, and yet is not merely a constitutive or "natural" quality of these experiences, it seems fitting to Moore to speak of it as a "non-natural" quality. It is a "supervenient" quality; something that such an experience possesses over and above its merely factual psychological characteristics.

This terminology, however, is not satisfactory for several reasons. (*a*) "Non-natural" is a purely negative term and gives us no adequate information about the matter. (*b*) If it is meant to imply merely that this kind of value is "supervenient," the term is too wide; for it could equally well be applied to aesthetic and logical values, which are also supervenient. What we want to know is the *distinctive* characteristic of *ethical* value. (*c*) There is a further and more important objection. Without some further explanation it is difficult to understand why the perception of a "non-natural" quality should ever evoke in us a sense of duty, when the perception of a natural quality never has by itself this potentiality. It was pointed out by H. A. Prichard, in an article in *Mind* (January, 1912), that the recognition of another's pleasure as something possible of achievement, would not give rise to a sense of duty, unless this recognition

were accompanied by a knowledge of the fact that pleasure in itself is something that "ought to be." To explain this sense of duty we need, he wrote, "the further thesis that what is good ought to be."

Prichard, however, did not draw from his analysis of the facts the most obvious conclusion (essential, as I think, to any satisfactory objectivist theory of morals) that we have the capacity to recognize the fact that some things "ought to be." On the contrary, misled, as I shall try to show, by a subtle error that "ought refers to action and to action alone," he repudiated the thesis as false. Meantime my analysis of such judgments is that, not only do we have this capacity to recognize ethical facts, but that the knowledge this faculty gives us (i.e. the knowledge that some things in themselves "ought to be"), is an indispensable factor in any satisfactory explanation of how we come to a knowledge of our duty. Of this I shall have more to say later.

Now if, in coming to a knowledge of our duty, we are guided by an intuitive perception of the fact that pleasure in itself (and, as I think, some other qualities of experience) "ought to be," then the assumption of a non-natural quality somehow inherent in it would seem to be superfluous. It looks like a fifth wheel to the coach.

It is necessary, however, to point out that, while this *terminology* is unsatisfactory, there is no substantial difference, in ultimate ethical theory, between the views of those who use this terminology and the views I shall try to establish. There seems to me to be an indubitable objective reference in our everyday ethical judgments, and I think that those who affirm the reality of a non-natural ethical quality intend to indicate by this term just their belief in this objective reference in ethical judgments. They wished to make clear that the values we observe in some situations and not in others, are really "there," and can be seen by anyone who will adequately scrutinize the situation in question. Unhappily the negative term they used lent itself too easily to ridicule, and its use temporarily defeated the very purpose it was intended to serve.

3. The difficulty of explaining the link between observed (and apparently objective) values on the one hand, and our sense of duty on the other hand, has tempted some modern philosophers to put forward a new version of a very ancient theory. Basing their case largely on arguments derived from linguistic usage, these writers state that the terms we use in ethical discourse do not denote anything objective at all, but denote merely our subjective acceptance of some things as good, and our rejection of other things as bad. Prompted by our likes and dislikes, we ourselves decide to adopt towards some objects a pro-attitude, and towards other things an anti-attitude. They further affirm that all "ought-sentences" expressing moral obligation are ultimately derived from these prior

decisions of our own regarding ethical and moral values, and "can be only verified by reference to a standard or set of principles which we have by our own decision accepted and made our own."[1]

This doctrine is reminiscent of the theory of some of the existentialist philosophers, who hold that "What has value has value only because it is chosen."[2]

I regret that in the space here available it is impossible to do full justice to the various lines of subtle argument used in attempting to establish these conclusions. I am satisfied, however, in view of the following facts, that this theory gives a very incomplete and misleading account of what is involved in our ethical and moral judgments.

(i) Moral judgments are not based solely on decisions of our own or of others, but arise, in part, from directly recognizable *ethical* values. It is true that when I make a moral judgment, such as "I ought to relieve this man, so far as I can, of his unnecessary and useless pain," I have made at least two prior decisions about the observed state of affairs confronting me. (*a*) I have decided on the evidence of the attendant physical facts that it is within my power to give him some relief, and (*b*) I have also concluded, as a result of a rapid and wider survey of the whole state of affairs presented to me, that this is the best thing I can do at the moment. But neither of these judgments concern the most important factor in the situation making it evocative of a sense of duty.

In coming to these conclusions, and in particular in arriving at the second decision, I have implicitly taken it for granted that pain in itself is an evil thing, in the sense that it ought not to be; and in consequence, I have assumed that, other things being equal, I ought to endeavour to eliminate it from the situation presented. In view of this assumption it is obvious that the "ought-sentence" expressing what I take to be my duty, cannot be adequately verified without taking this assumption about the disvalue of pain into account. Therefore in attempting to verify this moral judgment of mine an essential question is, "Is this notion about pain in itself a notion based merely on a decision of my own, or is it real knowledge of an objective fact about it, which I (and all other rational beings) can directly apprehend?" I shall endeavour to show that the person who, when he adequately reflects upon the matter, does not know that pain, for its own sake, is an evil thing, is more than a little "eccentric." He is a public danger. We are therefore being told a good deal less than the whole truth when it is suggested that "ought"-sentences can be only verified by reference to "principles which we have by our own decision accepted and made our own."

[1] R. M. Hare: *The Language of Morals*, p. 196.
[2] Sartre: *Existentialism and Humanism*, p. 32.

(ii) This theory brings us no nearer a solution of the problem posed by Prichard in his 1912 article. A mere decision of my own about pain in itself, or my like or dislike of it, is no sufficient reason why I should do anything about it. When a writer concludes that, "the sort of principles a man adopts will, in the end, depend on his vision of the Good Life, his conception of the sort of world he desires (so far as it rests with him), to create,"[1] he is unwittingly, no doubt, attempting to derive a "moral ought" from a mere factual "is." A man's "vision of the Good Life" is here apparently identified with "the sort of world he desires to create."

On this assumption, his moral principles originate in his desires. But desires are mere psychological facts, and are in an ethical sense good or bad, according to whether the object desired is good or bad. A theory that identifies the ethical good with the mere objects of a man's desire does not explain morality. It explains it away.

(iii) The fact that "Value-terms have a special function in language, that of commending,"[2] does not logically require us to think that that is their sole function. When I make a value judgment about a piece of logical reasoning, and affirm that the conclusion drawn is just what it ought to be, I am indeed commending the argument, but I am also indicating that it is based on objective links of entailment that any other intelligent person can detect for himself. Similarly, there is no good reason for excluding an objective reference from ethical and moral "ought"—sentences. They both commend and affirm, and the commendation is based on what is affirmed.

(iv) These writers, in their use of illustrations, often fail to appreciate the significance of the difference between the meaning of good in the sense of "good in itself," and good in the sense of "efficient for doing a particular thing."[3] "Whenever we commend" (as, e.g., when we say 'That is a good motor-car') "we have in mind something about the object commended which is the reason for our commendation."[4] This statement overlooks the fact that, when the object commended is an *intrinsic* value, it is commended solely for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else. This is most obvious in the case of a *basic intrinsic ethical value* such as pleasure in itself, whose worth is ultimate and inherent in itself. When we ask, "Why is pleasure in itself good?" or, "Why ought I, other things being equal, to choose pleasure for others rather than pain?" I can think of no conceivable reason that could be given, that did not imply that pleasure in itself is good, in the sense that it ought to be, and that pain in itself is bad, and ought not to be. It is in keeping with this confusion of things

[1] P. H. Nowell-Smith: *Ethics*, p. 313.
[2] R. M. Hare: *The Language of Morals*, p. 91.
[3] A. C. Ewing: *The Definition of Good*, p. 113.
[4] R. M. Hare: Op. cit., p. 130.

that differ, that the same writer paradoxically repudiates the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental goodness.[1]

4. A fourth interpretation of the phrase "ethical value" is that it denotes neither an objective quality nor an objective fact, but signifies the subjective fact that we feel a sense of "rightful" satisfaction in contemplating the pleasures of others. Sir David Ross, e.g., while he recognizes conscientious acts as being good in themselves, denies that this is true of pleasure. "One has," he says, "only to reflect for a little on one's attitude towards a brave act—and towards a sensuous pleasure, to see how very different the two attitudes are." On this ground he thinks that "the sense in which, from the point of view of any man, the innocent pleasures of another are good is that it is right for him to feel satisfaction in them."[2] Much as I owe to Ross, I cannot but think that he has stumbled in his argument here. I shall only make two brief observations on this theory.

(*a*) It is possible to explain the difference in the attitude we adopt towards conscientious acts, as compared with that which we feel towards the pleasure of another, without denying the intrinsic value of the latter. A conscientious act has in it a distinguishing characteristic of its own, namely, voluntary effort for a desired end believed by the agent to be intrinsically good. It is this voluntary effort for a good end that wins our admiration. But, as I shall try to show, the pleasure of another, when considered in and by itself, is also recognized to have its own intrinsic value.

(*b*) Ross's attempt to define the intrinsic ethical goodness of pleasure in terms of "right" satisfaction, puts the facts in the wrong order. The word "right" is applied primarily and chiefly to acts, and denotes the effectiveness of the act to bring about an intended end. When the intended end is in itself good, and is believed by the agent to be good, the act is said to be "morally right." The pleasures of others have intrinsic worth, not because our satisfaction in contemplating them is right. On the contrary, our satisfaction in contemplating them is right because of their own intrinsic value.

5. A fifth and I think a better account can be given of the meaning of ethical value. The denotation of such terms as "ethical good" and "intrinsic ethical value" is neither a non-natural quality nor mere subjective approval or acceptance, but is a *unique recognizable fact about* certain specific qualities of experience recognized in the state of affairs judged ethically good. When, e.g., we say that the situation presented by the group of happy children (described in an earlier page) is "ethically good," or "as it ought to be," our attention has been arrested by the evident happiness in their experience; and we immediately and *ineluctably recognize* that the whole situation is,

[1] Op. cit., p. 139.

[2] Ross: *Foundations of Ethics*, p. 279.

in that respect, as it *ought to be*. Further, when we say that pleasure is an *intrinsic good*, we mean that, wherever conscious experience exists, this quality of experience ought to characterize the experience, *other things being equal*, i.e. it ought, in itself, or in its own right, to be.

The assertion that a specific quality of experience, such as pleasure, possesses intrinsic ethical value, is thus the statement of a unique sort of fact about it—an ethical fact—the fact that it has within itself *a unique right to be*, wherever there is conscious experience. It is by reason of our recognition of this ethical fact about certain specific qualities of experience that we approve of them, and call them good. Further, it is the reality of this fact that enables us to justify our moral conviction that, in certain circumstances, we ought to choose pleasure for others, rather than pain, No doubt people generally *desire* pleasure rather than pain, but no moral ought can be derived from mere desire. It can only be derived from a desire the object of which is recognizably good, or at least not evil.

The intrinsic value of pleasure is thus a unique, and directly recognizable objective relationship between it and conscious experience. Whether, in a particular human situation, it obtains or not, it is something which, other things being equal, ought to obtain, and which is recognized by us as such. There are plenty of universal relationships of other types, which we come to know by direct, or intuitive, perception. The convex and the concave aspects of a concave mirror is a case in point. The qualities of shape and size are always conjoined in fact, though we can, of course, mentally distinguish them. The primary notes in the musical scale seem to belong together. The conclusions that logically follow from valid premises cannot be repudiated at will. The relationship of logical entailment is absolute and universal. But none of these perceivable universal relationships is altogether analogous to the relationship denoted by the term "intrinsic ethical value." In one respect it is unique. In some circumstances our recognition of a quality possessing intrinsic ethical value can *in its own right*, i.e. by its mere presence, evoke in us a sense of categorical moral obligation. No other sort of quality or relationship can do that. It is as easy to think of a round square as it is to think that, other things being equal, one ought to strive to create pain for others, rather than pleasure. That fact is of fundamental significance for moral theory.

Several possible objections to this interpretation of ethical value demand consideration.

1. The most formidable criticism of this theory that I have met with is that suggested by H. A. Prichard, which may be summed up in two pregnant and closely related sentences.[1] First, "The word

[1] *Mind*, January, 1912.

'ought,' " he wrote, "refers to actions and to actions alone." Some writers who, following Prichard, reject the theory I have commended, satisfy themselves by merely repeating this dogmatic assertion in different words.[1] The second of Prichard's incisive statements is that, "An 'ought,' if it is to be derived at all, can only be derived from another 'ought.' " Several recent writers, who recognize that every *moral* ought is, in a sense, self-imposed; and who repudiate the notion of any objective ethical ought, find in this statement of Prichard's support for a purely subjectivist doctrine of morals, very different from that which Prichard himself endorsed.[2] I shall confine my remarks to the second of these statements, as the plausibility of the first will depend on the degree of truth expressed in the second.

Both of these statements are only half-truths. The element of error in them arose from overlooking the fact that there are some phenomena that require for their explanation, not one ultimate principle or fact, but two. One cannot explain the motion of the earth in its orbit by calling attention solely to the centripetal force of gravitation. A centrifugal force is also involved. Or again, one cannot fully account for the validity of a syllogistic conclusion simply by saying that it is derived from the truth of the major premise. The minor premise is also required. Similarly, one cannot satisfactorily explain or justify a particular moral obligation by citing merely one of the conditions ultimately implied in its truth. You need two.

To illustrate this truth let us recall the instance of obvious ethical value presented in the scene of happy children at play, outlined above. Let us suppose that the school's games-master, after watching their play for a time, comes to the conclusion that, in the interests of the general well-being of some of them whose strength might be over-taxed by further exertion, he ought now to bring their game to a halt. He feels an obligation laid on him to terminate their enjoyment for the moment, in the interests of a greater good. He recognizes a duty. He sees clearly what he *ought to do*.

Now if he happened to be a reflective person, he might, if questioned about the wisdom of his intervention, satisfy himself by saying that one is always under an absolute moral obligation to choose the greater good rather than the lesser, when both are equally practicable. He might even insist that this principle is a moral axiom, discerned by intuition, and analogous in this respect to the axioms of geometry. And he might add, using the terminology of Prichard,

[1] de Burgh: *From Morality to Religion*, p. 141; A. C. Garnett: *The Moral Nature of Man*, p. 54.

[2] R. M. Hare: *The Language of Morals*, pp. 29–31; P. H. Nowell-Smith: *Ethics*, pp. 34–35.

that his knowledge of what he ought to do in his situation had been "derived" from that supreme moral axiom implied in every genuine duty.

Now obviously in the games-master's impromptu "derivation" of one "ought" from another "ought"—one duty from another duty—one "ought to do" from another "ought to do"—a circumstance of great importance has been overlooked. This circumstance was the well-being of some of the children, which might have been jeopardized by protracted exertion. Not only was there an awareness of this well-being, but there was in his mind a conviction that, from the point of view of what *ought to be*, this future well-being, that would be menaced by further play, was of far more importance than the present enjoyment of the group, good as that was in itself. There was thus clearly present, in this evocation of a sense of duty, a recognition of the worth, in some sense of the term, of the future well-being, of a section of the children, distinct from the sense of moral obligation evoked, and distinct also from any merit, or moral worth, that might attach to the master's compliance with his obligation.

The defect in the games-master's explanation of his moral obligation discloses the element of truth and the element of error in Prichard's dictum, "An ought, if it is to be derived at all, can only be derived from another ought." It is true that in the mind of anyone who has any sense of moral obligation there is always at work (often sub-consciously) an ineradicable conviction that the greater good ought always to be chosen, in preference to the lesser, other things being equal.[1] It is equally true that this conviction plays a part in shaping one's knowledge of particular duties; and this knowledge, therefore, cannot be adequately accounted for without making some reference to this supreme moral principle.

It is not true, however, that the knowledge of particular duties can be derived solely from this supreme principle, or completely explained in terms of it. Inevitably the recognition of a particular moral obligation implies the apprehension, or envisaging, of some *end*, thought by the agent to be capable of achievement by him, and believed by him to be good, in the sense that it *ought to be*.

In short, to explain any particular duty satisfactorily we have to recognize two ultimate concepts, distinct from each other, and both of them distinct from the notion of merely natural, factual phenomena. On the one hand, there is the sense of moral obligation, a sense which, when it demands the performance of a particular act,

[1] As already indicated, I do not consider it necessary for my purpose to take into account, in stating this principle, Ross's quasi-deontological theory, that some kinds of acts are morally obligatory on the ground of their own inherent "rightness." This qualification also applies to the problems of "fair distribution" of the greater good.

is an expression, in the circumstances then obtaining, of the supreme obligation to prefer the greater to the lesser good. It is to be noted that, from the point of view of the agent, this sense of obligation (though as objective in its reference as any other axiom) is subjective in its status, as compared with the end aimed at in his act.

The second concept, on the other hand, is that of a good, or well-being, which is objective in its status, and which gives a precise and definite "content" to the particular moral obligation. The trouble is that the word "ought" is used in ethical discourse to describe both of these concepts. There is an "ought to do" and there is also an "ought to be"; and it is impossible in ethical theory to dispense with either of these. Prichard's error arose from his attempt to eliminate the notion of "ought to be," as an ultimate, underived concept.

It would carry me far beyond the bounds of my present subject to attempt to indicate the distinctive characteristics of personal well-being, the worth of which justifies, in part, the choices imposed on us by our sense of moral obligation. By the blanket term "well-being," I mean chiefly personal well-being (although I think consideration ought at times to be given to the well-being of the lower creatures). Suffice it to say here that personal well-being would generally include an element of happiness, and often, in my opinion, several other qualities of experience as well. These value-elements in conscious experience, when purged of all constituents not essential to their value, are what I mean by *basic, intrinsic, ethical values.* The fact common to all of them, is simply that where human consciousness exists, they ought, in their own right, to be.

Two other remarks ought to be made on this theory of Prichard's as expressed in the two statements of his I have quoted. (*a*) The first of these statements, that "The word 'ought' refers to actions and to actions alone" is merely a tautology, if 'ought' means, "ought to do." If, however, ought means "ought to be" then the statement is patently inaccurate. (*b*) My second remark is that Prichard's error here is, in effect, identical with Kant's erroneous dictum that there is nothing good without qualification but the good will. Most Kantians would now agree that though Kant made an immense contribution to ethical theory in calling attention to the distinctive characteristics of good will, it is impossible to derive particular duties from this principle alone, however it be interpreted.

2. A second objection that at first sight would seem to lie against this doctrine is that it is based on a tautology. Owing to the fact that in our everyday speech the terms "good" and "ought" are applied indiscriminately to good acts (having *moral worth*) and good ends (possessing *ethical* worth), one would seem, by this theory, to define a good act as one that seeks what is good. The theory I have suggested, however, is that *moral* goodness (which pertains only to

good will) is the choice of *ethical* goodness which belongs to the objects sought by good will. It should be noted, however, that ethical goodness, being an ultimate concept, cannot be further defined, beyond stating that it denotes the fact that the objects so described ought, in themselves or in their own right, to be. I may also point out that the qualifying phrases "in themselves" and "in their own right" are negative in their significance. The phrases indicate that intrinsic ethical goodness, is not a "consequential" epithet.

3. Another objection that may be urged against this doctrine is that it is an attempt to derive an "ought" from an "is." This objection, however, is only a variant of the first which I examined above. It arises, like it, from an incomplete analysis of a situation that gives rise to a moral imperative. In such a situation there is, indeed, always a consciousness, however dim or intermittent, of a supreme imperative concerning what one ought to do. This ultimate moral principle, however, is abstract in its terminology, and would remain void of content, and would be completely inapplicable to experience, unless it were accompanied by a knowledge of the specific elements in our social environment which in themselves ought to be. Now this knowledge of elements of worth in some ends as compared with others, is, in a sense, knowledge of an objective fact; but it is a unique type of fact—an ethical fact—namely, that these elements ought in themselves to be, wherever there is human consciousness. Unless these value-elements can be recognized as such, we have no means at our disposal whereby genuine specific moral imperatives can be distinguished from the most pernicious commands. How do we know, e.g., that it is better, other things being equal, to commend the cultivation of happiness in home life, rather than to provoke misery and inflict pain. There is only one reasonable answer to this question. We are aware of the fact that happiness in itself ought to be, and therefore, other things being equal, ought to be sought in preference to pain, in accordance with the supreme moral imperative.

4. A fourth possible criticism is that, in view of the wide disparity of opinion amongst different peoples regarding what is good and what is evil, it seems temerarious to assert that human reason ineluctably recognizes any particular quality of experience as intrinsically good. There are three considerations that seem to me to take the edge off this criticism.

(*a*) We have to recognize that there are a few people who, though their mentality is in many respects perfectly normal, are nevertheless sub-normal in their capacity to recognize certain features of their environment. There are, e.g., a small minority of people who are colour blind, and there are a number who are note-deaf. It is not inconceivable that there may also be a rare individual here and

there who is a-moral, in the sense that he cannot recognize ethical qualities as such. I recognize, of course, that this differentiation of the normal from the sub-normal requires some clarification; and I shall try to show that such clarification is no more difficult in the case of the ethically blind person than it is in the case of the person who is colour blind.

(*b*) It is necessary, in ethical theory, to bear in mind the difference between "intrinsic ethical value," and "*basic* intrinsic ethical value." A human situation may be, in Ross's terminology, "good on the whole," even though it is not "wholly good." Such a situation is intrinsically good, notwithstanding that there are in it both good and bad elements. A *basic* intrinsic value, however, is wholly good. It is good through and through.

When this distinction is taken into account, it becomes apparent that the differences of opinion about what is basically good and basically evil is not so vast or widespread as we are often inclined to think. It has often been pointed out[1] that people whose moral codes conflict do not necessarily disagree about what is ultimately or basically good.

(*c*) There are certain primary laws of thought which are ineluctably recognized as valid by all thoughtful people who have given attention to their nature. They are recognized as valid because, unless they are assumed to be true, it becomes impossible to think logically or coherently about anything. Similarly, there are some qualities of experience—pleasure in particular—without recognizing which, as basically good, one cannot think coherently about good and evil at all. There is, e.g., no sense in speaking of a particular situation as intrinsically "good on the whole," unless there is in it some distinctive feature, or features, that lend to it its distinctive worth.

In the light of this fact we can discern a principle of coherence applicable to ethical thinking, just as reasonable in its own domain as are the laws of thought in the domain of mathematical or physical theory. Coherence in ethical thinking, however, is not compatibility merely with the laws of thought, but compatibility with the unique fact that some qualities of experience have a "right to be" that is not possessed by others. Any acquaintance with the attempts that people make to bring consistency into their ethical thinking and moral practice, will show that the happiness of others was a consideration which they felt compelled to take into account in any such effort. The occasional sadist, if such there be, who would deny this, and who presumably envisages as his ideal for humanity a world of cold-blooded devils tormenting each other, may rightly be treated as *sub-normal*, so far as ethical perception is concerned. He

[1] See Sorley: *Moral Values*, etc., p. 97; and A. C. Ewing: *Ethics*, pp. 126 ff.

is as myopic in this sphere of things as a colour-blind person would be in an exhibition of water-colour pictures.

There are several advantages in the account I have given of ethical value.

(1) This interpretation obviously is not guilty of any "naturalistic fallacy." The goodness affirmed of pleasure is, in current phraseology, a supervenient characteristic. It is, however, not consequential to anything else. Its worth is in itself, and is self-explanatory.

(2) It bye-passes the difficulty that Prichard found in utilitarianism, as it was understood in his day. When it is recognized that all moral beings are intuitively aware of a supreme moral obligation to choose, when recognized, the best practicable alternative in any situation calling for action, there is no logical difficulty in understanding how a mind, recognizing that obligation, and recognizing also that the happiness of others is something which in itself ought to be, will "sense" a categorical obligation to seek that happiness, when, so far as he can judge, it is the best alternative possible of achievement in the situation presented. There is no "link" missing between the objective value perceived and the inner sense of duty. One might as reasonably suggest that there is a link missing between the abstract "laws of thought" and the specific concrete objects to which they apply.

(3) Finally, there is a further advantage in this theory of ethical value, that is of more practical importance. It gives us good reason for thinking that we are not necessarily condemned to the dispiriting doctrine of an absolute ethical relativism. It may be that there is a real worth-while task awaiting us in this world, of the character of which we have some assured knowledge. And it may well be that by our efforts to fulfil this vocation we are furthering the completion of high ends greater than we can at present conceive.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL RELEVANCE OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE[1]

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1. The meaning of the title of this essay is not clear. And something must be done towards clarifying it, in order that the question at issue may be understood.

The term "religious experience" has a wide range of meaning. It might mean experience of God, in the sense that it is taken from the outset to signify experience of an existent Being whom it is proper to call God. Or it might mean experience which is claimed by the person who enjoys it to be experience of God, though we do not assume from the outset the validity of the claim. Or it might mean experience which is connected in such a way with the thought of God as to warrant its being called religious even though the claim is not made that it is experience of the divine reality itself. Further, some people might wish to say that there are experiences which possess certain qualities in virtue of which the experiences can or should be called religious even though they are not directly connected with the thought of God. Examples of religious experience in the last-mentioned sense might be a certain sense of sublimity enjoyed while contemplating a mountain-scene or of mystery while gazing into the depths of a forest.

Leaving the matter there for the moment, I turn to the term "philosophical relevance." When I ask whether religious experience possesses philosophical relevance, I intend to ask whether it increases our knowledge of reality. It might do this in at any rate two ways. It might increase our knowledge of the experiencer, the subject. And it might provide grounds for saying that there is a Being of such a nature that it is proper to call this Being "God." I propose to confine my attention to this second theme. In other words, the principal subject for discussion is whether religious experience affords adequate grounds for affirming the existence of God.

It is immediately evident that the term "religious experience," as used in this discussion, cannot be given from the outset the first of the possible meanings to which I have alluded above. For if we assume that there is experience of an existent divine Being, we assume the existence of God. I also exclude the last of the possible meanings which I mentioned.[2] In fact I propose to confine myself

[1] This paper represents a lecture given at The Royal Institute of Philosophy in March, 1956.

[2] This exclusion should not be taken as equivalent to a flat denial that feelings of sublimity and so on have any religious significance. Perhaps they have. But I do not intend to discuss the matter here.

to consideration of religious experience in the second of the meanings mentioned, namely to experience which is claimed by the person who enjoys it to be experience of God. And I wish to inquire whether we have adequate grounds, or can have adequate grounds, for thinking that this claim is sometimes true. I must emphasize, however, that I am talking about the external observer. I am not asking, for instance, whether it is psychologically possible for a person who enjoys certain types of experience to doubt the existence of God while the experience lasts. I am asking whether the external observer, if I may so describe him, has or can have adequate grounds for thinking that certain types of experience can best be explained by supposing that they are in fact what they are claimed to be, experience of God. And in speaking of adequate grounds I prescind, of course, from purely theological considerations and presuppositions.

What do I mean by the term "God"? I do not think that the term can reasonably be used to signify either the things which compose what we call the material world or finite human selves or both. For to affirm that the only existing realities are material things and human selves is, in ordinary usage, to affirm atheism. Hence at the very least I mean by God a Being which transcends material things and which is not identical with the human self. True, even though I do not wish to presuppose a specifically Christian concept of God, this description is very far from being all that is usually meant by the term. The first question to be asked, however, is whether religious experience affords empirical evidence of the existence of a Being other than the experiencer and the material world. For if a negative answer had to be given to this question, it would be senseless to discuss the Being's nature and attributes.

It is sometimes said that one cannot raise the question of God's existence "outside religion," and that "inside religion" there is no sense in raising it. The religious man, when left to himself, no more raises the question of God's existence than we raise the question of the existence of the air which we are breathing. "Outside religion," however, the word "God" has no meaning. The question of God's existence cannot, therefore, be raised. This is not a point of view with which I find myself in agreement. That certain experiences occur which are grouped under the heading of religious experience is an empirical fact. And there seems to me to be no cogent reason why the external observer should not raise the question whether or not the occurrence of such experiences affords at least probable evidence of the existence of a Being other than the experiencer, other finite selves and the material world.

2. In modern theological literature we hear a good deal about meeting or encounter with God and about the I-Thou relationship.

The religious consciousness, it is said, is characterized by this relationship. That is to say, for the religious consciousness God is not an "It," an object about which a man thinks in the same way in which he may think about the moon or about electrons or about the relations between the subconscious and the conscious. The metaphysician, it is true, may think about God in this way or at least in an analogous manner. But metaphysical reflection about the *Ens a se* is not the same thing as the encounter with God which is characteristic of the religious consciousness.

My reason for mentioning this theme is sufficiently obvious. I announced my intention of understanding by the term "religious experience" for purposes of this discussion experience which is claimed by the person who enjoys it to be experience of God. And what is often called encounter or meeting with God clearly comes under this heading. We can ask, therefore, whether reflection on this experience discloses evidence that it is in fact what it is claimed to be. But first of all I wish to make the following point. When people speak of encounter with God as a characteristic of the religious consciousness, they are talking, I think, of a common phenomenon, of an experience, that is to say, which is commonly enjoyed by devout Christians, Jews and Moslems and which is not a relatively rare experience such as mysticism. Hence I leave mysticism out of account for the moment, though I shall return to the subject later. I cannot undertake to discuss the relation between "ordinary" religious experience and mysticism, because I do not think that I could do this without introducing theological considerations which I wish to avoid. But it is clear, I think, that those who speak of encounter or meeting with God are not talking in an exclusive sense about mysticism, even if they would include it.

Now, the experience of the I-Thou relationship or of personal encounter with God can perhaps be regarded, from the point of view of the experiencer, as an experimental verification of a pre-existing belief. Take the case of someone who believes already in a God with whom man can enter into communication. If he then has the experience which is called encountering or meeting God, in prayer let us say, this experience counts for him as an experimental verification of his belief. And his life of prayer helps to sustain his belief. This is, I think, a common enough case. And generally speaking those who have what I have called "ordinary" religious experience are those who already believe in God. True, the experience may be itself the origin of real belief. But in such a case a man generally has already an idea of God, gained probably through his education, in the light of which he interprets the experience.

The question arises, however, whether religious experience of this type affords any evidence in favour of God's existence for those

who do not already believe in God and who look at the experience from outside, so far as it is possible to do this. For this to be the case, it seems that there would have to be some feature of the experience which could not be adequately explained except by postulating God's existence or at least which could be more adequately explained by postulating God's existence than by not doing so. And there appears to be some considerable difficulty in showing that there is any such feature. For it might be maintained that, once given the initial belief on the part of the experiencer, the experience can be adequately explained in terms of this belief. The validity of the belief may be provable on other grounds, metaphysical grounds for example. But this is not the point at issue. The question is whether we can point to any feature or features of the experience under discussion, when viewed from the outside, in support of the validity of the belief. And the comment might be made that though devout worshippers of Isis probably enjoyed some experience of encountering Isis, this does not show that Isis exists. Given the belief, the experience can be explained in psychological terms. Similarly, it might be argued, the religious experience of a monotheist does not show that the God in whom he believes exists. For, given the belief, the psychologist can account for the experience without postulating a transcendent object of the experience.

The reply might be made that there is some confusion here. For the problem is not that of justifying some particular conception of Deity. True, Isis was popularly conceived as an anthropomorphic goddess, and as such she belongs to the realm of mythology. But it might be argued that the religious experience of the devout worshipper of Isis was fundamentally an encounter with the divine, not with a mythological figure. The properly religious element in the experience of the worshipper of Isis is not without affinity to the religious experience of the devout monotheist. Did not Apuleius in the *Metamorphoses* speak of the one Deity worshipped under many names? And cannot we find similar utterances in the Vedas, with reference to Indian polytheism?

This may well be true. But we ought to be careful not to presuppose the validity of monotheism on grounds other than those provided by religious experience. I mean, we ought to be careful, for purposes of this present discussion, not to interpret the religious experience of the worshipper of Isis in the light of a belief in monotheism, resting on other grounds than religious experience, and then to use this interpretation to show that the belief is substantiated by the experience so interpreted.

It might, indeed, be argued that in all religious experience there is a sense of the Transcendent, and that though the way in which the Transcendent is conceived generally depends on pre-existing

beliefs, the sense itself is most reasonably explained as awareness of existent divine Being. In this case, however, it seems that the cases most likely to convince the external observer that there is such an objective awareness will be those cases in which the subject of the experience is, *prima facie* at least, most acted upon and in which the encounter is most evidently the result of the activity of Being other than the experiencer. I turn, therefore, to the consideration of mysticism. To do so is, of course, to limit the scope of the discussion. But a man who does not already believe in God is not likely to be brought to this belief by a consideration of other people's religious experience unless it can be shown to him that the experience cannot be adequately explained if we not admit the activity of a Being transcending the self, other selves and the material environment. And as this activity would seem to be more evident, *prima facie* at least, in mystical experience than in ordinary religious experience, it is, I think, only natural to turn to a consideration of mysticism.

3. The first point to be made is that in speaking of mysticism I am not speaking of phenomena such as imaginative visions, voices, levitation or even of ecstasies and raptures when considered under their physical or corporeal aspects. We all know that people "see things" and hear voices without any even *prima facie* connection with intimate union with God, and that there can be pathological states resembling ecstasy which are susceptible of a purely naturalistic interpretation. Nor am I speaking of the not so uncommon stage of mystical experience in which (if I may beg the question for the moment) the action of God is practically imperceptible but which is characterized rather by the prolonged act of wanting God. I am speaking of states in which the subject is aware of being acted upon, of an intimate union and one-ing with a Being immeasurably greater than himself. I am talking, if you like, of what Plotinus calls "the flight of the alone to the Alone," of the "vision" in which beholder and beheld are as one.

But if mystical experience is understood primarily in the sense of a purely interior experience, it is obvious that the external observer is dependent on the testimony of mystics. Some mystical phenomena are in principle visible by anyone, ecstasy in its corporeal aspect for example. But no external observer can see the accompanying interior experience. The question arises, therefore, how far we can be expected to accept this testimony.

The first remark which I wish to make on this topic is that in a certain number of cases we have at our disposal the normal criteria for deciding whether a person intended to tell the truth or not. There certainly have been pseudo-mystical charlatans and people who wished to draw attention to themselves. But if, for instance,

we find St. Teresa describing her experiences in writing because she has been told to do so by those whom she regards as possessing authority over her, and if we find that in ordinary life she was a woman of good sense and who was recognized as being free from pride and vanity, it is at least more probable that in her writings she intended to tell the truth as she saw it than that she intended to write what she knew or suspected to be false.

To avoid any possible misunderstanding, I must emphasize that I am not suggesting that the life of a mystic proves the truth of what he or she says. But it seems to me to be obvious that we can legitimately use available information about the life and character of a mystic to help us to decide whether he or she was in good faith and intended to tell the truth. This seems to me to be a matter of common sense.

One special reason, however, why we cannot use the probable good faith of a mystic to prove the truth of all he says is this. What a mystic says or writes about his experience is written subsequently to the experience itself. And he is likely to interpret the experience in the light of beliefs which he already possesses. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that two men, the one a Christian and the other a Hindu, enjoy similar mystical experiences. The former is likely to interpret his experience in terms of Christian theism, while the latter, if he already accepts a monistic version of the philosophy of the Vedanta, is likely to interpret his experience in terms of this philosophy. And when we have reason to think that the subsequent interpretation of an experience is probably due to, or at least influenced by, beliefs which precede the experience, we obviously cannot be expected to accept the occurrence of the experience as conclusive proof of the truth of the interpretation. In other words, the mystic's experience, even if genuine, does not guarantee the mystic's interpretation of it. No theological or philosophical statements which he may make are exempt from critical discussion in the light of the appropriate norms for judging whether such statements are true or false.

Diversity of interpretation can often be explained in terms of different previously-held beliefs. But is there any fundamental agreement in the testimony of different mystics? If we try to allow for elements which are probably due to pre-existing beliefs, we find I think, common testimony (at least in what are claimed to be the higher reaches of mystical experience) of intimate union with a Being which is felt as immeasurably greater than the finite self and which is felt as being the ultimate reality or, in some sense, as the only true reality. Further, this union is experienced as something given, as an invasion or transformation or taking-up of the self. Hence some psychologists of the religious consciousness speak of the "givenness" of mystical experience as being at any rate one of its

special characteristics. It may be said perhaps that I am able to find this common testimony because I recognize as "mystics" only those who enjoy certain types of experience. But it is, I think, an empirical fact that we can find marked similarities in the descriptions of mystical experience which have been given by mystics belonging to different periods and to different cultural and religious traditions. And this remains a fact even if we exclude a certain number of writers who are sometimes spoken of as "mystical" writers.

The question then arises whether this element of givenness can be adequately explained without reference to a metaphysical cause of or factor in the experience. And some, of course, maintain that it can be. (J. H. Leuba is one of these.) They maintain that there is no factor discoverable in mystical experience which cannot be explained naturalistically through the operation of psychological and physiological causes. It may well be that it is the character of givenness which makes the mystic spontaneously attribute his experience to contact with a reality other than himself. But the character of givenness accompanies the emergence of mental processes from the subconscious into consciousness. To take a simple example, a pious person may be troubled by conflicts, ideas and temptations which seem to come from without, and he attributes them to diabolical agency or suggestion. But the psychoanalyst can reveal the origins of these mental events in the subconscious. The character of givenness, therefore, provides no proof that mystical experience is what the mystic thinks it to be. And some writers would even go so far as to say that mystical experience can be reproduced artificially, as by the use of certain drugs.

Others would not allow that any adequate purely naturalistic explanation of mystical experience has yet been given. There are, indeed, a number of mystical phenomena, in a wide sense of the term, which occur even when there is no real question of contact with God. And in such cases naturalistic interpretations can be given. Further, it is difficult to exclude naturalistic explanations of such phenomena even when they are associated with the mystical experience proper. But no conclusive naturalistic explanation of the latter has yet been provided. And as for the artificial reproduction of mystical states by the use of drugs, descriptions of the states attained by such means do not appear to correspond with the descriptions given by the chief mystical writers of what they consider to be their most important experience. In any case the effects on life and conduct of the experiences of a St. John of the Cross or of a St. Teresa do not appear to follow in the case of "mystical" states deliberately and artificially produced; and this seems to indicate a difference between the two sets of states. It has yet to be shown that anyone whose "mystical experience" consists in states pro-

duced by drugs is a suitable candidate for beatification or canonization.[1]

It is arguable, of course, that even if no adequate naturalistic explanation of mystical experience has yet been given, we are not entitled to exclude *a priori* the possibility of such an explanation being provided at some future date. But some writers[2] contend that even if a purely psychological account of mystical experience can or might be given, it by no means follows that the mystic's own account of the matter is false. Naturalistic explanations can be given, for instance, of the movements of the planets. But the Christian does not suppose that this fact excludes the divine activity in Nature or that God's activity is confined to miraculous "interventions." Similarly, it might be true both that a naturalistic psychological account of mystical experience could be given and also that this experience was what the mystic takes it to be. For the matter of that God might, as William James suggested in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, act on the subconscious.

The general contention to which I have alluded in the last paragraph, namely that a psychological account of mystical experience does not necessarily exclude the possibility of the mystic's account being true, seems to me to be valid. But I doubt whether it helps very much in the present discussion. If a Christian believes that God's activity is manifested in the movements of the planets, he does so on other grounds than inspection of the planets' behaviour. If a theologian or a metaphysician believes that God "concurs" with every human act, including free acts, he does so on other grounds than empirical observation of these acts. Similarly, if an adequate naturalistic explanation of mystical experience could be given, the contention that the experience is at the same time the result of divine activity would have to be supported on other grounds than analysis of the experience as an empirical phenomenon. But it is with the experimental argument for God's existence that we are at present concerned. That is to say, we are asking whether mystical experience, so far as it can be known by the external observer, provides any evidence in favour of the conclusion that there exists a Being whom it is proper to call "God." It will not do, therefore, to presuppose the existence of God on other grounds and then to say that mystical experience, even if it is susceptible of a purely psycho-

[1] It may be said that the religious mystics themselves have employed a technique, for example ascetic practices. But the Christian mystics at least adopted ascetic practices for other purposes than for inducing mystical experience. In any case they did not regard the relation of mystical experience to ascetic practices as being that of effect to cause in the same sense in which states induced by drugs are the effects of the latter.

[2] I am indebted for this idea to a reading of Professor R. H. Thouless's valuable little work, *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion.*

logical explanation, is nevertheless the result of divine activity. It might be; but from the point of view adopted for purposes of this discussion, the point of view of the agnostic, this consideration is not of much help.

There is, however, another consideration which seems to me to be relevant. The highest mystical states are admitted by the mystics themselves to be inexpressible. Mystical writers have, indeed, tried to suggest their nature by the use of anology and imagery; but they recognize at the same time that nobody can really understand what the experience is unless he has enjoyed it himself. Now if we accept this view of the matter, and we can hardly avoid doing so, it appears to follow that no external observer can ever know that an adequate naturalistic explanation of mystical experience has been given. Nor can he legitimately state that it could in principle be given. For he does not really know what the experience is about which he is speaking. Similarly, he cannot recognize any of the abnormal states produced by the use of drugs as equivalent to the summits of mystical experience described in extremely obscure terms by St. John of the Cross. He can experiment with mescalin, for instance, if he wishes to; but he does not know and cannot know that the results are comparable to the supreme experience of the mystics.

Unfortunately, however, the very reason which militates against the claim that mystical experience is susceptible of a purely naturalistic explanation militates equally against the claim that mystical experience is philosophically relevant in the sense in which I have been using the term. For if the external observer cannot know what the mystical experience is, he is unlikely to be much impressed by an argument for God's existence which is based on such experience. One can doubtless exaggerate the ineffability of mystical experience. Mystical writers would hardly have attempted to suggest the nature of their experience by the use of analogy and imagery if they had thought that no idea at all, however inadequate, could be communicated. At the same time it appears that the external observer is not in a position to "recognize" the higher levels of mystical experience. In this case he can never know that any naturalistic explanation which is offered really is an explanation. Nor, on the other hand, can he feel confident that a supernatural explanation is required.

4. Readers of this paper will understand that I am not concerned with edification or with religious exhortation. But some may well feel disatisfied with the inconclusive position which I seem to have reached. And this dissatisfaction may arise, not because of the absence of edifying sentiments, but because it is felt that something important has been omitted and that the scope of the discussion has been too restricted. As I share this dissatisfaction, I wish to broaden somewhat the scope of the discussion and to inquire whether we can

make a little more of the experimental or empirical argument for God's existence.

It is, I think, a fact that those who are impressed by religious experience, especially by mystical experience, as testimony for the existence of God do not have in mind simply the interior experience itself. So far as this experience can be known from outside, by description rather than by acquaintance, they see it in the context not only of the lives of the mystics but also of the general history of religion and, indeed, of human culture. They see, as it were, a pattern which suggests to them an irruption of supernatural life and varying degrees of contact with the source of this life, a source transcending the material world and the finite self. In other words, the pattern suggests to them the hypothesis of God's existence. And even if they would not pretend to be able to exclude *a priori* and conclusively the possibility of a psychological explanation of the empirical data, they would maintain that the hypothesis of God's existence is more reasonable and makes better sense of the data than any naturalistic explanation yet advanced.

This line of argument has, of course, its difficulties. Suppose that we point to the characters and actions of religious mystics such as St. Francis of Assisi and argue with Bergson that it is more probable that the lives of these men and women are the result of contact with a source of life other than themselves than they are not. It is, indeed, scarcely necessary to remark that if a man does not admire or value the qualities and activities of a person like St. Francis, any line of argument which presupposes the admirable and valuable character of these qualities and activities will to this extent fail to impress him. But even if we do admire the character and actions of a St. Francis, it is still difficult to prove that they were the result of mystical experience. After all, outstanding examples of self-sacrifice and of charity can be found in the lives of people whom we do not ordinarily regard as mystics.

Nevertheless, the line of argument to which I have alluded undoubtedly weighs with some minds. Indeed, it seems to some people much more impressive than any purely metaphysical argument. But is it simply a question of some people seeing a pattern which others do not see or of one man seeing one pattern while another man sees another pattern? If so, it might be objected that the man who sees the pattern of varying degrees of contact with God does so because he already believes in a God with whom human beings can have communication.

Perhaps this last remark, intended as an objection or criticism, suggests a way in which the approach to God's existence through reflection on religious experience in general and on mystical experience in particular can form part of a cumulative argument for God's

existence. If a person has come to the conclusion on other grounds that it is in some degree probable that there is a God who could conceivably be the object of human experience, the occurrence of religious experience in general and of mystical experience in particular, especially when seen in the general context of human life, might serve for him as an empirical verification of the hypothesis at which he has already arrived. We would then have, it might be claimed, a general line of argument somewhat analogous to the process of hypothesis and verification in the sciences. In this case the conclusion would be more or less probable; but it would be capable of indefinitely progressive verification.

This is substantially the position of Bergson as presented in *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*. And it is a line of thought with which I find myself in sympathy. But there is, it seems to me, a serious objection against it. A scientist may form a hypothesis and then deduce that if certain requisite conditions were fulfilled and operations performed (I mean, if certain experimental work were carried out), certain events should occur if the hypothesis were true. And if the events do in fact occur when the experiment is performed, this tends to verify or confirm the hypothesis. But we are not in a position to make analogous experiments with regard to mystical experience. We cannot make experiments with other people. It may be said that I can perform experiments with myself. That is to say, I can fulfil certain conditions or perform certain actions and see what results in the way of religious experience. But to me at least it seems obvious that, apart from other considerations, one of the prerequisite conditions would be that I should commit myself to religious belief and to a truly religious attitude; and in this case I would no longer be the external observer of whom we have been speaking. Of course, religious experience might suddenly "happen" to me, as in the case of those sudden conversions to which William James devoted his attention; but such an event could hardly be called an experiment in the sense in which we speak of controlled experiment in science. If, therefore, we wish to maintain that religious experience in general and mystical experience in particular can play a verificatory role in regard to the hypothesis of God's existence, we cannot, I think, interpret verification here as strictly analogous to experimental verification in science.

But not all scientific verification takes the form of controlled experiment. An astronomer is not in a position to experiment with the heavenly bodies in the same way that a chemist can experiment with chemical substances. He may, however, be able to deduce from a hypothesis that if the hypothesis were true certain phenomena should be observable. And it might be argued that mystical experience can play a verificatory role analogous to that played by these

observable astronomical phenomena. It does not appear, indeed, that the analogy could be a strict one. For while it might be deduced from an astronomical hypothesis that certain phenomena must occur if the hypothesis is true, we can hardly argue that religious experience in general and mystical experience in particular must occur if there is a God who could be the object of human experience. However, we might pass over this objection and say that there is an analogy though not necessarily a strict one. If there is a God who could conceivably be the object of human experience, then it is tautologous to say that religious experience is possible. And if in fact it is found to occur, its occurrence serves as verification of the hypothesis.

Unfortunately the matter is not quite so simple as this. If we say that the occurrence of mystical experience verifies the hypothesis that there is a God who could be the object of human experience, we might mean either of two things. We might mean that analysis of instances of mystical experience shows them to be what they are claimed by the mystics to be, namely instances of contact with God. But as we saw in preceding sections, it is somewhat difficult for the external observer to assure himself that this is in fact the case. Or we might mean that from the hypothesis that there is a God who could be the object of human experience we can deduce that certain types of experience, considered in terms of a purely psychological description, could occur, and that instances of mystical experience are instances of these types of experience. In this case we would, indeed, have some analogy with the scientific process of hypothesis and verification. At the same time I cannot think of anyone who has argued explicitly in precisely this way; and at first hearing at least it sounds a very odd line of argument. Who, it might be asked, would ever think of deducing from the hypothesis that there exists a God who could be the object of human experience the conclusion that if such contact were to take place it would be accompanied by certain psychological experiences, and then of looking round to see whether in fact there are instances of such experiences occurring? Of course, the fact that a line of argument appears odd does not necessarily constitute a disproof of its validity. But if the argument which I have mentioned appears to us to be very odd and "artificial," it suggests at any rate that those who are impressed by religious experience in general and mystical experience in particular as testimony in favour of God's existence have not got this sort of argument in mind.

But is the argument really quite so remote as I have suggested from the way in which the minds of those who are impressed by mystical experience as evidence for God's existence actually work? If I may be permitted a crude over-simplification, we can say that

the mystic passes beyond all things which can be represented by the imagination and has the experience of entering what has been described as "darkness" or "night" or "the cloud of unknowing." Those comparatively few persons who pass beyond this stage have the experience,[1] in varying degrees, of union with a Being immeasurably greater than themselves, of being-taken-possession-of, of "transformation." Now, it is arguable that those who are impressed by mystical experience as evidence for the existence of God are impressed, in part at least, because they see in this succession of states "what they would expect" if there is a transcendent God who could be the object of human experience. In this case the line of thought at the back of their minds, even if they never formulate it explicitly to themselves, seems to resemble the line of argument which I first stigmatized as "odd." If there is a transcendent God who could be the object of human experience, one would expect that, for such experience to take place, man would have first to "pass beyond" the imaginable things to which his attention is first directed by nature. And this passing beyond would naturally involve "night" or "darkness." And any succeeding experience of union or contact would naturally be inexpressible save in terms of analogies and images taken from the world of "common experience."

What I have been saying may give the impression that I am preoccupied with assimilating arguments for God's existence to the scientific process of hypothesis and verification. But this impression would be based on a misunderstanding. In this paper I am treating exclusively of one particular argument, namely that from religious experience. This argument has been presented by some writers, notably by Bergson, in a form which is claimed to be analogous to the scientific process of hypothesis and verification. It is therefore relevant to inquire if in fact there is or can be any analogy and, if so, where it lies.

5. It may be said that in this discussion I have not arrived at any definite, positive results, and that the reason for this is that I have persisted in looking at the matter from the point of view of the external observer. True, in the last section I shifted to the point of view of the man who already believes on grounds other than religious experience that it is probable that there exists a God who could conceivably be the object of human experience. But I have represented this initial belief as analogous to a scientific hypothesis; and to this extent I have persisted in keeping to the point of view of the external observer. Yet those who are impressed by the argument

[1] I am using the word "experience" here to signify experience considered in its subjective aspect. I mean, by saying "experience of union with a Being" I do not intend to assume that the experience is necessarily what the subject feels it to be.

from religious experience in general and mystical experience in particular are not external observers if one means by this term those who are completely indifferent to religion. Even the "religious agnostic" (the man who has some "sense" of the Transcendent, of a reality other than the visible world, but who for various reasons is agnostic about any definite conceptual presentation of the Deity) is not an external observer. Why not simply admit that the argument from religious experience possesses force only in the minds of those who stand already "within religion"? It may very well be the case that, as I maintained in the first section, the question whether religious experience provides any evidence for the existence of God is a question which can be raised "outside religion." But the affirmative answer to the question impresses only those who stand to some degree "within religion." The hostile critic will say that their liability to be impressed is due to their proneness to snatch at anything which looks like an empirical verification of the belief which they wish to hold. But it is also arguable that they are impressed because they have already some knowledge by acquaintance of religious experience. Even the religious agnostic, in the sense alluded to, must be allowed to have some knowledge from within of religious experience, unless one wishes to circumscribe the meaning of religious experience in a very narrow way and to limit it to certain experiences in a place of worship or at a prie-dieu. And the reason why these people are prone to see in mystical experience an empirical confirmation of their belief is that they have a "sympathetic" insight into it and see in it, even if they cannot fully understand it, a prolongation and deepening of an experience of which they themselves already possess some awareness.

It seems to me to be true that those who are impressed by the argument from religious experience are generally those who already possess some belief in God or who at least wish to believe in God. And it is arguable that this "wish," when sincere, expresses what may reasonably be described as some degree of religious experience. But it might then be argued perhaps that these people see in mystical experience not so much evidence of the existence of a reality other than themselves and the material world as evidence of the nature of this reality.[1] And this is a matter with which I cannot deal in this

[1] The question of the relation between mystical experience and interpretation of the nature of God is an interesting question. In the case of those Sufi mystics, for example, who spoke of God in terms of "friend" and "lover" and who were conscious of their departure from the legalistic Mohammedan tradition, how far was the change in the conception of God due to their mystical experience and how far did it precede this experience, being shaped, for instance, by Christian influences? Such questions are difficult to answer. But if it could be shown that their conception of God was primarily due to their mystical experience, this would be a point of some importance.

paper. It doubtless comes under the general heading of "the philosophical relevance of religious experience"; but I have deliberately confined my attention to consideration of one particular point.

A final remark. If in this paper I have dealt with the argument from religious experience in a rather critical way, I should not wish it to be thought that this was due to the fact that I am associated with a philosophical tradition in which no stress is laid on this particular line of argument. It is, indeed, a line of argument which appeals to me. But one has to examine what sort of an argument it is and what, if anything, is shown by it. I do not profess, however, to have done more than to suggest some lines of reflection which have occurred to me. I make no pretence whatever of having given a definitive treatment.

COULD MACHINES BE MADE TO THINK?

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I

THIS question as to whether machines can, or could, be made to think, has become familiar in recent years since the renewed outburst of interest that has taken place in the development of Cybernetics. The notion of servo-mechanisms and the like has a history in remote antiquity but the form of its fundamental question has recently taken on a new and especially acute significance.

Our analysis will be essentially twofold: it will attempt to analyse the question from a semantic point of view, and also from the point of view of scientists seeking to express general laws of behaviour. It will incidently consider, as part of the first viewpoint, the criticism of Turing's theses[1] made by Dr. Mays.[2]

What are we asking when we ask whether or not machines could be made to think? We needs must be careful to make it absolutely clear what we mean by a "machine" and what we mean by "think." If for example we define "machine" in such a way as either to include the meaning of "organism" or to exclude it, or if we define "thinking" as something that organisms do, and machines do not do, then we make the whole question merely a matter of verbal definition in the most obvious sense; a matter of convention or stipulation, and this I shall suppose is not the intent behind the question. Thus we need criteria for machines and thought.

Let us notice straight away that if we took "machine" to mean a mechanical device such as a motor car or an aeroplane, then we would have no serious difficulty saying that machines do not in any plausible sense think. This notion of a machine is the one, one suspects, that many people have in mind when they ask themselves these sort of questions. These machines are not, in any sense, thinking machines nor were they ever designed as such. Now from our semantic point of view it is clear that the basic question that we set ourselves: "could machines think or not?" depends upon how broadly or how narrowly the two relevant terms "machine" and "thinking" are taken. There are *at least* two different interpretations of the two terms in existence and these two interpretations lead, not unnaturally, to different conclusions. Turing has proceeded to take a very broad interpretation, at least in one sense, limited in another, of the term "think" and has shown that there is a perfectly good sense of

[1] A. M. Turing: "Computing Machines and Intelligence." *Mind* (1950), Also in *Intelligent Machinery*—Unpublished.

[2] W. Mays: "Can Machines Think?" *Philosophy* (1952), pp. 148–162.

"machine" that makes the answer to our question *yes*. On the other hand Mays has taken a narrower definition that leads him to say *no* to our question. From the point of view of semantic and linguistic analysis, our question is obviously not a very important one, since the real problem seems to be to define "thinking" and also "machine," but it should be noticed that there is a more or less established sense in which the answer should be *yes*. Our next problem is to consider the reasons that Mays and Turing have for the views that they respectively urge, and their points of difference, since it appears to be a matter of confusion between them that they are really talking about different things, or rather talking about the same thing from two very different points of view. In other words we must decide what various scientists mean by the two crucial words and what interpretations seem most plausible. We have also to face the old problem of whether or not natural usage should be our guide; or perhaps we should ask:— to what extent should natural usage be our guide?

II

Let us first turn to the objections that are voiced by Mays against the viewpoint put forward by Turing, which essentially says that, at least in principle, a "machine" can be constructed that will do anything that a human organism will. It is quite clear that he (Turing) is not thinking in terms of crude passive machines, but active machines such as digital and analogue computers and artefacts of the negative feed-back type.

The first statement of importance that is made by Mays may be quoted:—[1]

> "Perhaps it is as well to make a confession of faith here. I accept the evidence of my own introspections, as well as those of other people, that there are such things as private psychological events . . ."

This admission represents the core of May's objection. He really feels that the word "think" is, or perhaps should be, reserved for humans and he would support this claim by pointing out that machines do not have consciousness, feelings and will, etc., and the term "thinking" is properly thought of as involving these other conative aspects as well as the more cognitive ones. Mays then takes up another point made by Turing when he says:—[2]

> "It does not follow that because q, the sonnet-writing behaviour, occurs, that it is due to p, thoughts and feelings felt; it may be due to a bank of relays or a regiment of monkeys hammering away on typewriters."

Mays' objections can so far briefly be summarized by saying that he feels that Turing has no right to include psychological terms and

[1] Op. cit., p. 149. [2] Op. cit., p. 152.

phrases which refer to the machine as "being punished and rewarded," "obeying orders," etc., without the same objective redefinition of these phrases that he gives to the word "thinking." Mays asks whether Turing would realize that it would be idiotic to talk of a "machine" enjoying itself, since the word enjoyment has a meaning only by reference to our private feelings.

What does this amount to? It amounts to the fact that Mays would appear to be saying that Turing's argument is unreasonable because he is talking about only one kind of human behaviour, principally the deductive and inductive processes, i.e. the processes of intelligence, and he is overlooking the much wider aspects of human behaviour that the machine cannot have. Mays says:—[1]

> "It is merely a conceit of the logician to imagine that the main function of natural language is to transmit information rather than to communicate personal and social feeling."

This amounts, in this context, to no more than a different interpretation of the word "thinking" and also the word "information," since surely "information" should include personal and social feelings, although one may agree with much that underlies the words. The particular point about thinking being dependent on feelings, etc., rather than on a bank of relays carries no conviction since we might just as easily argue that human thinking is dependent on a set of neurons. We cannot show this fact for certain, for obvious reasons; but modern physiological psychology gives strong evidence to support such a belief. In any case there is no evidence of note—clearly no certainty—that machines don't have feelings in the same manner as, or similar manner to, humans. Of course this is most unlikely in any existing machine, but how can we know that it is impossible to build a machine that *has* got exactly the same feelings, willings, etc. No one, as far as the writer knows, has seriously tried to do this, for the very good reason that so far we have only been concerned with "thinking" machines of the Turing type. Thus I would conclude that Turing could well have redefined his "anthropomorphic" phrases objectively and he would not have infringed the behaviouristic viewpoint, and further that his interpretation of "thinking," which hinges primarily on the process of deduction, although also including induction, is more in keeping with what we usually mean by thinking, or rather what we should mean by thinking if we were careful to strip off the relative irrelevancies of sources, than Mays would admit. No doubt the accompanying feelings are of great interest to us humans in our lives, but they would not seem to have the same importance in the context of a question about machine construction, artefacts, decision procedures and the like. The absence

[1] Op. cit., p. 156.

of the emotional aspects of thinking are on the same level as would be the absence of a liver and a pancreas or any other organ that is neccessary to the human digestive system but not believed relevant, in any direct sense, to thought; it is simply an aspect that has not been mimicked, but there seems to be no reason to suppose, on this account, that it could not be.

It is well known to those working in logic, especially in the field of recursive functions, that what is called the Turing machine involved the theoretical process of passing a tape through a box which reads its instructions from the tape. Mays' criticism of this is essentially that it is the machine *and* the tape that corresponds to the "human mind," and not just a box. It is difficult to take this comment seriously since whatever the word "mind" is taken to refer to, surely it is not to some part of the organism independent of any environment. The analogy of Turing's seems perfectly justified since the most elementary considerations from psychology should convince the reader that there will be no "mind" without an environment which supplies "instructions," or more plausibly the basis in perception, for inductions. Whether or not the (black) box starts with certain biases or initial conditions that may correspond to what we vaguely refer to as innate ideas or instincts is certainly no argument against Turing's view.

It does not seem to the writer that Mays' point about Gestalten and the fact that the "human machine" probably does not work in an additive way has any relevance whatsoever, since we can certainly construct "artefacts" that have non-linear and non-additive arrangements.

When Mays argues that we cannot identify "seeing green" with certain brain-states, we are back on familiar ground. The well-known Mind-body problem. This particular problem is too complicated to discuss here at length, but it seems to the writer that this type of statement is based on a fundamental confusion created in the first place by those dualistic philosophers who insist on talking about mental and physical events in such a way that they are subsequently committed to saying that they cannot in any sense be the same, precisely because *they* started by defining them as different, usually on most inadequate and misleading grounds. This is another way of putting Mays' real objection to Turing and it will receive the sympathy of many philosophers, particularly those of a non-pragmatic persuasion. I doubt on the other hand whether it will cut any ice with harder-headed empiricists, who will continue to try and make aircraft fly even in the face of philosophers who believe that they have a proof, that it is *a priori* impossible for an aircraft to fly.

The last point in Mays' article we should mention is his statement that mechanized calculi need a power supply and mathematicians to

translate mathematical problems into a form that the machines can handle. This again appears to be irrelevant to the Turing view since there is no earthly reason to suppose that we could not construct "machines" that could do this work too. It might just as well be argued that humans need a staff of cooks and manufacturers to prepare our food and make our blankets and sheets, and so on. This simply isn't relevant. The point might be put in another way. Only a part of mathematics is machine-like in an obvious sense. That is, while there is a decision procedure for the propositional calculus, there is no such procedure for the functional calculi, indeed Church has proved that such a decision procedure can never be forthcoming. This does not mean, however, that we could not construct a "machine" that could employ all the methods of hunting for solutions that are known to man. So at this stage of the discussion I will submit that Mays has made no impression whatsoever on Turing's position.

III

One point made by Dr. Mays in his paper is of special significance. He says that it is essential not to confuse logic with psychology. He says that a logical calculus is nearly the antithesis of thinking since it is a mechanical routine that is substituted for our vague intuitive and imprecise thought processes. This is the well-known Reichenbach distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. Now it is particularly important that we say a few words about this matter, since it not only links up with what was said in our last section and helps to account for what we would regard as the irrelevance of Mays' argument, it has other far-reaching consequences in the relation of science to philosophy.

To put the matter briefly, "logicism" and "psychologism" are terms that have been used by many philosophers as words of opprobrium to hurl at anyone who attempts to use scientific methods in the solution of philosophical problems. In other words, to use the Carnap terminology, we cannot attempt to place the formal analyses of pure semantics in the empirical mould of pragmatics. The empirical facts of language, he argues, are not relevant to their logical properties. Against this we have a resurgence of pragmatism under the healthy leadership of such writers as Professors Quine[1] and Morton White[2] who argue, and the writer wholly agrees with such an argument, that the division between formal and factual science is not absolute, it is at best relative. This is clearly the way to cut down the absolute dualisms of philosophy under the heading of Mind-body

[1] W. V. Quine: "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." In *From a Logical Point of View.*" Cambridge, Mass. (1952).

[2] M. G. White: "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism." In *John Dewey. Philosopher of Science and Freedom.* New York. (1950).

and analytic-synthetic, and in cutting away these arbitrary fetters we lost the fear that we are committing a circularity in applying empirical science to philosophical questions. In particular it leads to a revision of the nature of logic, which may be regarded as closely related to human thinking in that it represents the ideal, best ordered and most complete of thinking processes. In practice we may not go through all the steps of a logical argument because we may quickly see that we can reduce a problem (say) to one already solved or some such shortened process as this . . . such a realization may constitute an example of what we may call "insight." However, it would be completely false to assume that these processes are entirely different. We are not necessarily aware of all the steps in the processes which our own organisms go through, and we cannot, in any event, assume on the strength of our inadequate introspections, that the neural process is not as complete as the bank of relays of the computing machine.

The point at issue here is essentially that philosophical matters can be reconstructed within a theory of behaviour as effectively as can scientific matters within a logical reconstruction. It is perhaps not worthwhile to pursue this particular argument here since those who are already persuaded will already know the argument, and those who are not already persuaded will not, in any case, be persuaded by this brief section. Nevertheless it is the underlying point and we shall say a little more about it in the next section.

IV

The argument so far has been to support by virtue of its objective (scientific) approach the views of Turing against the attack of Mays. But it would be foolish to suppose that a thinker as knowledgeable as Dr. Mays should be as consistently wrong as we have tended to suggest. The truth remains that they are thinking of the problem in quite different terms. Turing is arguing from the viewpoint of a mathematician and a logician and he is assuming, an assumption which is apparently ludicrous to Mays, that ultimately the ability to say merely "yes" or "no" in answer to some question is of fundamental importance. To people familiar with logic, algorithms and the like, it is easy enough to see where Turing's analysis starts. Mays on the other hand is taking a very different view of what "thinking" involves and would deny that the essence of the problem had been dealt with by Turing. Many philosophers will tend to support Mays, and some (we hope) Turing. The problem in philosophical terms reduces largely to the problem of whether or not we can absolutely separate analytic from synthetic statements, and what is equivalent, whether one accepts reductionism, or again, to state a problem

equivalent to the analytic-synthetic distinction, whether one would wish to insist on the dualism of Mind and body.

One point should now be made, the writer does not in the least wish to deny the truth of the first "confession of faith" of Mays that there are introspections and we should take our introspections seriously. The question is whether we should confuse (I believe it would be a confusion) the issue by introducing our introspective beliefs and our feelings, artistic and otherwise, about ourselves, into the objective or behaviouristic data with which the psychologist deals. Not of course that introspections are not at the moment vital to psychology, but they are not vital to a discussion of machines and thinking, when the question is one of principle. Whether or not you would support Turing or Mays would depend on answers to these questions, all too briefly mentioned, about the relation of philosophy to science, or so the present writer claims. If this thesis is correct, then the answer to our question reduces to an already well-known issue, and the way we would answer that problem.

V

Granted that we can say little more about the problem of machines and thinking, from an analytic viewpoint, we might take the opportunity to add a few words on it from the second point of view, that of physiology and psychology. It is here that the title question can be given a significance, and to which can be found a meaningful answer. The full possible usefulness of Cybernetics in general has not by any means been worked out as a model or as a construction method in either psychology or physiology. But there seems to be no objection in principle to the notion of treating organisms as if they were *machines*. Indeed, and this is the final point, we cannot see what aspects of human behaviour cannot be mirrored by artefacts. Indeed ultimately such an extension of the notion of a *machine* makes it quite impossible to decide where a *machine* ceases and organisms begin. In this it is similar to the biochemist's difficulty in saying where *non-living* "organisms" cease and living ones begin. The conditions that Mays uses as a distinction are perfectly reasonable if we use the word "think" and the word "machine" in the restricted sense that they are now often, even usually, used and thought of, but these same conditions cannot be shown to be in any way a barrier to the thesis that *machines* (taken sufficiently broadly) can be made to do anything that organisms can. Our trouble intuitively is that we are continually being made aware that *machines* are *constructed* but forget that organisms are *constructed* also. We dwell on the fact that machines can only do what we build into them to do and forget that exactly the same condition holds for organisms.

The most significant developments in modern psychological theories have been the increased attention paid to Cybernetic models. Indeed increasingly there is the tendency to regard the process of thinking as close to that of an inductive logical *machine.* The question of difference that we have discussed at some length already comes to its behaviouristic head, in the question:— How should we regard the emotive or conative aspects of behaviour? Doubtless they are more basic (i.e. older and earlier in phylogenesis) but it is doubtful whether we would want to say that "thinking" was more than incidently connected with these processes. Emotion is regarded as either a disruptive or constructive background to thinking. There is still much argument about the role of emotions in behaviour and their connection with the autonomic nervous system, but certainly from a behaviouristic point of view there can be no reason to doubt the ability of science to reconstruct such states in analogues.

What evidence is available to psychologists tends to suggest that humans operate on the same basis as an inductive logical machine, whose memory—part of the basis for inductions—is not wholly reliable, perhaps by virtue of emotive contamination, and whose inductions do not always thus range over all the available evidence in the broadest sense. No doubt the best available inductive machine would make inductions much like humans when certain randomizers or certain further error-considerations were introduced. In any case we can quite obviously construct a *machine* that plays the human role when we are capable of describing that role. To deny that we are capable of describing it with sufficient completeness would demand proof, for which there would seem to be little or no no evidence. In the same way there seems to be no good reason for saying that we cannot construct artefacts with a "stream of consciousness." This is what so many seem to deny; but let them first describe what they mean, and as they do we shall construct the necessary *machine.*

The fact that "machines" are not, so far, constructed by the same protoplasmic means as humans are constructed, should not be any hindrance to the mimicking of the thinking operations. There is of course no reason to suppose that we could not construct *machines* —should we call them organisms now?—that can reproduce themselves,[1] and do all that Mays says a machine cannot; the word "machine" has, if you like, changed its meaning. But are we to say that *machines,* in the sense we are discussing them, are the same as what we commonly mean by "machine"? They clearly are not what we have often meant, but equally clearly they come within

[1] See J. G. Kemeny. "Man viewed as a Machine," *Scientific American,* 1955, pp. 58–67.

the compass of what we could mean. In short, for natural language purposes, it seems worth separating organisms from artefacts, say, but we shall not pretend the distinction is more than a matter of degree.

Perhaps the following somewhat humorous question that can be asked is relevant to the discussion. If I assert to some man "Your wife is a machine. I happen to know that she was constructed in a workshop on the South Coast," the man's answer may be "I don't believe it," but when you answer "But she is, and you can't tell me anything that your wife can do that a machine can't (in principle)," the man is left with a sort of nagging doubt, or perhaps with some difficulty as to how to state his case, since it is not easy to see what he can assert clearly that she has got, or can do, that cannot have been constructed in a workshop.

We can now *roughly* divide the people who have answers to our original question into three groups:— (1) those, like Mays, who seem to regard the answer as definitely no, for the reasons he gives; (2) those, like Ashby, who seem to say definitely yes, and (3) those like Turing (although he may be said to come under (2)) who seem, and the writer would be in full agreement with such a view, to admit the question is open to serious semantic difficulties which tends to reduce its answer to trivially yes or trivially no. At the same time the writer sees no reason to doubt that the views of those in group (2) should be acted upon, as it is not obvious to him that we cannot build a machine or artefact to do anything a human being can do.

I would like to believe that the relative futility of discussing the matter "could machines be made to think?" has now been made clear. The problem is not one that merits much discussion as the problem is empirical. What can we actually construct ourselves, either in hardware or in theoretical terms, and what can these constructions actually do? To talk of their activities by reference to the same terminology as is derived from introspection, is to risk the sort of rebuke that Mays gives. It seems pardonable, however, if it is realized that we are in fact not relying on fixed usage in natural language—if we were, we should lean more toward Mays and more away from Turing—we are in fact stretching our common usage to meet new sorts of cases and this surely is the cause of much confusion and the reduction to near-meaninglessness of such questions as "could machines be made to think?" If it were insisted that the interpretation of *machine* meant any existing *machine*[1] then the case for an affirmative answer could hardly be so strong.

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[1] See, for example, J. R. Kantor, *The Logic of Modern Science*, Principia Press, 1953, p. 21 *et seq.*

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

Eugenio Garin's book, *Cronache di filosofia italiana*, 1900–1943 (Bari, Laterza, 1955) has given rise to much discussion in Italy. Eugenio Garin is noted particularly for his studies in the philosophy and life of the Italian Renaissance; in this field he is the most competent scholar in Italy, and among the most competent in the world. His latest researches, collected in *Medioevo e Rinascimento* (Bari, Laterza, 1954), are among the finest and most illuminating, for in them a sound and fruitful interpretative hypothesis on the structure of this historical period is used with great skill to elucidate an extremely rich and varied documentary material, much of which has been recently discovered. Among Garin's other contributions to the history of philosophy it will suffice to mention here a copious work, *Storia della filosofia italiana dal Medioevo al Risorgimento*, published in two volumes in 1947 (Milan, pub. Francesco Vallardi). What makes the value of these *Cronache* is Garin's evident honesty and moderation in judgment and his scrupulous documentation; frequently the author refrains from making any pronouncement on a personage, but a judgment emerges clearly from the authentic quotations in the text (*ex ore tuo te judico*). Garin has called his book "Chronicles" because it does not make mention of all the personages of the period under consideration; it does not outline the philosophical systems, and it discusses, besides philosophers, minor and marginal figures, whether of polemics or of facts, that serve to depict the period in question. But in reality it is a work of history in the best meaning of the term. It is the history of a failure, or rather, of several failures. The failure of positivism, which, in its Italian elaborators in the first decades of the century, turned more and more in the direction of idealism and spiritualism, reversing the romantic exaltation of science (from which nineteenth-century positivism took its rise) by depreciating and ignoring it. Failure of the mysticizing and irrational tendencies (generally inspired by Sorel), presented as the ideological counterpart of fascism. Failure of the idealistic and realistic opponents of the romantic idealism of Croce and Gentile, who had nothing to offer in its place but forms of compromise and verbal reconciliations. Lastly failure of that very idealism of Croce and Gentile, which Garin nevertheless does not mean to undervalue, considering it rather as the profoundest and most salutary experiment of Italian philosophy of this period, which finally, and particularly in the course of the second world war, revealed its insufficiency. In this period, says Garin (p. 511), "Italian philosophical discussion, when not academic and evasive, hungered after bodily, worldly, and truly human experience; after the works of human hands, made by tangible labours, far from exhausted verbiage; after liberty, not a mere matter of words, but lived to its fullest extent, defended against continual negations, affirmed in the face of cultural and political violations; after a human society beyond the master-and-servant relationship, of men coexisting in collaboration." It would be impossible, I believe, to express better the condition of the living part of Italian philosophy during the second world war and at its end. "All who have lived through to the end," adds Garin, "the collapse of the old rational order without losing their reason have learned that the immutable and objective order was only the crystallization of a human product, constructed and destroyed in the course of history. Human reason will have to construct yet others, better suited to the needs of life as it is lived. And it is to this end

that philosophical thought has turned today, whether it applies itself to a study of the past in order to avoid running unwarily into fresh barriers, or whether it elaborates adequate instruments to take the place of those that have been found wanting." It is doubtless a question of the reduction of the task of philosophy to more modest proportions, commensurate with human possibilities, but also more effective and fruitful. And in consequence "a language common to at least a part of thinking Italy" has been formed, and there has been fixed "a precise boundary between whoever sees in the philosopher only a man who works with men and for men in precise and definite tasks, in an attempt at critical clarification and common construction, and whoever imagines him as contemplating with detached mind the Infinite Absolute and announcing it for all time in absolute and definite terms, as if man was neither born nor died, and did not have to struggle and suffer." (P. 523.)

Ugo Spirito's latest book, *Significato del nostro tempo* (Florence, Sansoni, 1955), also contains, among other items, an essay on contemporary Italian philosophical thought. But the difference in method, procedure, and evaluation between Spirito's essay and Garin's book is very significant. Garin documents his own statements at every step with quotations and precise references, but there is no documentation whatever in Spirito's essay. For that reason many of the judgments contained in this essay leave us somewhat perplexed. Take for example the statement that "modern thought has progressively aimed at determining the reality in thought, eliminating by degrees all transcendence and all presupposed objectivity." (P. 227.) Many currents of modern thought cannot be described by this formula, and they are those that nowadays display the greatest force and vitality. One of these is precisely the phenomenology to which Spirito devotes an essay, but for some reason he takes phenomenology for phenomenism. Then there is no documentation for his statement that "the essence of Italian thought" is "hypercriticism," wherefore "no speculative position subjected to its analysis succeeds in hiding its own metaphysical contradiction and its own critical insufficiency" (pp. 228–9). Anyone who, like the present writer, is often called upon to select new Italian professors of philosophy, and is consequently obliged to read a large part of Italian philosophical production, cannot help a feeling of weariness when confronted with much of this, which continues to ruminate threadbare themes, dogmatically representing as "absolute truth" theses for which it does not offer the smallest proof or evidence, neglecting or ignoring analyses, experiences, facts or situations without whose support and interpretation philosophy operates in the void. Spirito does not deny the crisis or failure of romantic Italian idealism, but he maintains that the only alternative remaining open is "problematicism." And what is problematicism? It is the radical, utmost consciousness of the crisis itself (p. 37), the "incapacity to escape out of contradiction"; and yet it is not relativism, because "it does not understand how it can renounce the hope of the absolute" (p. 229). Thus defined, Spirito's problematicism appears as the messianic expectation of an absolute truth on the part of whoever maintains that an absolute truth is contradictory. What apt significance, what instrument of research or of action, this faith suggests, Spirito does not say. It may also be suspected that he is waiting for such a faith in absolute truth to be imposed on him, and that this is in reality only the expectation of a philosophical, religious or political dictatorship. This suspicion seems to gather strength from what he says about the "Two conceptions of liberty," which are those of individualism and of totalitarianism (or communism), and from his observation that "the passage from individualism to socialism (totalitarian socialism or communism) is becoming more and more inevitable."

(p. 68). But here it seems that Spirito's prophecy is suggested to him by the old antinomy between the individual and society, an antinomy that no one would nowadays admit as the theoretical foundation of the conflict between individual liberty and the exigencies of social life.

The first five volumes, out of the projected fifteen, of the *Grande Antologia filosofica* have appeared, under the direction of Umberto Antonio Padovani (Milan, Marzorati, 1954). Each school or tendency and every important author has been entrusted to a particular scholar, who has written a brief introduction, compiled a limited bibliography, and selected a certain number of texts. The same treatment has been accorded to certain themes deemed fundamental. Thus the two volumes on classical thought contain, besides the treatment of the schools and authors, a handling of the following themes, likewise entrusted to different writers: religion, aesthetics, the concept of history, science, pedagogy, politics and law, and economic doctrines. Similarly, of the three volumes devoted to Christian thought the last contains studies and texts on: theology and philosophy, aesthetics, historiography, science, pedagogy, political thought, the philosophy of law and economic doctrines. This distribution of the work, while enabling the specific abilities of many scholars to be used, has at the same time caused a certain disparity in the value of the treatments, some of which are undoubtedly well carried out and informed, while others clearly seem superficial or critically inadequate. There is also observable, especially in the volumes dedicated to Christian thought, the weight of Catholic ideology and of dogmatic preconceptions that have guided and limited the work of the compilers. Some disproportions are evident. For instance, the anthology of Aristotelian texts is altogether inadequate, in quality and quantity. Equally inadequate are the treatment and texts of the pre-Augustinian Fathers (eight pages of Origen, a page and a half of Gregory of Nissa, and so on), while on the other hand the space devoted to the post-Augustinian Fathers seems disproportionate. It is understood that in such a vast work imperfections, defects and errors cannot be altogether avoided; however, with regard to this anthology it may be observed that its compilers would have benefited from a less prejudiced and more calmly objective point of view. It is certainly meritorious of the director and publisher of the work to have wished to provide Italian students with a useful means of study. The impression is however unavoidable that, considering the scale on which it has been planned, it falls between two stools; it is too vast and massive for students and dilettantes, and too limited and inadequate for specialists.

NICOLA ABBAGNANO.

(Translated from the Italian by Beatrice Allen)

NEW BOOKS

A Study of History. By Arnold Toynbee. Vols. VII-X (Oxford University Press, £7 10s.)

In the earlier volumes of *A Study of History*, Professor Toynbee defined the breakdown of civilizations as "failures in the audacious attempts to ascend from the level of primitive humanity to the height of some superhuman kind of living." He further spoke of such breakdowns in "non-material" terms as the "loss of creative power in the souls of creative individuals or minorities, which divests them of their magic power to influence the souls of the uncreative masses." However questionable may be the assumptions of this viewpoint, it nevertheless seemed apparent that the writer of the study deplored the breakdowns and failures, and did not invite us to rejoice at them. Yet even in an early volume [Vol. V, part 5] he had hinted at a view which regards the world as well lost and which cuts across the allegedly empirical definition of civilizations as a species of society: churches, too, he suggested, were representatives of another species of society, as distinct from the species civilizations as the latter were from primitive societies. The concluding four volumes now before us are very much concerned with this new "species" and with the development of this second view.

Thus in Volume VII, containing parts 6 and 7 on "Universal States" and "Universal Churches" respectively, Toynbee clearly develops his suspicions of merely material success. He rejects the claims of universal states to represent their respective civilizations at their apexes. Instead, they are a product of disintegration and decay, the last desperate throw of a minority which has lost its "creative power" and must now maintain itself by force. Yet however valuable the institutions which are the conditions for the widespread peace maintained by the universal state, these cannot absorb the "creative power" present in the warring parochial states of the time of troubles. Instead, the universal churches, creations of the "internal proletariat," whose development is favoured by the institutions and conditions brought about by the universal state, now absorb and receive new energy for creative action which the latter is unable to employ. It is characteristic of Professor Toynbee's approach that the example which he gives to indicate this transference is that men are now ready to die as martyrs for the new church.

Universal states exist for the sake of the universal churches or "higher religions." Toynbee now decisively rejects the view he considered in the earlier volumes, namely that the main role played by universal churches was their provision of the chrysalis from which the offspring civilization was to be born, that their significance lay in the way in which they bridged the interregnum between civilizations, carrying over a precious freight so that some might start with a heritage which put them on a higher footing than their forebears. Though some churches have fulfilled this function, this is not their essential purpose and, indeed, they may compromise their higher goals by serving to bring more civilizations to birth. Interregna are now not to be deplored as unfortunate breaks in the onward and upward march of civilization —now they appear to Professor Toynbee as occasions for "flashes of intense spiritual illumination and bursts of fervent spiritual activity." [Vol. VII, p. 425]. The old terminology of "Dark" Ages, adopted by the eighteenth century philosophers of history, has now undergone a simple reversal of colouring. The cyclic rhythm of rise and fall of civilizations, allegedly discovered by the empirical method, is now interpreted as the revolutions of the

"wheel" which carries the "chariot" of religion farther and farther towards its goal. Why should the descending movement of civilization be the sovereign means for carrying religion forward and upward? Professor Toynbee answers his own question by saying that this is but an exemplification of a Divine Law which decrees that spiritual progress can only be achieved at the cost of material tribulation. "The circumstances favourable to spiritual and secular progress are not only different but antithetical" [Vol. VII, p. 425]. This may well reinforce our doubt as to whether Professor Toynbee is clear what he means when he refers to churches as a higher species of *society*. Surely the term "society" carries more mundane considerations along with it.

Drawing his prophetic mantle closely around him, Professor Toynbee looks at our present situation—employing a strange trick of style whereby he refers to "Mid-twentieth Century Western Civilization" in the *past* tense. This suggests that he is speaking retrospectively, from a future where prophecies are already fulfilled and the issue of our present condition already a matter of historical fact. Thus he forecasts the rise of a new Higher Religion, which will employ the material means furnished by a world-wide western civilization, which unites the earth culturally and economically, if not politically. This is to be a syncretistic mixture of the four extant higher religions, Christianity, Islam, Mahāyāna, and Hinduism. Our doubts as to the practical possibilities of this development are stilled by the following words:

> "On the longer view that was visible to the eye of faith, it could be forecast that the driver would master his team and that the chariot would continue to mount on the heavenward course that it had been following continuously since before Abraham was" [Vol. VII, p. 444].

The above extract, incidentally, is a fair example of Toynbee's style in these later volumes. He delights in expressing himself in the words of the Bible, and embedded in this rich impasto of Biblical phraseology, selfconsciously applied with footnote references, we find an encrustation of his own abstracta, entities like "Subconscious Psyche," plus further additions of mythological impedimenta, taken from a syncretistic palette which includes Nirvana, hubris, the Yin and the Yang, Original Sin, and so on.

Undismayed by the disquieting possibility that the disintegration or breakdown of our own precariously balanced civilization might make impossible the material conditions for any kind of social life to be sensibly called civilized, the prophet continues: it might

> "be augured that, if a secularized Western civilization were to break down in its turn, having swept all its contemporaries into its net, the living religions would not only survive but would grow in wisdom and stature as the result of fresh experience of secular catastrophe" [Vol. VII, p. 448].

Here we feel that the apocalyptic vision has indeed blinded the eye of faith to all mundane considerations.

It is evident that, with these concluding volumes, Professor Toynbee has vacated the field of philosophy of history for what might be called a theology of history. The former, as distinct from the latter, had its birth in eighteenth century optimism and rationalism, and rested on the presupposition that an empirical study would reveal laws of historical development, indicative of a generally progressive tendency, to be made smoother by the removal of reactionary individuals or groups which stood as temporary obstructions in the way. This Panglossian optimism never rested on very sure foundations; yet though keen minds never needed the evidence of the grim events of the

Twentieth Century to shake their belief in the inevitable progress, nevertheless these have created the appropriate atmosphere for pessimism. So Spengler's *Decline of the West*, the pessimistic view of human history as inevitable revolutions of the wheel of a birth-death-birth cycle, of development inevitably followed by decay, was a natural cousin of the earlier view, still leaving its presuppositions uncriticized. Now Toynbee presents a third stage in this development. Spengler's pessimistic relativism is replaced by optimism—which is not that of the eighteenth-century originators of philosophy of history, but an apocalyptic optimism which harks back to the older theological view. This can be seen by the way in which the old central concepts are "spiritualized" by Toynbee. The unity of history and the notion of historical laws of development, key notions of traditional philosophy of history where their application was to social and political events, are now translated to a higher sphere. Just as "churches" replace "civilizations" as higher species of society, so the unity of history becomes the unity of the higher religions—with the ultimate, inevitable objective the syncretistic goal, now to be achieved in place of the mere "mundane" unification of civil society which Kant held out as the goal of historical development. Similarly, historical "laws" are taken up into God's laws to man.

In Vol. IX, Professor Toynbee does make some telling rebukes against the antinomianist historians who repeat H. A. L. Fisher's dictum by rote. We may fairly agree that the extra information on civilizations, brought to light by the archaeologist, at least leaves it an "open question" as to whether the empirical data justify the employment of some concept of law in application to history. Indeed, Professor Toynbee does make a telling point against such metaphysical cartographers who would seek to draw a line upon the map which separates the law-abiding territory of the natural sciences from the anarchistic jungle of human affairs. Surely it is paradoxical, he suggests (Vol. IX, p. 205), that just when historians are extending their territory into those fields of everyday activity which supply the sociologist and economist with data for their "laws" relating to human affairs, the former should continue to deny the applicability of the concept. Yet when Toynbee continues by raising the question "Do such laws of Nature governing human affairs turn out, when we understand them, to be inexorable?" [Vol. IX, p. 218], then it is evident that he has been misled by the insufficiently analysed concept of law whose anthropomorphism he himself has admitted leads to unavoidable confusions. If he could have disabused himself of the notion that a scientific "law" is a commandment or in any sense inexorably decrees the actual succession of events, then it would have been unnecessary for him to have called in an appeal to the "Laws of God" to make good the dilemma of freedom versus determinism. For surely the claim that the historical "laws of nature" only "make sense" when they are pictured as the "wheels that God has fitted to His Own Chariot" is not a proposition that any empirical appeal to the data of history can either prove or disprove. It is the basic confusion of this imperfectly analysed concept of a law of history that blinds Toynbee to the inconsequence of statistics to the Prophet's Message, and, equally, the inappropriateness of Prophecy to the interpretation of statistical evidence.

The dilemma of a Christian philosophy of history is that the crucial events of its Sacred History—the Fall, the Reincarnation, the Last Days—belong to a different order of things and lie outside the empirical history of the City of Man. The promised City of God, the apocalyptic Fourth Age, remains obstinately outside historical time, and only the heretical opinions of a Joachim de Floris can effect a junction, displeasing both to theologian and to historian. Toynbee notes Collingwood's warnings against the inescapable eschatology of

Christian philosophy of history and its tendency to look for the essence of History outside history itself "by looking away from man's actions in order to detect the plan of God." Yet he is confident that the criticism does not apply to his own view. I doubt whether many of his readers will share his confidence. His Christian critic, Mr. Martin Wright, to whom he has so generously given space in notes and appendix, on one occasion disputes his assertion that Christianity can make claim to be the carrier or originator of the ideal of individual liberty. Christianity, Mr. Wright suggests, is in fact capable of accommodating itself to any political regime. Here, surely, is an expression of the dilemma of any Christian philosophy of history. Its values are never wholly of this world, and events of a historical nature, social states of affairs, are only indirectly its concern.

Finally, there is one last observation to be made on this attempt to see human history sub specie aeternitas—from a Pisgah height which approaches God's view. Traditionally, the heavenly outlook on human affairs has been thought to be marked by two characteristics—a concern for even the apparently most insignificant individual event, together with a compassion which is necessarily dependent on this concern. Professor Toynbee's report from his exalted eminence is singularly lacking in both these attributes, in spite of the vast amount of learning and factual erudition that illustrates his pages. Though he repeatedly claims, as an article of faith, that the significance of individual relationships is the root of all spiritual significance, very few features of individuals are discernible in the historical pages of his work. Civilizations, societies, armies on the march, the clash of sects and churches, the spread of systems of belief or institutions—these fill the pages with very rarely any glimpse of the individual faces of the marchers, the inner experience of the worshippers, or even the individual personalities of the "creative" power-wielders who appear only in their hieratic roles. Is it significant that one of the comparatively few occasions when a human individual does emerge from this impersonal record, is that on which St. Daniel the Stylite makes a brief descent from his pillartop in the year A.D. 475?

P. J. BINDLEY.

Answer to Job. By C. G. JUNG. (Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1954. Pp. xviii + 194. Price 12s. 6d.)

It is difficult to believe that the Jung whose writings every psychologist knows and respects, wrote this book. He takes the Bible, and the apocryphal book of Enoch, with the undiscriminating credulity of the fundamentalist. He ignores the critical position with regard to Scripture, taking everything at face value, and apparently regarding John the Apostle as author of the Johannine literature. He even thinks it worth while to explain that Cain's wife must have belonged to another order of creation not bearing the divine stamp, but created as are the beasts. Does he mean an anthropoid ape?

Yahweh of the Old Testament is, we learn, a fierce, incalculable tyrant. Jung does not treat that as due to the way men looked at God, but as the actual nature of God, who gradually, apparently, reforms till we get the picture of God given by Christ, though even then God isn't quite what He ought to be. The petition about not being led into temptation shows that "Christ considers it appropriate to remind his father of his destructive inclinations toward mankind and to beg him to desist from them"! The atonement is "a reparation for the wrong done to man by God." Satan is God's bad son and we learn of "Christ's victory over his brother Satan."

Jung contends that God always has wanted to become man and that applies not only to the Incarnation but to individual man. Together with this, is a surprising leaning towards Roman Catholic dogma, for example the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption of Mary. The latter is, we learn, "in every respect timely" and "the most important religious event since the Reformation." Indeed the Pope was "evidently inspired by the workings of the Holy Ghost" in announcing the dogma. Its value to Jung is that it introduces a feminine element in this notion of incarnation. Protestantism, Jung says, is nothing but a man's religion. Yet one cannot imagine the Roman Church approving these strange speculations, or any Protestant theologian either. It is literalism run mad and cannot but detract from one's respect for Jung's psychology. "Corruptio optimi pessima." E. S. WATERHOUSE.

God and Space-Time. By ALFRED P. STIERNOTTE, with a foreword by Henry Nelson Wieman. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1954. Pp. xxvi + 455. $3.00 net.)

With the rise of linguistic philosophies metaphysical studies like that of Alexander have fallen into disrepute. This is a pity since the incidental thinking contained in such studies is often of a high order. This book is an examination of the part played by Deity in Alexander's *Space, Time and Deity*, with especial reference to his realism and value theory. It is as good a piece of scholarly research as one is likely to come across nowadays and is in the tradition of the great philosophical commentaries. One wonders whether Stiernotte's way of setting about the problem has been the correct one. He has discussed Alexander's *Space, Time and Deity* in the light of his own immediate reading of the text and that of other commentators, instead of historically, from the point of view of Alexander's own philosophical development. For a system like that of Alexander which emphasizes historicity this is something of an anomaly.

He is unaware, as are most of Alexander's commentators, that Laird in his evaluation of Alexander's work used only a small part of the data available to him. The Alexander collection of correspondence, reviews and unpublished articles in the Manchester University Library throws a much greater light on Alexander's philosophical development and the nature of his doctrines than any commentary so far published. A preliminary examination of these documents shows that there was a continuous development of Alexander's views; that his early idealism shades off into his later naturalism and that his epistemology and theology were developed prior to his metaphysics, despite Alexander's statement in *Space, Time and Deity* that his metaphysics is prior to his epistemology.

Stiernotte's book is divided into two parts; in the first part the main ideas of Alexander's system are expounded. The three aspects of his conception of God and Deity are then discussed; their metaphysical nature, the nature of the religious emotion, and the relationship of Deity to values. Alexander's conception of Deity is based on a theory of levels strangely reminiscent of the modern doctrine of language levels. He accepts a realist conception of the nature of religious emotion, though values are regarded as human inventions. Stiernotte indicates that certain features of Alexander's system, such as his coherence theory of truth, have elements in common with Absolute Idealism.

The second part consists of evaluations and criticisms. Alexander's views

are compared with that of other evolutionary philosophers, Bergson, Lloyd Morgan, Smuts and Whitehead, and with recent cosmological enquiries. Stiernotte is certainly not uncritical of Alexander, he disagrees with him that values are human inventions. He holds they are objective and attempts to reconstruct Alexander's system by postulating a primordial matrix of Space-Time-Value. He believes that Alexander's cosmic extrapolation of the mind-body formula should be interpreted in a metaphorical rather than metaphysical sense. It is doubtful whether Alexander would have taken very kindly to this interpretation.

This is unquestionably a competent piece of Alexander exegesis and criticism. Throughout the work there is, however, only the most passing reference to recent philosophical doctrines. It would have been interesting to see how Alexander's system stands up to the modern onslaught against metaphysics.

W. Mays.

A Philosophy of the Real and Possible. By Harry Todd Costello. Woodbridge Lectures No. 4. Columbia University Press. (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1954. Pp. 153. Price 22s. net.)

What a change this book is from the usual kind of philosophical writing. It sparkles with fun. Though it is a serious work, essentially an account of American philosophical thought, it has the salty tang of the *New Yorker*. It contains a number of amusing anecdotes, and some of them are at times to say the least, somewhat full-blooded. Professor Costello is a wise and humane individual with a keen sense of humour who is able to enjoy a joke at his own expense.

This work introduces us to American philosophical thinkers about whom we know all too little in this country. Costello knew Palmer, Royce, James and Santayana, and he gives interesting vignettes of them, making them come to life in their early twentieth-century Harvard setting. We get glimpses of Santayana in his black Spanish cloak, Royce's gnome-like Mr. Jiggs figure, and of William James lecturing in halting and muffled tones so very different from his lucid written style. There is also an amusing account of Costello's attendance at one of Bergson's lectures in Paris which began with a free fight for front row seats. His anecdotes sometimes misfire, as when he attributes a wife to the bachelor Samuel Alexander.

In five lectures, he touches in turn on logic, mathematics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics and includes snippets from the history of philosophy. The book ends with an appreciation of the naturalism of Frederick Woodbridge in whose memory the lectures were given. As far as his own views are concerned, Costello is an empiricist, a strong believer in a perceptual world and a physical world, and in Eddington's two tables. He champions the view that a general science of order is prior to logic and mathematics, and claims that mathematics is synthetic and not analytic. Costello's excursions into philosophical biography are based on his belief that the philosophy one professes is intimately connected with one's own personality.

Despite the slightness of this volume which is also indexless, it contains a number of penetrating insights and criticisms. Its philosophical point of view seems, however, rather dated; its sub-title might well have been "Harvard by Gaslight."

W. Mays.

Aesthetics and Criticism. By H. Osborne. (Routledge and Kegan Paul. Pp. 341. Price 28s.)

This is a crusade on behalf of an "objective" theory of the "peculiar excellence of works of art," the theory that their beauty is "real" in the same sense as their primary qualities. It is not concerned with nature, which is said only to be called beautiful in a different sense. This thesis logically necessitates a rejection of all "expressionist" theories, since, the author rightly recognizes, what is not always recognized by their defenders, that what is expressive to one man may not be expressive to another. He also makes the good point that, since expressiveness may be held a three-term relation involving originator, medium and recipient, it is not a term happily used of natural beauty except with theological assumptions; perhaps "embodiment" should be preferred. Unfortunately Mr. Osborne generally assumes that "expression" of an emotion means its stimulation or infection. He holds that the obvious diversity of appreciation, even among reputable critics, is due to the influence of various wrong aesthetic theories, and does not consider another possible cause, namely that the subjective and expressionist view is correct. For if this is so, genuine but different aesthetic experiences may, and indeed must be stimulated in different persons by the same presentation. Moreover some good critics who differ, as Johnson and Lamb, might seem to have no aesthetic theory, and some who have one give verdicts inconsistent with it.

The author's own view is that the peculiar excellence of works of art lies in their being "organic wholes of configuration," that is, wholes where every part partakes in the nature of the whole and no part can be changed without changing that nature. But apart from the question whether this is true of all works of art (say, the Iliad or Westminster Abbey) and of them only (not, say, of an athlete's body), a surprise is sprung upon the reader when he comes to the statement of what the work of art or organic whole is. It turns out not to be the configuration of colours, shapes, sounds or of words and sentences and meanings actually produced by the artist. It is "a characteristic of sense-perception, and to this only beauty must be ascribed." This potentiality is only "actualized" when "a competent person" apprehends the physical configuration. As no person's actualization can be certainly identified with the artist's or anybody else's, it is hard to see how this theory will advance "scientific criticism." Few subjectivists would ask more.

It is a pity that readers may, from the start, be discouraged by the style of this book. It is diffuse and repetitive in belabouring theories, surely now moribund, such as those of literal mimicry, mere quantity of pleasure, moral or intellectual edification, social utility, excitement of the passions. It is brusque and dogmatic in dictating the author's own view. After quoting with approval sweeping condemnations of nearly all predecessors he adds, "I would exempt from these strictures my own book *Theory of Beauty*." But if he owes little else to any previous writer he owes that title. Or is this irony?

The present work has more than its fair share of misprints.

E. F. Carritt.

Utopian Fantasy: A study of Utopian Fiction since the end of the Nineteenth Century. By Richard Gerber. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1955. Pp. xii+162. Price 16s.)

Dr. Gerber's work lies in the no-man's-land between political philosophy and literature. Though it shows at times considerable philosophical insight, it is,

as its sub-title suggests, largely a literary study. It deals with the origins and developments of the more recent Utopian writing, especially with the phenomenon of its rapid growth over the last fifty years. Dr. Gerber lists about three hundred such works written between 1901 and 1951.

His point is that in the past sociologists and philosophers have given us summaries and criticisms of the programmes of social reform contained in Utopian literature, and attempted to define the principles of Utopian thought. Few, however, have considered Utopian writing as a literary medium. In the present study he is primarily concerned with evaluating the main themes underlying Utopian literature, endeavouring to show that they are the outcome of a comprehensive imagination and way of life.

In the older Utopias with their emphasis on the working out of general principles, likeness to real life was of little moment. With the development of the Utopian novel, the hopes and fears of western man are now translatable into a more realistic form. Instead of discussions of abstract ideas we are given detailed descriptions of the interplay of the Utopian *dramatis personae*.

The original Utopia depicted by Sir Thomas More exemplifies the desire to create the best of all possible worlds. Under the influence of the Darwinian evolutionary doctrine, progress becomes an important element in Utopian literature. The modern Utopian attitude then arises and with it the belief in the miraculous power of unlimited evolution. But after two world wars, the rise of dictatorships and the dangers of the atomic bomb, Utopian optimism wears thin. Under the pressure of contemporary events Utopia takes on a more socially realistic character. It is no longer perfect, it has become a place of power and fear, in which the social discontents and moral dilemmas of the present are written large. This is reflected in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* and George Orwell's *1984*. In these novels power is used unscrupulously and mankind subjected to subtle but ruthless forms of oppression.

This work might well have included some reference to psycho-analytic doctrine which together with social disenchantment is probably at the root of the modern Utopian conception of human nature. It is not enough to lay it at the door of an unanalysed Utopian imagination. Nevertheless, Dr. Gerber has done a most thorough and able piece of work in delineating the chief literary tendencies of recent Utopian fantasy.

W. Mays.

The Essence of Philosophy. By Wilhelm Dilthey. Translated by S. A. Emery and W. T. Emery. (University of North Carolina Press, 1954. Pp. xii+78. Paper $1.50, cloth $2.50.)

It was time that some specimens of Dilthey's writing should be made available in English. Translations have already appeared in French and Italian. The present translators have done well in choosing to give us *Das Wesen der Philosophie*. This is a work of manageable compass, published in Dilthey's last years and therefore presenting his mature thought. It is complete in itself and it deals with a problem which in one way or another concerns all philosophers today.

The approach adopted here may seem strange at first to readers who come to it from the British philosophical tradition. Yet points of contact are not lacking. Dilthey, like ourselves, is aware of a change in the philosophical situation and a need to reassess our philosophical inheritance. Like many of ourselves he believes that the way forward now is to stop trying to write what used to be called "metaphysics" and to carry through the principle of empiri-

cism to its full consequences. The way in which he sets about this task, however, can be understood only in the context of German philosophy as it was fifty or more years ago, and in the light of his own personal interests. In this particular book he is not concerned so much to point the way forward as to understand what philosophy has been and meant in the past. Regarding "philosophy" as a name which people have agreed to give to a very varied assortment of intellectual activities, he asks what common feature of these activities has led to their long association with one another. The result is a historical survey accompanied by elements of psychological and sociological analysis.

The analysis shows what philosophers in the past have been doing, and also how by doing it they ran into an impasse. Philosophy has sprung from the abiding human need to achieve integration in thought and life. Its aims have been (1) to set every sectional idea or activity in its context as a part of life, (2) to take nothing uncritically, to seek a reasonable ground for all principles of thought or action, and (3) to express the results of (1) and (2) in a logically watertight system of doctrine. While (1) and (2) are of course possible as perpetually continuing tasks, (3) can now be seen to be impossible. Instead we must (4) analyse more closely the relation between experience and the various interpretative schemes which we apply to it. Some age-old controversies have arisen through trying to force a decision between schemes of interpretation which can and should be regarded as complementary to one another.

This book has value as showing what Dilthey thought philosophy has been and should be, but it contains little of the contribution which he claimed to be himself making. For his theory of expression and understanding, and for his analysis of historical thinking, we must look to other works bearing directly on these subjects.

The present translation is disfigured by occasional inaccuracies, several of which seriously affect the sense. For example, in the second sentence on page 10, "it succeeded in ending" should be "the aim was to end," and "the Enlightenment" should be "enlightenment." On page 12, line 25, the "followers" of Alexander the Great should be his "successors." On page 46, line 29, "distinguish" should be "disintegrate." On page 49 the sixth sentence down should read: "From the peculiar attitude of the religious persons involved (which had its presuppositions in an older circle of dogmas) arose in the former case the vision of escape from the chain of birth, works, retribution and transmigration by means of knowledge, in which the soul grasps its identity with *brahman*."

H. A. Hodges.

The Principles of World Citizenship. By L. Jonathan Cohen. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 1954. Pp. viii+104. Price 10s. 6d.)

The terminology of social and political theory has been largely devised during the four centuries in which the "sovereign nation state" has been accepted as the ultimate unit; but the development, especially over the last fifty years, of a "polycentric world community" (to use Mr. Cohen's expression) has so altered our working conceptions that our outlook is in many respects more mediaeval than early modern. It is important, therefore, to review the concepts we use in analysing our problems, and try to reformulate them more in accordance with the realities of our situation.

This, broadly speaking, is Mr. Cohen's theme. He gets down to essentials

without waste of time; and his book, despite its brevity, is quite obviously the fruit of considerable reading and reflection.

His initial difficulty, of course, has been to orientate his argument from a set of assumptions which will not be open to challenge as merely arbitrary. He himself rejects the view that there is any system of rules universally accepted as right or any system of ends universally accepted as good. But he gets out of this difficulty by suggesting that—assuming wide differences of moral and valuational outlook—all of us, on reflection, agree that "conditions favourable to the *reasoned discussion of conflicting policies and codes* are fundamental to any kind of community life." His argument is designed to make explicit what is implicit in this basic agreement, and thus provide a general criterion for social policy.

As respect for rational or logical principles is presumed in the discussion of theoretical questions, so the ground of reasoned discussion of social policy is respect for law. Anyone claiming a liberty or right for himself or his group is implying the existence of a juridical order—the mutuality of rights and duties, claims and counter-claims. But to presuppose law is to presuppose a great deal more. The difference between a moral order in a general sense and a legal order in the specific sense is that the latter requires *public* institutions for its declaration and enforcement, and to these institutions the members of the community must accord respect sufficient to ensure their functioning.

Developing this point, Mr. Cohen has some interesting things to say. (1) Law and public authority are not necessarily instrumental to the promotion of some specific general end; for the fundamental requirement of a juridical order is that it should provide the conditions in which individuals and groups can devise modes of co-existence for differing ideals and values. (2) Nevertheless, the institutional authorities needed to operate such an order cannot function without enforcing the pursuit of common ends to some extent; and therefore the policies of individuals in authority will tend to determine, as a matter of fact, the rights and duties of the constituent members. (3) It is the private demands recognized under point (1) and the public necessity of point (2) which, taken together, underlie the conception of constitutional government. But constitutional government depends, not only on devices for keeping social authorities subject to law, but also upon permitting and encouraging a "staggering of the lines of cleavage" in the community, so that the various interests of a given individual link him to different groups and do not make him identify himself exclusively with one group. (In this connection it would be interesting to consider how far a political party committed to a policy of segregation on racial—or any other—grounds can be trusted to respect principles of constitutional government if it ever attains to power.)

In the latter part of his book Mr. Cohen discusses the problems arising from the fact that, in any polycentric community, the individual is subject to a variety of at least semi-autonomous legal orders; and he takes the view that, where the demands of these different orders conflict, our paramount obligation is to that legal order which is most widely administered. Thus today, he holds, international law and institutions have a higher claim to our allegiance than rules of municipal law in conflict with international. He does not deprecate the existence of different, semi-autonomous legal orders. Indeed he seems to regard them as a feature of developed community life; and he discusses the law of the "world community" mainly on the assumption that it is of a federal character. His point is simply that, if the fundamental purpose of law is to provide conditions for peaceful discussion of divergent codes and policies, paramount obligation must be to the most widely administered system.

The last and longest chapter—on "World Citizenship"—considers in more detail some organizational issues involved in the conception of a world community.

Naturally, there are aspects of Mr. Cohen's argument open to question. Three points in particular occur to me. *Firstly*, what he has to say of "ethical monism" may be a bit out of perspective. Many of those who might go under this name would not be concerned to argue that any specific code or system of ends is accepted as universally valid, but only that certain criteria are presupposed as universally valid; and Mr. Cohen's own principle of rationality, with its implication of "respect for law as such," looks extraordinarily Kantian when one tries to work it out. *Secondly*, it may be doubted whether his distinction between the non-technical and the technical meanings of "law" is defensible in the last resort. *Thirdly*, even if one accepts his conception of the world community and of international law and institutions as unquestionably valid, it may be questioned whether, in this or in any other case, we do not simplify moral and legal issues out of all recognition by asserting that precedence always belongs to an obligation under the most widely administered juridical order.

However, I merely refer to these as controversial points, for it seemed appropriate to devote most of the space at my disposal to indicating the character of Mr. Cohen's work. If plain men of our generation have somehow got the impression that moral and social philosophy consists in rushing round intellectual deserts raising linguistic dust-storms, they will, I'm sure, welcome this evidence that it sometimes does something more useful in cultivating fields profitable to humanity. Mr. Cohen is to be congratulated on his initiative in tackling a very difficult and very important subject.

W. D. Lamont.

Minds and Machines. By W. Sluckin. (London: Penguin Books, 1954. Pp. 223. Price 2s.)

Up to now most works in English on Cybernetics have been of a severe technical nature, plentifully besprinkled with symbols. This book, which is to be welcomed, is the first attempt in this country to give an elementary account of Cybernetics and its influence on contemporary thought. It gives a simple introduction to modern computing machines and servo-mechanisms, and describes the ingenious devices constructed to simulate human behaviour. Such topics as control and communication in machine and animal and the working of the nervous system are also discussed. Mr. Sluckin shows that Cybernetics is not without interest for the psychology of perception, learning and thinking; and in view of the number of philosophical hares it has started running, for philosophy too.

On the debit side, Mr. Sluckin might have examined in more detail such topics as the "theory of games," which may yet prove to be of more use to psychological theory than the mechanical models described, which, as he recognizes, often owe their allure to implicit anthropomorphisms. In any case, the "model" approach is a rather crude form of analogical theorizing.

Mr. Sluckin seems to assume that disputes about "purpose" and "thinking" in machines, are chiefly concerned with the "proper use" of these expressions, and centre round the advisability of extending or restricting their meaning, which, it is said, is highly ambiguous. However, to talk of "proper use" in this context begs the question, if by this is meant giving a restricted

behavioural definition to expressions which in ordinary speech have a complex subjective and behavioural significance. Such expressions may only appear ambiguous in the light of precise technical definitions which restrict themselves to selected features of the factual situation. Further, even if introspections are valueless for psychological science, they cannot be ignored in everyday life. The citing of philosophical attempts to give behavioural transcriptions of such data, overlooks that reductionism still remains an unproved assumption and may indeed be false.

Apart from these reservations Mr. Sluckin's book can be warmly recommended to those who wish for an intelligible introduction to this new field of enquiry. W. MAYS.

Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. By HERBERT MARCUSE. 2nd edition. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955. Pp. ix & 440. Price 25s.)

Reason and Revolution was originally published in this country in 1941, and was reviewed at length by Professor T. M. Knox in *Philosophy* for July, 1942. It is now reissued with an unchanged text and an eight-page epilogue, of no great consequence except that it serves to make it clear that the author, while remaining a Marxist, has little admiration for Soviet Russia. The greater part of the book is taken up with what appears to be a fairly orthodox Marxist interpretation of Hegelianism, an interpretation which stresses the origin (or supposed origin) of Hegel's dialectic in reflection on the antagonisms he saw below the surface of the politics of his day, and which claims that the true implications of his thought were revolutionary, despite the fact that Hegel himself in his later years became an apologist for the *status quo*. After a brief survey of the early theological writings and an interesting account, more detailed than anything else so far available in English, of Hegel's first attempts to produce a systematic philosophy during the Jena period, Mr. Marcuse passes to the *Phenomenology*, the *Science of Logic*, the *Philosophy of Right* and the *Philosophy of History*, all of which he deals with at some length. In discussing the *Phenomenology* he lays special stress, surprisingly at first sight, on the opening sections where Hegel examines the common-sense view of perception; Hegel's criticism of naïve realism seems to him important since, in his view, acceptance of naïve realism and political conformism go hand in hand (this connects with attacks made later in the book on "positivism," which term is used to cover both the theories of Comte and 20th-century "neo-positivism"; compare here the remarkable statement on p. 145 that "Hegel recognized an intrinsic connection between mathematical logic and a wholesale acquiescence in facts"). In the section on the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel's shrewd analysis of "civil society," which comes so near to anticipating Marxism and is so little attended to by his English critics, is properly pointed up, and emphasis is laid on certain liberal or semi-liberal aspects of his political thought, such as his belief in the rule of law. This chapter can be read as a useful corrective to the common picture of Hegel as a political absolutist convinced that the State need stop at nothing to impose its will on the individual.

The remainder of the book consists of a rather unconvincing survey of post-Hegelian thought, written to justify the thesis that philosophy had no future after Hegel was dead, its task having passed to "social theory," i.e. to Marxism.

The great merit of the work as a whole is that it succeeds in showing that Hegel had something to say and some grounds for saying it. Life is breathed

into the abstractions of the Hegelian logic, and yet it is made plausible that Hegel should have talked in terms of these abstractions. In this respect the book, for all its shortcomings, serves a real philosophical purpose. But that it has shortcomings could scarcely be denied. It is, in the first place, unduly dogmatic: there is no hint, for example, that the interpretation which the author offers of the origins and material content of Hegel's thought is a controversial one, which would be disputed by virtually all non-Marxist Hegelian scholars. Here Mr. Marcuse, like his fellow Marxist Georg Lukács, assumes too readily that because Hegel was intensely interested in politics he must have been exclusively interested in politics, whereas everything goes to show that this was not the case. And secondly the language in which the book is written, though much simpler than Hegel's, is nonetheless not wholly satisfactory; words like "negativity" and "necessity" are used without adequate explanation, and there are many passages where the exact meaning is obscure. These defects, and the presence of a few wild *obiter dicta* like the sentence quoted above, may well deter readers accustomed to the niceties of linguistic analysis. Yet they should be encouraged to persist despite their qualms, for by doing so they can gain an understanding, if only a partial one, of a way of thinking which has been too long misunderstood and whose results have, in places, a surprising relevance to contemporary philosophy.

W. H. Walsh.

Fact, Fiction and Forecast. By Nelson Goodman. (University of London, the Athlone Press, London, 1954. Pp. 126. Price, 15s.)

This book consists of four lectures of which the first was given by Professor Goodman in New York in 1946 and the rest in London in 1953 as advanced lectures in philosophy for the University of London. Though separated by space and time in their composition and delivery, the lectures are bound by a common theme which is, roughly, that of the analysis of statements about what might be but is not and what might have been and happened but was not or did not happen. Despite the title of one lecture—The Passing of the Possible—Professor Goodman is concerned with what is physically or empirically (and not merely logically) possible but not actual.

The first lecture introduces the theme with a discussion of the now all-too-familiar problem of counter factual conditionals, those statements of the form "If this glass had been dropped it would have fallen" and "If Keats had not died young he would have composed a great epic poem." Professor Goodman criticizes previous attempts to solve the problem and concludes that a solution requires an adequate definition of "law" (which he tries to provide on p. 28) and an account of how a general statement may be accepted independently of any particular instance. Only thus may "accidental" generalizations be distinguished from laws and only laws can sustain counter-factual conditionals. The use of "law" would, even so, presumably have to be stretched to cover the counter-factual conditional about Keats. The second and third lectures consider possibility in relation to dispositions, possible entities and inductive prediction. In them Professor Goodman introduces his key term "projection" which is further discussed and applied in the final lecture. As an empiricist he is anxious that there should not be more things dreamt of in his philosophy than there are in heaven and earth (p. 39). Possible things and events are not a species of things and events. Nor is talk of them non-significant. Such talk is philosophically intelligible if understood as an "extension" of statements about what is and is manifest. Thus dispositions are not occult entities but a way of

referring to what is regularly manifested in actual situations. Or "inflammable" projects the predicate "burns" since "being inflammable" is a way of predicting in what other observable situations burning will occur and not of referring to a mysterious, imperceptible cause of burning. Statements about "possible" entities and states of affairs, are then defined as statements about dispositions (pp. 52–54). To talk of a possible blue patch where now exists green is to say that in certain circumstances (c) blue might be manifest here instead of green. Or place (p) now green is "C-blueable." Thus "blue" is projected beyond its actual range at any time but not so as to appear to characterize a non-actual object. I hope I have not misrepresented Professor Goodman but, if not, I find it hard to see what "projection" adds to the ordinary and true statements that what is inflammable will burn in certain circumstances and what is green may become blue. If more is intended by the relation of projection I do not think this is made clear. The discussion seems altogether too compressed and the lectures might well have been expanded so as to elucidate and illustrate further this important point. The actual is not one of many possible worlds, says Professor Goodman, but rather all possible worlds lie within the actual world (p. 56). This may be agreed. There are no migrants to possible worlds. Nevertheless, possibility may still be an irreducible linguistic or thought category. To say that the blueness of a green patch is a possible state of affairs is not to refer to the present blueness of the sky or to "project" any actual quality to another time or place but only to say what, it seems to me, cannot be said in simpler terms, viz. that this place which is now green may become blue. I don't think Professor Goodman intends to deny this, though his comparison on p. 52 of the "entity" $p + t$ with the whole comprised of the body of one automobile and the chassis of another elsewhere seems a little suspicious. There is surely no need to "eliminate" possibility but only to dissolve philosophical puzzles about it. I have no space in which to comment on other topics interestingly discussed by Professor Goodman, especially those of law, hypotheses and induction. The book may be warmly recommended to all interested in these fundamental problems of knowledge, scientific theory and philosophy.

MARGARET MACDONALD.

The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, By GUSTAV BERGMANN. (Longmans Green and Co., 1954. Pp. 341. Price 42s.)

Professor Bergmann will be known in this country to the readers of *Mind* and *Analysis*. He writes with considerable acumen and great enthusiasm on a number of important topics which are now being debated in America; in particular on the nature of philosophical analysis, phenomenalism, mental acts, and the question of analyticity. The book is a collection of eighteen papers, most of them published during the last five years. The first six are said to give the author's present views in outline; they are followed by three earlier papers (1946–7) on the "realism phenomenalism issue." The next eight papers elaborate particular themes "struck in the first nine pieces." One of these, "The Problem of Relations in Classical Psychology" (1952) seems to me to provide an excellent historical introduction to some of the main questions discussed in the book. The last paper is a semi-popular lecture on Ideology and the views of the late Professor Karl Mannheim. Many of the papers are contributions to symposia, reviews of books, or comments on particular works, and cannot be followed without reference to their contexts. The author has done nothing to avoid repetition: the main themes (especially

"What Philosophy is") occur again and again, often with the same illustrations and dicta. In his Preface, Professor Bergmann says that writing a book would have obliged him to repeat a great deal of what everyone else has said: the present collection avoids this only by repeating again and again what the author has said. It should be added that the collection is well served by an admirable index and footnotes.

The author's tone is highly controversial and he contributes criticisms of a number of important writers, American and English, including Carnap (*Der logische Aufbau der Welt*, 1928); Hempel ("The Concept of Cognitive Significance," 1951); Quine ("Two Dogmas of Empiricism," 1951); Nelson Goodman (*The Structure of Appearance*, 1951); Russell (on particulars, from *Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, 1940); Ayer (Inaugural Lecture, 1947); and Black—still regarded as British—("The Identity of Indiscernibles," 1953).

Mr. Bergmann is much occupied with "the grand strategy of positivist analysis," and does his best to sort out the various authors he discusses into the different wings of the positivist movement. From his third paper, "Logical Positivism, Language, and Reconstruction of Metaphysics" (1953), I was able to draw up notes rather like those made by Julius Caesar on the disposition of Pompey's forces at Pharsalus—always remembering that the quarrels between the different commands are at least as important as the offensive against the non-positivists. I tentatively suggest the following:

F. Waismann
J. Wisdom (?)
J. Austin (?)
CASUISTS

G. Ryle
CONVENTIONALISTS

ANALYSTS OF USAGE
OR FUTILITARIANS
"Little Bloomsbury"

N. Goodman (?)
A. J. Ayer (?)
G. Bergmann
RECONSTRUCTIONISTS
("Aufbauers")

W. V. Quine
R. Carnap
FORMALISTS
NEO-PRAGMATISTS

IDEAL LINGUISTS

POSITIVISTS

The names of commanding officers are those indicated or strongly hinted at in the book. Mr. Bergmann makes the interesting suggestion that the main divisions date from 1932 or shortly afterwards. I forbear to comment on the scheme except to say that since the publication of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, his close connection with the two left wings is now clear to everybody (cf. p. 51).

Philosophy begins (on Mr. Bergmann's view) with highly paradoxical questions, and with such contentions as "that we never really see bodies"—"absurd" contentions which can hardly be accepted at their face value. The philosopher proceeds to construct a sketch of an ideal language of a purely formal type. This calculus is then interpreted into ordinary language; but in this interpretation the characteristically puzzling statements which a philosopher makes in his study do not occur except in quotation marks. The next stage is the discussion of this interpretation (again in ordinary language), which serves to show why it is that our interpretation excludes the paradoxes. This discussion is "the last and crowning phase," "the heart of the philosophical enterprise," "the Moorean discourse": and is successful in so far as it dissolves all philosophical puzzles "simultaneously." That is to say, the same ideal language is to be shown to serve for all puzzles. This may take a lifetime to demonstrate, but the point is that it is not sufficient to construct

different formal systems to deal with different problems. No problem is solved unless all are solved (pp. 115–6). That a certain calculus does the trick is a matter of *fact*. Not all philosophy is verbal. We do not solve problems by hypothesis, "posit," or choice or convention. But the calculus is only a sketch; it cannot be a complete set of blueprints; and there is no suggestion that we ought now to proceed to talk in the language which results from our interpretation. "Syntactical positivism proposes to clarify the language we speak but do not fully understand by one which we understand but cannot speak" (238). *Cannot* speak, if only because it can never be a complete language. Mr. Bergmann illustrates his view of philosophical analysis by reference to the problem of existence. "Do centaurs exist?" is a problem which Russell solved by the construction of the formal system of *Principia Mathematica*. We are able to interpret the signs $(\exists x)\ .\ Px\ .\ Qx$ as "There is something which both has the body of a horse and the head and shoulders of a man." This proposition is no doubt false: the description has no application and we see that we can answer the original question without making an *ontological* statement of existence. So the theory of descriptions solves one of the great "existence-questions." Nevertheless this construction is of philosophical importance only because it also solves (or can be amplified to solve) other problems, for instance, the existence of classes. Mr. Bergmann's "ideal language" is a phenomenalistic one. Its logical machinery consists of "the non-controversial parts of P.M."; its logically proper names stand for such things as sense-data and elementary feelings and its set of undefined predicates are appropriate to these particulars. Only these particulars have (ontological) existence: "chairs" and "tables" occur only as descriptive phrases defined in terms of sensory predicates. We can indeed say that "There are chairs" (or even that "chairs exist"); but this is not a philosophical statement. The principle that all defined predicates are defined in terms of characters that are immediately observable is known as the Principle of Acquaintance. Mr. Bergmann regards it as a fundamental part of the philosophical discourse about the ideal language (265). To this traditional phenomenalistic language, two important additions are made. (1) Provision is made for a direct description of "mental acts"; (2) an undefined value-predicate is introduced.

Mr. Bergmann is concerned to defend first his view as to what philosophy is—the "ideal language" thesis; and secondly his conclusions as to the particular nature of the ideal language.

Mr. Bergmann argues that philosophy is not any kind of scientific or grammatical study of language; nor is it simply formal semantics which has some philosophical interest but *is* not philosophy. "Philosophical questions require philosophical answers" (133). Mr. Bergmann dismisses the "grammatical" study of ordinary language ("Casuism") as a probing and pruning of the idiom, and a refusal to recognize the existence of philosophical *problems*. He agrees with Carnap that philosophy is essentially *formal* and proceeds by the setting up of a purely formal system. But he holds that this system is only a tool: it is not *itself* the answer to any problem—except a purely logical one. As far as I can understand Mr. Bergmann's criticisms of Carnap, they amount to the charge that he holds the following views:

(1) The philosopher aims to set up a *complete* formal calculus for ordinary propositions—complete for its own sake, or in order to comply with requirements of purely scientific systems. ("Cutting butter with a razor.")
(2) Carnap defines a notion of "L-true" which is supposed to be applicable to all analytic statements but in fact (*a*) it presupposes the meaning of

"analytic" and (*b*) it is used to cover statements which are not really analytic.

(3) Philosophical questions (e.g. Do numbers exist?) are to be answered solely by reference to the calculus—does it include numerals? (64). This makes them purely verbal questions.

(4) It is admitted by Carnap (1950) that there are questions external to the framework of his system—questions of its comprehensiveness and its usefulness in classifying traditional philosophical questions. But he still despises such questions.

Mr. Bergmann agrees with Quine ("Two Dogmas of Empiricism," 1951) in holding that we cannot in fact make detailed analyses of physical object statements into phenomenalistic language, but denies that this constitutes an objection to the linguistic thesis of phenomenalism. Some meanings are "holistic" and resist complete formalization: but the philosopher does not wish to produce a complete language. Mr. Bergmann is utterly opposed to Quine's view that it is up to us to "posit" the existence of certain kinds of entity. This (he says) is to attempt to answer in the ideal language one of the very questions it was designed to avoid (102). Bergmann also defends the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions (the first dogma attacked by Quine) by an argument which purports to show that unless we are in a position to make this distinction we cannot distinguish logical signs from descriptive signs.

So much for Mr. Bergmann's defence of his view of the nature of philosophical language-construction. In defending his view of the particular character of the ideal language, he has first to oppose physicalism—"this silliest of all philosophical theses." This is done in a paper on "Bodies, Minds, and Acts" (not previously published). "That Jones has a green sense-datum" is not a piece of philosophical moonshine but a commonsensical thing to say. And it may be said by Jones himself or by Smith. When Smith says it he does not *merely* mean that Jones's body is uttering certain words or behaving in a certain way. He *does* mean this but he also means that "There is something green" in the same sense as is implied by Smith's own remark "This is green." In Jones's case, Smith infers that there is something green with the help of a factual general proposition or law: but he does not make any such inference when he himself says "This is green." And Mr. Bergmann contends that physicalism is unable, by any kind of "definitional reconstruction" to make clear the difference between Smith's statement about Jones and Smith's statement about himself. The ideal language, therefore, cannot be a physicalist one.

Mr. Bergmann does not do much to justify his addition of undefined value-predicates. These turn out to be descriptive of peculiar affective tones always (somehow) conjoined with predicates describing observable properties or certain configurations of them (243 f.). His addition of a predicate of knowing (corresponding to a mental act) is defended again and again but the doctrine is very obscure. We are asked to introduce into the ideal language the vocabulary necessary to distinguish between "This is green" and "I know that this is green." But the second does not (in Mr. Bergmann's view) describe the relation of a known content to a knowing self: for Hume has shown that there *is* no knowing self. What is described, is a relation between a content and "a knowing" which makes the knowing a knowing *that this is green* and not that anything else is the case. Now we are asked whether "knowing" is to be introduced "directly" or not. This (it is said) is not a question about the

relation of the states of affairs *This is green* and *It is known that this is green*: rather it is a question of the role played in the ideal language by these two "texts" (220). If we introduce knowing "directly" we commit ourselves to a new syntactical category—that of dependent clauses: and a dependent clause is combined with its major clause ("It is known") in a nonextensional manner. Mr. Bergmann says: "there is no *a priori* reason why one should not thus enrich the syntax of the ideal language": and yet he goes on to say that to do so is to take the road to absurdity. Mr. Bergmann believes there is another way out: "to construe 'knowing' (in the ideal language) as a nonrelational predicate and the name of what is known as a particular" (151). Does this mean that "I know that this is green" is a conjunction: "This is green and is known"? In another place, and speaking metaphorically, the author says that unless we introduce "mental acts," the positivist's universe remains flat, with subject and object squeezed into one plane" (56). Can anything be flatter than a conjunction? Mr. Bergmann admits in his Preface that the doctrine "has bothered some of his friends." I would number myself amongst them.

KARL BRITTON.

The Social Self. By PAUL E. PFUETZE. (New York, Bookman Associates. 1954. Pp. 392. Price $4.50.)

Professor Pfuetze here compares and contrasts the theories of human personality developed by the late Professor G. H. Mead and by Dr. Martin Buber. These two thinkers differ widely in their general outlook and mode of approach, but both perform the feat of discarding a great deal of rubbish, pseudo-scientific rubbish on the one hand, and pseudo-philosophical on the other. They both emphasize as their central point that what makes a man fully human, a person, conscious of himself as such, is that he is a *socius*, not just an individual; in short the pure individual is a fabulous monster. Mead, whose outlook is naturalistic and empirical, discards the misleading physical analogies so popular in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this his pragmatist philosophy helps him, even if it hinders him in other ways. Dr. Buber, whose outlook is explicitly theistic in the Hebrew tradition, to whom we owe the vital distinction between *I–it* and *I–Thou* relations, can be called an Existentialist. He differs from most of them, however, in the sobriety and intelligibility of his language. Thus far their work can be summed up, in Professor Pfuetze's words, "Mead provides a scientific *floor* and Buber a metaphysical *ceiling* for man's abode."

There is a wide space between floor and ceiling, where we get little help from Mead or Buber or our present author. Granted that men only become human in their relations with their fellows, yet in those very same relations they frequently become in-human or sub-human and very occasionally super-human. Every one of us is a *socius*, yet there is no universal society; possibly there ought to be, but if so it will not be like any existing society. There exist and always have existed a hotch-potch of larger and smaller, interweaving and interfering, societies with conflicting claims producing conflicting loyalties. There is also the paradox rightly emphasized (even if a bit over-emphasized) by Dr. R. Niebuhr in his book *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, that men in their group relationships and specially in the larger, more powerful kinds of group operate collectively at a lower level than the very same men do individually in small-scale relationships. Buber has one suggestion which is some small help with this last problem, namely that the

larger group relationships belong more to the realm of *I–it* than to that of *I–Thou*. For the rest he has to be content with the apocalyptic hope of the Hebrew Prophets. Mead is worse off; he relies on the secularized nineteenth-century evolutionary version of the apocalyptic hope, the assumption that the future must be better than the past, that since societies get bigger, as they do almost automatically, they get better, quite automatically.

This is a useful book for anybody interested in the philosophical problems of human personality; lengthy and pedestrian in exposition, but always careful and never obscure. Professor Pfuetze supplies bibliographies of the two writers he discusses.

A. D. Ritchie.

Aristotle. Parva Naturalia. A revised text with introduction and commentary by Sir David Ross. (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1955. Pp. xi + 355. Price £2.)

The so-called *Parva Naturalia* of Aristotle is a collection of short treatises on the physical aspects of sensation and the sensible, memory and recollection, sleep, dreams, oneiromancy, longevity, youth and old age, life and death, and breathing. Although for a full appreciation of his scientific achievement a reading of his more detailed zoological works is essential, the balance of his mind between observation and theory is well illustrated here. Since Darwin said that Linnaeus and Cuvier were schoolboys to him, it must be so. Yet for all his wealth of acute observation he confused phosphorescence with the glimmering reflection from any polished object in the dark (*De sensu* 437b6), he was apparently unaware of any connection between tadpoles and frogs (Ross p. 324), and we know from elsewhere that he believed the caterpillar, not the egg, to be the earliest stage of a butterfly's existence. The wording of a sentence in *De respiratione* (478a34) is curious and perhaps significant. It may be rendered: "To discover the situation of the heart relative to the lung, one must rely for visual evidence on dissection, but for precision on the written treatises." (He refers to his own *Historia Animalium.*) A commentary on these works which aimed primarily at a fuller explanation and appreciation of Aristotle's methods and merits as a biologist—calling perhaps for collaboration —would still be welcome. He saw all life as ultimately dependent on the maintenance of heat in the central organ, i.e. the heart. Food acts as fuel for this heat, and the function of breathing is to supply sufficient cooling to prevent it from burning out too quickly. This theory and the location of the "common sensorium" in the heart may have been erroneous, but they indicate a scientific, and therefore fruitful, approach. Our sense of perspective is aided here by Sherrington, who wrote that Aristotle, by his description of mind, made to that theme perhaps the greatest contribution not only of antiquity but of our own era so far as the Renaissance. "His faulty 'localization' was soon corrected, and . . . his conception of a 'common sensorium' was fundamental and fertile during more than eighteen centuries."[1] Sherrington shows also that Aristotle had, in his time, good reasons for neglecting the claims of the brain in this connection. His account of prophetic dreams in *De Divinatione per Somnum* is sober and sceptical, denying their divine origin and suggesting natural causes, and it is hard to believe that the man who set aside so widespread, tenacious and respectable a belief accepted as fact the superstition that when a menstruous woman looks in a mirror its surface takes on a reddish tinge which

[1] *Man on his Nature* (1940), p. 239 (Pelican ed. 1955, 197.)

may be difficult to remove. (*De insomn.* 459b27ff.) In spite of Ross and Lulofs, Biehl was surely right to suspect the authenticity of this passage.

There existed in English no complete edition of the collection with introduction and commentary, though for *De sensu* and *De memoria* the work of G. R. T. Ross (1906) is still valuable, as are the texts of *De insomniis* and *De div. per somn.*, with English introduction, by the Dutch scholar Dr. Lulofs (1947). Sir David Ross has now provided, in the familar red binding of his *Metaphysics*, *Physics* and *Analytics*, a text of the whole with bibliography, full introduction, commentary and indexes. The notes are brief, and biological comment, for which the editor pronounces himself unqualified, is not their primary intention; but their brevity is offset by the very full summaries, amounting almost to translations, which precede each chapter.

In the introduction Ross deals with the question of the place of these treatises in the development of Aristotle's ideas on psychology and related studies. F. Nuyens[1] distinguished three stages. (1) In the early dialogues, Aristotle adopted the Platonic view that the human soul is alien to the body and immortal, only living its true and natural life after death or before birth. (2) In the biological works of his middle period he regards soul as essentially the same in all living things, located in a particular organ of the body, namely the heart ("or in bloodless animals the part analogous to it"). (3) Finally comes the doctrine of *De anima* that soul and body are not two substances, but two aspects of a unity, the living body, of which the body itself is the matter and soul the 'form' or entelechy, the principle of its structure or organization. As such, it can no longer be localized in any particular organ. Of the *Parva Nat.* Nuyens assigned *De juventute etc.* (including *De resp.*) to the second stage, the remainder except *De long. vit.* to the third, and described *De long. vit.* as already very near the third. Ross, in spite of certain resemblances in detail between *De sensu* and *De mem.* on the one hand and *De anima* on the other, considers that all the treatises of the *Parva Nat.* share the fundamental outlook of the biological period. (He argues against Lulofs' division of *De somno* and *De insomn.* into an earlier and a later part.) His reason, which seems decisive, is that all alike teach the two-substance view of body and soul and localize the latter in the heart. The only difficulty lies in the repeated references in the *Parva Nat.* to τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς. Ross would explain these as later additions, an explanation which he considers "less drastic" than the hypothesis that they refer to an earlier version of *De anima* written before Aristotle had adopted the theory of the soul as entelechy. Yet (1) the references are numerous and by no means all to be easily torn from their context,[2] (2) Ross says that *De juv.* 467b12 refers to *De an.* 2.414a19, but this seems impossible, for it runs: "Since I have written elsewhere on the soul, and it is clear that its essence is not corporeal, but that nevertheless it exists in *a particular part of* the body . . ." and goes on to argue that this part must be the heart. The "corresponding" sentence of *De an.* says only that the soul must exist "in the body," and it belongs to a passage proving the soul to be the body's entelechy—a theory with which, as Ross himself has shown, its location in a particular organ is inconsistent. The significance of the references in the *Parva Nat.* to "the work on the soul" needs further study.

In establishing the text the editor has behind him a lifetime of familiarity with his author. He does not lightly introduce conjectures of his own, and when he does it is either to secure an improvement in the sense or to make the Greek conform more closely to what he knows to be Aristotle's idiosyncrasies of style.

[1] *L'Evolution de la psychologie d'Aristote* (1948).

[2] Cf., e.g., the opening words of *De sensu* and 436b 8–10. Ross on p. 17 lists 12 of these references, but there are in fact 15. Add *De mem.* 449b30, *Somn.* 455a8, *Insomn.* 459a15.

These ends he sometimes attains by merely changing the traditional punctuation. The account of the manuscripts in the last section of the introduction is a little too condensed to be easily followed, and it is not clear in what sense a ms. of "*saec.*xiii–xiv" (L) can be the ancestor of one of "*saec.*xii–xiii" (X), and another of "*saec.*xiii–xiv" (W) the ancestor of one of "*saec.*xi" (U). (See pp. 67 and 61.) But perhaps in the second case "xi" is a misprint. Lulofs at least assigns U to the thirteenth century.

W. K. C. Guthrie.

The Illusion of the Epoch. Marxism-Leninism as a Philosophical Creed. By H. B. Acton. (Cohen and West, Ltd.; 1955. Pp. viii + 278. Price 18s.)

The concluding chapter of this work takes the form of a dialogue between "a reader" and "the author." The former's final request is for a summary in a phrase or two of the latter's criticisms of Marxism. The reply runs, "let me be briefer still and say that Marxism is a philosophical farrago" (271). Professor Acton's main criticism of Marxism (that is to say, of Marxism as developed by Lenin and Stalin) is that it is "a mixture of two philosophies which cannot consistently go along together, positivism on the one hand and Hegelianism on the other" (251). This seems to me to be perfectly true. It is doubtless sometimes the case, as the author observes, that Marxists, when using Hegelian terminology, "are not thinking Hegelian thoughts," but in the process of setting Hegelianism on its feet, as they have claimed to do, they transpose into a materialist setting a concept of the movement of history towards an inevitable goal which has no sense apart from an "idealist" philosophy. Again, logical words are used in a context where their applicability is questionable. When Engels says, for instance, that there are contradictions in nature he "has taken an argument from Hegel's *speculative* philosophy, and used it as if it could be comfortably housed in the Marxist *anti*-speculative philosophy" (98). To the unreflective mind Marxism may give the impression of being a massive, coherent system; but it comprises within itself incompatible elements. The Marxists may commend "dialectical thinking;" but they presumably do not wish to commend a self-contradictory system of philosophy. It is, therefore, up to them to show that the system does not contain incompatible elements rather than to take refuge in panegyrics of dialectical thinking.

The validity of this general line of criticism tends, I think, to be confirmed by the emergence in the history of Marxism of divergent lines of interpretation, right-wing and left-wing or idealist and mechanistic. That these divergent lines have been held in check has not been due to any fundamental coherence in the system, but rather to the connection between Marxism and an extra-philosophical factor. As the system has been treated as an essential weapon in the hands of a closely-knit social-political Party, it has been possible to lay down a philosophical orthodoxy and to maintain it by varying forms of coercion. I see no cogent reason for supposing that, were it not for its alliance with a highly-organized social-political movement, the latent tensions within the Marxist system would not have manifested themselves long ago in an unmistakable form.

Professor Acton devotes the first part of this book to dialectical materialism which he considers in two chapters, entitled respectively "Marxist Realism" and "Marxist Naturalism." The first chapter contains an interesting discussion of the relations between Marxism and phenomenalism. In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* Lenin argued that phenomenalism is inseparable from idealism, and that it therefore favours a religious outlook, whatever phenomenalists

may say. Professor Acton takes the "therefore" to indicate both factual and logical connection, and he challenges Lenin's statement in both senses. He argues that though phenomenalism appears to be committed to some sort of idealism it "consigns both God and material substances to a common and irrelevant grave" (23). Materialism, however, if it asserts the reality of material substances beyond sense-experience," excludes phenomenalism but only at the expense of making God appear a possibility" (*ibid.*) The author is obviously speaking of full-blown modern phenomenalism, and his interpretation of its nature and consequences may be correct. But he later admits that though the sort of phenomenalism which Lenin was criticizing appears to render meaningless the concept of a transcendent God, it "appears also to require there to be some Observer (not necessarily God, but perhaps merely a Sensitive Gas) to make sense of the conception of the world that existed before the coming of animal or human life" (35). However, Lenin did not, of course, confine himself to arguing that phenomenalism is indissolubly connected with "idealism"; he also maintained that it is not in fact true. And, in the author's opinion, he discerned certain essential weaknesses in this philosophy, though he did not examine them with sufficient patience and fullness. At the same time Lenin seems to have committed himself to the copy-theory of perception. And Professor Acton argues that "once Marxists accept the view that perception is by means of images, then there is nothing to distinguish their views from phenomenalism except the wish that it were not" (38). In other words, Engels and Lenin saw that a realist account of perception was required for establishing a materialist philosophy; and some of Lenin's criticisms of phenomenalism are to the point. Yet the account of perception which is actually given by Engels and Lenin can scarcely be reconciled with a realist materialism, opposed to phenomenalism.

In his chapter on Marxist naturalism the author considers, among other matters, the theory of the transformation of quantity into quality. He analyses with care the different meanings of this transformation which are implied by the examples selected by Hegel and discusses the use made of these ideas by the Marxists. One important point which he makes is that they wish to emphasize two things, the occurrence of qualitative leaps in nature and the possibility of a science of society which will allow the making of social predictions. "These two views, however, do not easily go together" (89). The Marxists can give plausibility to their theory only by leaving a notion such as "novelty" insufficiently clarified.

The second part of the book is entitled "Scientific Socialism" and comprises chapters on historical materialism and on Marxist ethics. After outlining the materialist conception of history Professor Acton submits it to detailed and trenchant criticism. To some intelligent people it has appeared to be obviously true. But "it has seemed obviously true because of the tautologies concealed in the language in which the theory is formulated" (167–8). To take an example. If in a fishing society which uses canoes someone were to invent a large sailing vessel, the use of the latter would necessarily involve a new division of labour, new jobs. If we care to speak of the new set-up as a new productive relationship, it is true to say that the invention of a new productive force must result in new productive relationships. But "the 'must' indicates a tautology, for new machines are not merely differently constructed machines but machines that have to be worked in new ways" (162). The term "productive relationship" can, however, be used, and is used by the Marxists, to cover relationships which are wider than those actually involved in operating a tool or machine but which are required, in some form or other, if the tool or machine is to be used at all. And it is the author's contention that no good reason is provided for

saying that once new productive forces have been set in motion a particular given form of productive relationships, in the wider sense of the term, must eventually result. What has happened is that Marxists have left the term "productive relationship" conveniently vague and that they have transferred the necessity of the relation between productive forces and productive relationships in the narrow sense to the relation between productive forces and productive relationships in the wider sense. The author does not intend to condemn tautologies. But we have to beware of transferring the certainty attaching to tautologies to propositions which are not tautologies; and this, in the author's opinion, is what has occurred in the case of the materialist conception of history. He also points out, of course, some of the obscurities, confusions and ambiguities to be found in the theory of historical epochs and in the Marxist account of the ideological superstructure.

In the chapter on Marxist ethics Professor Acton illustrates the element of relativism in Marxist ethical theory. Lenin, for instance, expressly declared that "we do not believe in an eternal morality, and we expose all the fables about morality." But though relativist arguments are employed to confound opponents of Marxism, the latter's supporters do not hesitate to speak of moral progress and of a "truly human" morality. Both Engels and Lenin spoke in this way. The Marxists may think that he is speaking in purely scientific terms, but he "can derive moral precepts from his social science only to the extent that they already form, because of the vocabulary used, a concealed and unacknowledged part of it" (190). The author further argues that the Marxists' account of the society of the future is "Utopian" in the very sense in which they criticized people such as Saint-Simon, Fourier and Owen for being Utopians. To be sure, the Marxists, who are good at having things both ways, refuse to make their picture more definite on the ground that precision of this sort is Utopian and romantic fantasy. "But if they are right in this last contention, then surely they are wrong in claiming that their view differs from Utopianism in being predictive in any important sense. Very vague predictions are of even less practical value than are detailed wishes" (249).

It will be seen from this account of Professor Acton's book that it is a sustained adverse criticism of Marxism. He does not, of course, deny that the Marxists say things which are true. But he would maintain, I think, that the truths which are to be found in the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Company have no necessary connection with dialectical materialism, with what belongs specifically to Marxism-Leninism as a philosophical creed. It is possible that the Marxist can provide a satisfactory answer to this or that detailed objection advanced by the author. But the general line of criticism seems to me to be unassailable. A Marxist would doubtless say that the author has failed to understand Marxism. He might even claim that a man can really understand Marxism only if he commits himself to it. But this would be a strange position to adopt. It is true to say that a man cannot really understand aesthetic experience or religious experience unless he has enjoyed it, if by "really understand" we mean having the experience in question. For it is tautological to say that we cannot have an experience without having it. But Marxism is a philosophy; indeed, according to the Marxists, it is the one and only scientific philosophy. And before we can decide about its truth and commit ourselves to it if we decide that it is true, we must first understand what it is. And in this clear and careful analysis of Marxism Professor Acton reveals the presence of heterogeneous and incompatible elements and thus successfully discredits the claim of this philosophy to be the final scientific truth about the world and human society.

There is, I think, no likelihood of Marxism being accepted by philosophers

in general unless circumstances arose in which it could be imposed by force, circumstances, that is to say, in which nonconformist philosophers were silenced. But in view of the truisms which it exploits and because of certain other factors dialectical materialism is capable of winning for itself among those who are not trained to philosophical analysis a disproportionate respect. Hence, even if British and American philosophers do not, in the vast majority of cases, stand in need of any conversion in this respect, Professor Acton's work can be of very great use in helping to expose an illusion. He does this very largely by what may perhaps be called linguistic analysis, but not, be it added, by committing himself to a particular philosophical system and then criticizing Marxism in so far as it runs counter to that system or point of view. This freedom from party-spirit adds, I think, to the value of the book, even though Marxists may find in it additional ground for indignation or scorn.

FREDERICK C. COPLESTON, S.J.

Science versus Idealism: in Defence of Philosophy against Positivism and Pragmatism. By MAURICE CORNFORTH. (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd. 1955. Pp. 463. Price 27s. 6d.)

This book will undoubtedly become the standard textbook in English for the criticism of Western philosophy from the standpoint of dialectical materialism; but it is only briefly noted here, because it combines (and replaces) two earlier books, *Science versus Idealism* (1946) and *In Defence of Philosophy* (1950) each of which has already been fully reviewed in PHILOSOPHY (vol. xxiii, p. 280, and vol. xxvii, p. 178). The union is a happy one, resulting in a well-integrated historical and critical study of the "modern analytic movement." I have found little to justify the claim of "very extensive changes" in the author's earlier work. The original chapter on "The Philosophy of Wittgenstein" (an acute and penetrating analysis of the *Tractatus*) has been altered only by the addition of a short section on the *Investigations* (which is rather complacently dismissed as a "remarkable example of the complete disintegration of a philosophy"). Of the criticisms to which Cornforth acknowledges his indebtedness, it is significant that almost all are by Marxist writers. It is a pity that he has merely ignored the criticism of reviewers (in PHILOSOPHY, *Mind*, etc.) whose philosophy he dislikes.

BERNARD MAYO.

Science and Religion: A Changing Relationship. The Rede Lecture for 1954 by C. A. COULSON. (Cambridge University Press. Pp. 36. Price 2s. 6d.)

In this lecture Professor Coulson provides many new and lively impressions of the changing relations of science and religion, but it would have been helpful if he had not left it so much to the reader to read between the lines of some of his observations. The main theme of the lecture is however plain. It is that if we are to understand the relations of science and religion aright, we must have regard to the processes of science as a whole, including the total experience of the scientist. There can thus be no sharp division into secular and religious phenomena, and we must not look for God in the gaps of our scientific knowledge. The failures of science are a challenge to better science, and "if we ask a question about nature in purely scientific terms we shall only be right to expect scientific answers." On the other hand science is not to be detached from the experience of persons, for the laws of nature "are them-

selves human constructs," even "though nature existed before ever man was." Man and nature are "intermingled." One consequence of this is that we must guard against the increasingly abstract character of science and the lack of immediacy in contacts with nature, there being cases where we actually "screen ourselves off from what is happening by thick layers of concrete." If the sense of reverence and "haunting presence" is to be restored, we must make experiences, rather than patterns constructed out of them, primary. But if we are able to encounter God in this way we may then find in science a way of enlarging "our concept of God's activity in the world," and by viewing nature thus in the light of "a fully incarnational religion" we shall find further extensions of our total religious experience. Our confidence in reason will be deepened, and we shall regard the vastness of nature and man's relative insignificance within it, notwithstanding that it is also his own construction, as an indication of the "otherness" of nature by which "the order of Nature has a value, independent of man," as "something in which God could rejoice for its own sake." We shall likewise find the tensions of spiritual experience reflected in the contrasts of nature, tragic and joyous, beautiful and red in tooth and claw, "the X-ray tearing the electrons out of an atom as it reveals its structure and symmetry." We thus arrive at a "sacramental view (of nature) in which we see heaven mingling with earth." Only this incarnational "involvement of God within his own handiwork can do justice to its relation to ourselves."

This thesis, especially when summed up in the reference to an "assumption of a spiritual wholeness about life" and "the inter-relatedness of all things within the role of a person," has obvious affinities with idealistic philosophy, and it would have been helpful if Coulson, since he claims to be describing recent changes of attitude, could have indicated explicitly how he stands in relation to thinkers like Bosanquet and other idealists who spoke, in the same vein, of a sacramental universe and of every bush being "afire with God." Would Coulson wish to amend the substance of their teaching? If not, how does he meet the usual objections to their views? I believe he does wish to say something different from the idealists, but it is here that his view is most elusive and, for that reason, difficult to criticize. The insistence on the primacy of experiences seems to me very sound, but can the force of this for religious thought be appraised without greater stress on the distinctiveness of certain sorts of experiences? How otherwise can we avoid reducing religious insight to a mere sense of the general inter-relatedness of things? Idealism has always tended to blur essential distinctions; what course will Coulson shape to avoid that and retain the distinctiveness of particular occurrences and experiences which we have been taught recently especially to associate with "a fully incarnational religion"? These are some of the questions prompted by this stimulating lecture, and it is much to be hoped that Professor Coulson himself will find an early opportunity to throw further light upon them.

H. D. Lewis.

Experimental Psychology: A series of Broadcast Talks. Edited by B. A Farrell. (Basil Blackwell, 1955. Pp. xi + 66. Price 7s. 6d.)

It is still not uncommon to meet well educated persons who are genuinely puzzled by allusions to psychological experiments and psychological laboratories. "I can't imagine," they exclaim, "how you can make experiments in psychology." Often their bewilderment springs from an acquaintance with psychology derived from non-experimental fields, e.g. philosophical treatises,

or psychoanalytic writings. To those so puzzled this little book can suitably be presented. It illustrates briefly and clearly some of the ways in which psychologists study their subject by experimental methods. The substance of the work consists of the scripts of a series of Broadcast talks on recent research. A. J. Watson (Lecturer in Psychology at Cambridge) discusses Perception. Harry Kay (Lecturer in Experimental Psychology at Oxford) selects certain aspects of Adult Learning and Remembering. J. A. Deutsch (Lecturer in General Psychology at Oxford) considers what sort of machine an organism must be in order to account for the facts of "motivation." B. A. Farrell (Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy at Oxford), who also edits the volume, examines the bearings of some recent empirical studies on "Some Hypotheses of Psycho-analysis." Michael Argyle (Lecturer in Social Psychology at Oxford) reviews some experimental and other empirical studies of Social Behaviour. R. C. Oldfield (Professor of Psychology at Reading) concludes by a discussion of "The Prospects of Experimental Psychology."

The contributions are at a uniformly high level, but being brief "talks" are inevitably selective, rather scrappy, and topical. Too much was perhaps attempted in the way of indicating the relevance of the selected studies to large theoretical issues. It might have been better if in each field a single experiment had been selected and the bearing of its results on one crucial issue considered in more details. Better still would have been to have taken the opportunity of publication to expand the volume into a work of more permanent value. However, as it stands it serves its restricted purpose well and gives members of the Third Programme public who missed the broadcasts a very good idea of the sort of things that experimental psychologists are interested in today. For philosophers its interest derives from the preoccupation of psychologists with questions of methodology rather than of content.

C. A. MACE.

Language in Culture: Conference on the inter-relations of Language and other aspects of Culture. Edited by Harry Hoijer. (University of Chicago Press. 1954.)

From the philosopher's point of view this is an interesting but unsatisfactory book. It is the record—papers and discussions—of a conference of linguists, anthropologists, and philosophers, the primary aim of which was to examine certain of the views of Benjamin Whorf. Whorf, an extremely lively and persuasive writer, had become pre-occupied, chiefly as a result of researches among the Hopi Indians, with the idea that any language in some sense embodies and imposes upon its speakers a "metaphysic," a "thought-world," a special picture of the universe, even (as he sometimes said) a special "logic"; and that some languages, Hopi for instance, differ very widely in this respect from what he called Standard Average European. Whorf's claims for the importance of this idea were pitched very high, and his own applications of it, if speculative, were undeniably interesting. His writings raised even the problem whether *any* experience could be regarded by him as unconditioned linguistically, as capable of being strictly common to all human beings. In Kantian terms, he appeared to emphasize Form to the almost total exclusion of Matter, and to regard Form as specifiable only with reference to one particular language at a time. His idea has thus been charged with involving an extreme, almost hopeless, "linguistic relativism." Two questions, however, arise with some urgency: what exactly was this idea that he thought so important? and, how far was he right?

The papers in the present volume vary widely in their relevance to these questions, and also seem—to the inexpert eye—to vary greatly in merit. There is throughout a disconcerting tendency to pass rapidly from dicta of enormous generality to minute observations on the quirks of particular languages; and a good deal of space is devoted, possibly usefully, to very general adumbration of programmes of research, of "projects" and methodology. Where the so-called "Whorfian hypothesis" is squarely approached the attitude is for the most part sceptical. The first paper in particular, by Joseph Greenberg, discusses most admirably the dangers involved in making quick inferences from language to life. For example: Whorf had drawn the conclusion that the Hopi's conception of time was peculiar, that their way of counting days embodied the idea, not of items succeeding each other, but of the same one item regularly re-appearing; Greenberg points out that in this respect French differs from English very much as Hopi does, that Whorf's reasoning would lead for instance to the conclusion that successive kings of the same name are regarded by French speakers, though not by English, as re-incarnations of a single man. The good point is also made that metaphysics, at least as that word has been commonly understood, tends to derive, in so far as it derives from language at all, not directly from language, but from doctrines or prejudices, philosophical or grammatical, *about* language. Surprisingly, it is not emphasized that speakers of a common language do not all always agree, as Whorf *prima facie* implies that they should, on metaphysical doctrines. However, it becomes in the end sufficiently clear that, if languages do indeed incorporate their own metaphysics, it can only be in some queer sense of "metaphysics" that this is true.

It is persuasively argued elsewhere that "the most precisely definable differences between languages are also the most trivial from the Whorfian point of view." Very clear linguistic differences can often be explained in terms of humdrum divergences of background, history, or predominant interest, with no occasion for introducing any metaphysics at all. It is not difficult to understand why Arabs should be verbally ill-equipped to gossip about the weather, or Eskimos amply provided with words for different kinds of snow. Unfortunately, in proportion as the conclusions seem to be of greater significance, the basis for them becomes more precarious and ill-defined.

But this volume's curious blend of scepticism and grandiloquence does not destroy, nor surely should it destroy, the feeling that Whorf was concerned, however confusedly, with questions of serious interest and importance. There is perhaps detectible in these pages a certain atmosphere of conservative comment upon a risky radical, and this to my mind does Whorf no discredit.

It is a pity that no more serious attempt is here made to determine exactly what sort of difference a difference of "thought-world" would be, and what sort of dissimilarity between languages might be regarded as connected, and in what way, with differences of that sort; for until some such attempt is made Whorf's questions though engaging are too vague for profitable discussion. Disappointingly little is here done towards either clarifying or answering them. But there is certainly scope for all the projects and programmes here suggested, and philosophers would do well to keep an eye on any results that may be forthcoming. It is in any case stimulating to read a discussion of language well supported by ample and exotic empirical data. Incidentally, why should not enquiries of this sort be undertaken not only into Hopi, or Yokuts, or Zuni, or Shawnee, but into Latin and Greek? The lack of live native speakers would be a serious obstacle, but on the other hand the literatures available are vastly more extensive.

G. J. Warnock.

Leibniz in France from Arnauld to Voltaire. A study in French reactions to Leibnizianism, 1670–1760. By W. H. Barber. (Oxford, At The Clarendon Press 1955. Pp. xi, 276. Price 42s.)

Up to 1760 the only writings of Leibniz accessible to the general French public were his contributions to periodicals in the French language, his correspondence with Clarke, and the *Theodicy*. There were German and Latin translations of the *Monadology* in 1720 and 1721, and his contributions to the *Acta Eruditorum* in Latin, rather less accessible. There is little evidence that his writings were studied with any care in France. For twenty years after his death they were more or less neglected. The success in France of Pope's *Essay on Man*, and the growing reputation of Wolff in Germany, brought a new interest in Leibniz round about 1735, strengthened by the popularity of Madame du Châtelet's *Institutions de Physique*, 1740, in which Leibnizian doctrines (derived mainly from Wolff's *Ontologia*) were expounded. Wolff was also being expounded, and defended against attacks, by a small number of French Protestants living abroad, but writing in French. The interest in Leibniz however was only temporary, and there was no enthusiasm for the doctrines themselves. Newtonian science was increasing in prestige, and metaphysical speculation was considered a waste of time. The monads were regarded as useless for an understanding of the nature of matter and of the phenomena of physics, pre-established harmony was denounced as depriving man of freedom, optimism held to be dangerous to Christianity. The only criticism of Leibniz's ideas of any philosophical depth was contained in Condillac's *Traité des Systèmes* (1749).

Mr. Barber expounds all this very clearly in Part II of his book, and in Part III shows how it affected Voltaire, making a careful study of Voltaire's changing views on freedom and on optimism, the last stage of which is represented by *Candide*. In Part I he gives a brief résumé of Leibniz's correspondence with Arnauld, Malebranche and Bossuet and of his main writings in the French learned periodicals. He keeps a sharp eye on the reviews and discussions in these periodicals—especially the *Journal des Savants* and the *Mémoires de Trévoux*, as an indication of French interest during his period, and his survey of the literature from 1720 to 1760 is wide, admirably arranged and written with great clarity. Mr. Barber does not give us a general picture of the main currents of French thought during his period, but his study is a valuable contribution to this, and it is as such that he presents it.

He makes too much of Leibniz's principle (in the *Discourse on Metaphysics*) that in a true proposition the predicate is somehow contained in the subject, regarding it as the only thing which could make his various views intelligible, and yet as carefully kept out of sight by Leibniz after 1686, on account of the severe handling it got from Arnauld. Indeed he goes so far as to say (17) that Leibniz "voluntarily abandons the possibility of becoming in his lifetime an influential philosopher, in order not to detract from his own value as a negotiator in causes as near his heart as the reunion of the Churches." There is no evidence whatever for this. Mr. Barber even sees the fatal "secret reasons" in what Leibniz writes to Malebranche in 1676. The atmosphere of Mr. Barber's paragraph about this (18–19) is all wrong. So is that of the first half of p. 38, where he is discussing Leibniz's account of extension. It is a mistake to say as Mr. Barber does (14–15) that the notion of an individual substance "logically entails" the notions of everything that can truthfully be predicated of it.

On p. 41 *predicatio* should be *predicatum*.

L. J. Russell.

The Impasse in Ethics and a Way Out. (Howison Lecture, 1954. University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 28. No. 2. pp. 93–112.) By Brand Blanshard. (University of California Press, 1955. Price 25 cents.)

In this delightfully written lecture Professor Blanchard surveys the field of contemporary moral philosophy in Great Britain and the U.S.A. He sees it divided between *deontologists*, who argue that what is right is not necessarily based on what is good, *naturalists*, who endeavour to reduce ethical judgments to judgments about psychological or sociological facts, and *emotivists*, who deny that ethical utterances are judgments at all and claim that they are expressions of feelings or of attitudes. He rejects the deontological view on the ground that reasons can be given for preferring a right to a wrong action, and that these reasons refer ultimately to the goodness of the sort of community within which the right action would be typical. It is not quite clear whether he rejects the naturalistic view, since he holds that "to fulfill and satisfy what nature prompts" is what goodness means. But he certainly rejects the emotivist view on the ground that it implies that we always talk nonsense when we say that something *was* good or bad or *will be* good or bad. He also argues that pro-attitudes or anti-attitudes would be arbitrary if there were no objective appropriateness of pro-attitudes towards some types of action and of anti-attitudes towards others. His own view is that ethical value is necessarily connected with satisfaction and fulfilment, that men (and other living creatures) are therefore naturally good, and that the rightness of an action derives from "its place in the form of the good life." This is not only an excellent introduction to contemporary moral theory but is also a lucid and elegant contribution in its own right, though the discussion of emotivism suffers from a failure to make enough of the distinction between a feeling and an attitude.

H. B. Acton.

The Emotive Theory of Ethics. By Avrum Stroll. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 1–92. University of California Press, 1954. Price $1·25c.)

This little book should be read by anyone who wishes to understand and assess the importance of the emotive theory of ethics. What Mr. Stroll sets out to do is first to state the theory as carefully as possible, bringing into the open as many hidden or unspoken assumptions as possible, and then to consider the strength of the arguments by which it has been supported. He concludes that it is not one theory but two, and that nothing has been said by its supporters that makes it necessary to accept either of them. The first theory is that all ethical terms are *purely* emotive, and Mr. Stroll's objection is that there are no ethical terms that do not arouse beliefs in their interpreters. He argues, too, that since ethical terms, if they express emotion at all, often, if not always, do so *voluntarily*, they contain elements of belief and communication. In developing this argument Mr. Stroll examines in some detail the differences between exclamations and statements and between different sorts of exclamation. He considers, for example, that such an exclamation as "Ouch!" is not purely expressive since it is a conventional sign of pain. The second theory is that ethical terms, even if they are not *purely* emotive, must necessarily contain an emotive element. Mr. Stroll's objection to this cannot be expounded in a few words, but roughly amounts to saying that those who hold this form of the theory do not succeed in distinguishing their view from ethical naturalism and

that naturalism requires ethical utterances to be capable of truth and falsity. These are only the bare bones of an argument that is distinguished by careful elaboration of detail and an unusual philosophical detachment. It is Mr. Stroll's view that there is nothing new in the second, less radical form of emotivism but that the first, pure form of it is new though false. His bibliography has no mention of two early versions of this theory which, as far as I know, compete for the distinction of being first. They are: C. D. Broad's "Is 'Goodness' the name of a Simple Non-natural Quality?" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1933–4), in which the view is stated and attributed to A. E. Duncan-Jones; and W. H. F. Barnes's "A suggestion about Value," in *Analysis* for March 1934, which was part of a paper read at the Jowett Society in Oxford on November 8, 1933.

H. B. Acton.

Royce: On the Human Self. By James Harry Cotton. (Harvard University Press; O.U.P., London, 1954. Pp. 347. Price $5.00.)

This book deals with the main philosophical doctrines of Josiah Royce, who was generally regarded as the leading American representative of the neo-Hegelian movement of the late nineteenth century. Professor Cotton shows clearly, however, the extent to which Royce's Hegelianism, or neo-Kantianism, was modified by the popular pragmatism of his day. Royce's views are put before us by means of selected extracts from his writings, interspersed with the author's own comments and criticism; and the central thread which connects these extracts is, as the title implies, what Royce had to say on the "human self."

Naturally, most of the fine-spun arguments on this topic have, for us, an archaic ring; and Royce's idealist metaphysic, like that of Bradley from whom he differed sharply on many points, makes somewhat tedious reading for the modern student. But we have to remember that Royce wrote in an age when impressive but confused concepts were still the current coin of philosophical discussion; and that the logical analysis of such concepts was not to be undertaken for many years to come. Fortunately, this conspectus of Royce's philosophical endeavour covers, though all too briefly, some of his contributions in the field of logic, as well as an interchange of views between himself, Peirce and James. The two chapters devoted to these topics form the most interesting part of the book, for Royce's work on symbolic logic was in the tradition of Boole, Peano and Frege and closely allied to that of Peirce. It may seem therefore all the more curious that a logician of Royce's calibre, who had no time for the logic of Bradley and Bosanquet, should have committed himself to all the linguistic confusions involved in that familiar Hegelian talk about the Absolute. However, Royce is certainly one of the venerated names in American philosophy and Professor Cotton has provided, as the dust-cover puts it, "the first full-length study of Royce's philosophy in English." He is to be congratulated on having performed his task so judiciously.

J. Hartland-Swann.

Books also received.

Charles Schoenfeld. *God and Country.* Philosophical Library, New York. 1955. Pp. (vi) & 119. $3.00.

Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1954. Government Printing Office, Washington. 1955. Pp. (ix) & 455.

BEN KIMPEL. *Moral Principles in the Bible*. Philosophical Library, New York. Pp. 171. $4.50.

Aristotelis De Anima. Recognovit brevique adnotatione instruxit W. D. Ross. Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. (ix) & 110.

Tr. JOHN WARRINGTON, Introduction by Sir David Ross. *Aristotle's Metaphysics*. J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd. Everyman Library. 1956. Pp. (xxvii) & 388. 7s.

JOHN COHEN and MARK HANSEL. *Risk and Gambling*. Longmans, Green & Co. 1956. Pp. (viii) & 153. 14s.

VARIOUS AUTHORS. Intro. by Gilbert Ryle. *The Revolution in Philosophy*. Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1956. Pp. (v) & 125. 10s. 6d.

Trans. and Intro. by A. E. TAYLOR. *Plato: Philebus and Epinomis*. Ed. by Raymond Klibansky. Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd. 1956. Pp. (vi) & 271. 21s.

HERBERT MARCUSE. *Eros and Civilization*. Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1956. Pp. (xii) & 276. 25s.

Dr. M. AHMED. *The Theory of Judgment in the Philosophies of F. H. Bradley and John Cook Wilson*. The University of Dacca Press. 1955. Pp. 295. Rs. 10.

APOSTOLOS MAKRAKIS. *The Foundation of Philosophy*. Tr. by D. Cummings. The Orthodox Christian Educational Society, Illinois. 1955. Pp. (x) & 193. No price given.

FRANCIS M. MYERS. *The Warfare of Democratic Ideals*. The Antioch Press, Ohio. 1956. Pp. 261. $3.50.

LIU WU-CHI. *Confucius: His Life and Time*. Philosophical Library, New York. Pp. (xv) & 189. $3.75.

A. B. PURANI. *Sri Audobindo's Savitri: An Approach and a Study*. Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry. 1956. Pp. (viii) & 393. Rs. 10.

S. K. MAITRA. *The Meeting of the East and the West in Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy*. Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry. 1956. Pp. 451 & (xxxi). No price given.

CONSTANCE ROWE. *Voltaire and the State*. Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. (xi) & 254. 32s.

Ed. and introduction by H. G. ALEXANDER. *The Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence*. Manchester University Press. 1956. Pp. (lvi) & 200. 16s.

OSCAR W. MILLER. *The Kantian Thing-in-Itself or The Creative Mind*. Philosophical Library, New York. 1956. Pp. (xix) & 142. $3.75.

JAMES WILKINSON MILLER. *Exercises in Introductory Symbolic Logic*. Edward Bros. Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan. 1956. (Lithoprint.) Pp. (ix) & 59. $1.50.

THOMAS E. HILL. *Ethics in Theory and Practice*. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 1956. Pp. (xiii) & 431. $4.50.

A. DA SILVA MELLO. Tr. by M. B. FIERZ. *Man: His Life, His Education, His Happiness*. Philosophical Library, New York. 1956. Pp. 729. $6.00.

FREDERICK COPLESTON, S.J. *Contemporary Philosophy*. Burns & Oates. 1956. Pp. (ix) & 230. 18s.

E. L. MASCALL. *Christian Theology and Natural Science*. The Bampton Lectures, 1956. Longmans, Green & Co. 1956. Pp. (xvii) & 328. 25s.

JOHN HOSPERS. *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis*. Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1956. Pp. (xii) & 532. 25s.

BERNARD WUELLNER, S.J. *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*. The Bruce Publishing Company, Wisconsin. 1956. Pp. (xvi) & 138. $4.25.

KENNETH E. BOCK. *The Acceptance of Histories Toward a Perspective for Social Science*. University of California Press. 1956. Pp. 132. $1.75.

Ed. G. E. W. Wolstenholme and Elaine C. P. Millar. *Extrasensory Perception.* A Ciba Foundation Symposium. J. & A. Churchill Ltd. 1956. Pp. (viii) & 240. 27s. 6d.

O. Brière, S.J. *Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy, 1898–1950.* Tr. by Laurence G. Thompson. George Allen & Unwin. 1956. Pp. 159. 21s.

Ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop. *The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne.* Volume 8. Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd. 1956. Pp. (viii) & 312. 30s.

Ed. Peter Laslett. *Philosophy, Politics and Society.* Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 1956. Pp. (xv) & 184. 18s.

Tr. N. J. Dawood. *The Koran.* Penguin Classics. 1956. Pp. 428. 5s.

Harry A. Wolfson. *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers.* Vol. I. Harvard University Press. 1956. Oxford University Press. Pp. (xxviii) & 635. 80s.

David A. Stewart. *Preface to Empathy.* Philosophical Library, New York. 1956. Pp. 157. $3.75.

Upton C. Ewing. *Thresholds of Existence.* Philosophical Library, New York. 1956. Pp. (x) & 286. $3.75.

Paul Oskar Kristeller. *The Classics and Renaissance Thought.* Martin Classical Lectures, Vol. XV. Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. 106. No price given.

Herbert L. Searles. *Logic and Scientific Methods.* An Introductory Course. Second Edition. The Ronald Press Company, New York. 1956. Pp. (viii) & 378. $4.25.

Erick Frank. *Wissen, Wollen, Glauben.* Ed. Ludwig Edelstein. (German and English.) Artemis-Verlag. Zürich. 1955. Pp. 508.

Ernst Hoffman. *Pädagogischer Humanismus.* Artemis-Verlag, Zürich. 1955. Pp. 364.

H. Kayser. *Akroasis.* Benno Schwabe & Co., Basle.

Karlo Oedingen. *Die Spekulative und die Geoffenbarte Wahrheit.* Balduin Pick Verlag, Koln. P. 103.

Waldo Ross. *El Mundo Metafisico de Andres Avelino.* Sociedad Dominicana de Filosofia. 1956. Pp. 23. No price given.

Domenico Antonio Cardone. *Il Divenire e L'Uomo.* Vol. I. Ricerche Filosofiche, Palmi. 1956. Pp. 211.

Rodolfo Mondolfo. *L'Infinito Nel Pensiero Dell'Antichita Classica.* La Nuova Italia, Firenze. 1956. Pp. (x) & 635.

André Lamouche. *La Théorie Harmonique.* Tome II. *Biologie.* Gauthier-Villars, Paris. 1956. Pp. 575. 1,400 fr.

Jean Hyppolite. *Études sur Marx et Hegel.* Librarie Marcel Rivière et Cie, Paris. 1955. Pp. 204. 600 frs.

Albert Cartier. *Existence et Vérité.* Presses Universitaires de France. 1955. Pp. 258.

Paul Ginestier. *La Pensée Anglo-Saxonne depuis* 1900. Presses Universitaires de France. 1956. Pp. 134.

Joseph de Tonquédec, S.J. *Merveilleux Metapsychique et Miracle Chrétien.* Centre D'Etudes Laennec. Pp. 133. No price given.

Dr. Mubahat Türker. *Üç Tehâfut Bakimindan Felsefe Ve Din Münasebeti.* Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, Ankara. 1956. Pp. 417.

INSTITUTE NOTES

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The Society for Psychical Research Prize Essay

The excellent response to last year's essay competition has encouraged the donor to repeat his offer, and a prize of fifty pounds (or $140) will be awarded for an essay of less than 3,000 words on one of the following topics:

(*a*) The best programme of research for the first one hundred hours of work with the next successful card-guessing subject discovered (if there is one): the design should be supported by argument.
(*b*) The best discussion of the logical and/or scientific implications of precognition assuming this to be established statistically from the work of card-guessing subjects.

Entries should be submitted under a pseudonym together with a sealed envelope containing the entrant's actual name and address. They should be carefully written or typewritten, double spaced, and should reach the Secretary, Society for Psychical Research, 31 Tavistock Square, London, W.C.1, before October 1, 1956. Entrants may submit more than one entry. The judges will be Dr. D. J. West, Professor H. H. Price and Mr. Denys Parsons, with assistance from Dr. S. G. Soal.

The Cornell University Press propose to publish a series of short books under the general title of "Contemporary Philosophy." The editor of the series will be Professor Max Black (Cornell), with the assistance of an editorial board composed of Professors Charles A. Baylis (Duke), William Frankena (Michigan), and Morton G. White (Harvard).

The privately endowed David F. Swenson-Kierkegaard Memorial Fund has made available since 1949 annual Fellowships for the study of the writings of Soren A. Kierkegaard.

Another Fellowship is being made available for the year 1956–57. The stipend for this next year will be $1,000. Persons of any creed, nationality or colour are eligible. Each recipient is free to choose his own place of study. In view of the character of the subject-matter, a religious interest and a reading knowledge of Danish are requisite. Anyone seeking application blanks or information is urged to write the Secretary of the Swenson-Kierkegaard Memorial Committee, Dr. Paul L. Holmer, Department of Philosophy, 106 Westbrook Hall, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 14, Minnesota.

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INCREASE IN SUBSCRIPTION PRICE OF JOURNAL

As a result of the settlement of the strikes and disputes in the printing industry early this year, printing costs have been raised by a total of 20 per cent. It will be necessary, therefore, for the subscription price of PHILOSOPHY to be raised to 6s. a number (25s. 3d. a year, post free) as from the January issue, 1957. The Editor very much regrets this increase which, however, is unavoidable.

The subscription for membership of The Royal Institute of Philosophy remains unaltered at 30s. a year.

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